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ABSTRACT
What follows is a discussion of Jean-Paul Sartre’s writings and political 
activities on the Algerian revolution between 1954 and 1962. In this 
study, it is stressed that Sartre’s political writings are in favour of the 
struggle of the Algerian people not only because of his general 
philosophy of life but also because of his idea of freedom for which he 
had fought since the Second World War. Thus, I discuss, first, how 
the organized revolution started in November 1, 1954, against the 
French colonialists and how the French government reacted by 
transferring power to the military forces in Algeria. Torture and 
indiscriminate killing were the main policy of the French Army in 
Algeria. In the course of my examination, I concentrate only on the 
most important events of the Algerian War. Secondly, I attempt to 
analyze the development of Sartre’s philosophical and political writings 
to show how he became involved in the Algerian revolution to the 
danger of his life in the early 1960s.
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INTRODUCTION
The Algerian War has been the subject of many critical discussions. 
However, four months after the Geneva agreements had ended French 
colonialism in Indo-China, the Algerian revolution began on November 1, 
1954. This insurrection was to last for seven and a half years, bringing 
for France the fall of the democratically elected Fourth  ^Republic at the 
hands of an insubordinate military and provoking the greatest crisis in the 
French government; and for the Algerians, it was the last and most 
serious challenge to confront French military power and Nato forces, a 
struggle which cost the people of Algeria one and a half million martyrs 
in order to achieve their independence and freedom. Indeed, torturing, 
shooting people indiscriminately, and burning villages and forests became 
the norm to the French Army in Algeria. This French savagery and 
barbarism made the writers of high intellectual standing who were actively 
involved in the debate over decolonization after the Second World War 
concern themselves in the Algerian revolution. Among those intellectuals 
was Jean-Paul Sartre who was committed politically to the struggle of the 
Algerians. Thus, in the following thesis, I intend to make a contribution 
towards clarifying Sartre’s position on the Algerian revolution. More 
specifically, I shall attempt to show that Sartre’s writings and political 
activities are in favour of the Algerians.
My purpose is to concentrate on French colonialism in Algeria and 
on how the FLN (National Liberation Front) reacted to the French 
government in November 1954, by organizing new military forces against 
the oppression. In the course of my analysis, I will gradually attempt to 
offer some explanations and justifications on both sides, and I will 
suggest briefly some alternative interpretations. The thesis is divided into
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four chapters. Chapter One introduces Sartre’s philosophical and political 
thought before and after the Second World War. The following three 
chapters show how France waged her war in Algeria and discuss the 
development of Sartre’s writings and political activities on the Algerian 
revolution.
Chapter One presents Sartre’s philosophical and political freedom 
as a starting point of the development of his writings, and discusses how 
he has been influenced by the Left-wing, particularly his relationship with 
the Communist Party which vacillates between agreement and 
disagreement. The essential point to be noted in this chapter is that it 
was probably Sartre’s theory of freedom which led him to become 
involved in the Algerian War, as will be shown in the following chapters.
Chapter Two is concerned with the outbreak of the Algerian 
revolution on November 1, 1954, and the aim of the FLN’s organization 
which lay in the independence and liberation of Algeria. The next step 
of this chapter discusses the attitude of the French intellectuals toward the 
Algerian War: such as Albert Camus, Francis Jeanson, and Frantz Fanon 
who were actively and practically involved in the Algerian revolution, and 
also who were close to Sartre after the Second World War. This may 
help us to understand how Sartre gradually became involved in the 
Algerian problem.
Chapter Three deals directly with the torturing, indiscriminate killing, 
and shooting for "fun" which became normal behaviour for the French 
Army in Algeria. This point will be discussed in both sections with some 
evidence from the eye-witnesses of the Algerian War. As Sartre became 
involved in the Algerian revolution since 1956 the development of his 
political writings will be examined at length, particularly on torture.
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Chapter Four discusses the conflict of the Algerian problem in the 
period of General De Gaulle’s proposal of self-determination for the 
Algerian people and how his army became opposed to his Algerian 
policy. The next stage of this chapter is not only concerned with the 
development of Sartre’s writings and political activities related to the 
Algerian revolution in the 1960s but is also a continuation of his position 
on the Algerian War stated in the preceding chapters. Finally the list of 
Sartre’s commitments to the struggle of the Algerian people is drawn up 
in order to assess his political writings which are in favour of the 
Algerians.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE DISCOVERY OF FREEDOM IN SARTRE’S THOUGHT
(a) Sartre’s Ontology
(b) Sartre’s Political Freedom
(c) The Left-Wing Influence on Sartre
4
Politics, of whatever sort, is action carried out in common 
by certain men against other men; based on convergences 
or divergences of interests, relations of solidarity, like those 
of struggle and of hostility, define a total attitude of man 
towards man.
Jean-Paul Sartre, "Le Fantome de Staline". Les Temps Modernes. No. 129-
SI, November-December 1957. p.579.
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INTRODUCTION
The present chapter discusses briefly Sartre’s ontology as a starting 
point of the development of his thought. To analyze Sartre’s writings on 
the Algerian revolution, we felt it necessary to review first Sartre’s views 
on political freedom and how he was influenced by the Left-wing before 
and after the Second World War. To better understand this attitude we 
reviewed Sartre’s relationship with the French Communist Party which 
vacillated between agreement and disagreement.
(a) SARTRE’S ONTOLOGY
Before discussing Sartre’s ontology it will be useful to take a close 
look at his life.
Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre was born on June 21, 1905 in 
Paris. His formal education began in October 1915 in the Lycee Henri- 
IV in Paris and his teachers reported that he was "excellent in every 
aspect". [1] In 1924, he entered the Ecole Normale Superieure where he 
met many students who became later among the greatest intellectuals in 
French history, such as Raymond Aron, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul 
Nizan, etc... As Sartre put it later:
1. Archives of the Lycee Henri IV, 1915-16; cited in Michel Contat 
and Michel Rybalka, "Chronologie", in Jean-Paul Sartre, Oeuvres 
romanesaues. (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), p.xxxviii.
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L’Ecole Normale, pour la plupart d’entre nous, pour moi, fut 
du premier jour, le commencement de Pfndependance. 
Beaucoup peuvent dire, comme je fais, qu’ils y ont eu quatre 
ans de bonheur. [2]
In July 1929, Sartre met Simone de Beauvoir in Paris and told her 
"from now on, I am going to take you under my wing."[3] From then on 
it was clear to her that "he would never go out of my life again".[4] In 
February 1931, Sartre finished his 18 months of military service as a 
meteorologist, and then began to teach philosophy at the lycee in Le 
Havre. In September 1933, he left for the French Institute in Berlin, where 
he studied German philosophers, particularly Edmond Husserl and wrote 
his essay "The Transcendence of the Ego" which appeared in Recherches 
Philosophiaues in 1936. Also he wrote the first part of L’lmaoination which 
appeared later with the second part in 1940. In 1938, Sartre published 
his novel Nausea which was very well received by the critics, and then 
he started publishing quite widely and became known not only to French 
society but also to the world. However, on June 21, 1940, on his 
thirty-fifth birthday, he found himself a prisoner of war in France where he 
remained until August 1940, then in Germany (Stalag XIID, Trier) until 
March 1941. In October 1941, Sartre returned again to teach philosophy 
at the Lycee Condorcet, where he was to stay until 1944.
On June 25, 1943, Sartre published his first main work, Being and 
Nothingness, which classified him as an existentialist philosopher. Indeed
2. Sartre in his preface to Paul Nizan’s Aden-Arabie. (Paris: Frangois 
Maspero, 1960), pp.21-22.
3. Simone de Beauvoir, Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, translated by 
James Kirkup, (London: Penguin Books, 1963), p.339.
4. Ibid, p.345.
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between the 1940s and the early 1960s, Sartre committed himself in 
writings and acting according to his theory of freedom, though he is 
basically a thinker whose novels and plays are essentially different ways 
of artistically exemplifying a certain type of existentialist thought, as we 
are going to see in this thesis.
No philosopher in all history has reached as large an audience in his 
lifetime as Jean-Paul Sartre. Also, he was one of the most versatile minds 
of our time. Indeed, he is not only a philosopher but also a playwright, 
novelist, psychologist, journalist, and politician (and an astonishing 
person). Everybody who has heard of the doctrine of existentialist 
philosophy will couple it with the name of the French philosopher Sartre, 
only afterwards he will think about other philosophers. Furthermore, 
Sartre is a man who lived half his life in the limelight of extreme notoriety. 
Indeed, he was one of the writers during his lifetime who had been the 
target of many attacks from terrorists, like Andr6 Malraux, De Gaulle’s 
Minister of Culture (1958-1962) as we are going to see later. But what are 
Sartre’s reasons? The reasons: because of his involvement in the 
Algerian War (1954-1962), as will be seen in detail in the following 
chapters. But now, I am only concerned with his ontology as a starting 
point for the development of his thought.
In order to understand Sartre’s political freedom, it is first necessary 
to briefly review Sartre’s notion of ontology and how it is related to his 
thought.
Ontology is defined philosophically as the study of being, that branch 
of metaphysics which relates to the being or essence of things, or to 
being in the abstract, and considers questions about what is and what
8
is not. [5] But from where does the term ontology derive?
Historically the word ontology comes from the Latin term "ontologia" 
which was coined by scholastic philosophers in the seventeenth century. 
Some writers use the term interchangeably with metaphysics but others 
use it as the name of a subdivision of metaphysics. Most philosophers 
distinguish clearly the term ontology from natural theology. The first user 
of the term ontology is Christian Wolff (1679-1754), the German rationalist 
philosopher, who achieved a reputation for his systematic approach to 
philosophy rather than for any great originality of mind. However, 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) discusses the term ontology as a subdivision 
of metaphysics that included rational psychology, which is differentiated 
from empirical psychology, what he called "science of God and World". 
He says that . .in ontology I discuss the more general properties of 
things, the difference between spiritual and material beings".[6] Thus, 
Kant becomes the most influential user of the term "ontology" after 
scholastic philosophers. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) does not hesitate 
to use it in his writings. Certainly Heidegger’s ontology is very different 
from that of the scholastics. His ontology is not deductive or even 
systematic in form. It proceeds at times by the exegesis of poetry and 
philosophy. Heidegger treats ontology as the starting point of his main 
thought. His basic question "why is there something rather than 
nothing?", because he presupposes that we already know what "being" 
and "nothing" are. Heidegger is concerned with knowing the nature of 
being as being. He claims that he returned in philosophy to the old 
Artistotelian problem of being, and the point is explicitly stated by Jean
5. A Dictionary of Philosophy, editorial consultant, Antony Fleur 
(London: Pan Books, 1979), p.255-6.
6. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp 
Smith (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1929), p.502.
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Wahl in his book A Short History of Existentialism:
Heidegger has declared that he is not a philosopher of 
existence, but a philosopher of Being, and that his eventual 
aim is ontological. Heidegger considers the problem of 
existence solely to introduce us to ontology, because the 
only form of Being with which we are truly in (contact 
according) is the being of man. [7]
Now let us see what Sartre’s ontology is. Sartre’s thought in general 
and his philosophy in particular are indebted to the projected ontology of 
Heidegger. Certainly, he has been influenced by his philosophy and 
Sartre himself is Heidegger’s best-known follower. Sartre, also, starts with 
the problem of Being. His main work, Being and Nothingness (1943) is 
subtitled "Essay in Phenomenological Ontology". In this essay Sartre 
attempts to develop an original ontology. He defines ontology as the 
study: "of the structures of being of the existent taken as a totality." 
Ontology describes Being itself, the conditions by which "there is" a world, 
human reality, etc..."metaphysics".[8] Thus, the purpose of Sartre’s 
investigation is to construct an ontology and the description of the being 
of the world, and of man. Traditionally, the term "metaphysics" also 
signifies a study of being itself. But Sartre distinguishes ontology from 
metaphysics by saying that metaphysics is to ontology as history is to 
sociology. For him, metaphysics is concerned with the question of why 
there is anything rather than nothing. He claims that he is interested only 
in the fundamental description of being; by the use of the word "as if1:
7. Jean Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism (New York, Philosophical 
library, 1949), p. 28.
8. Sartre, Being and Nothinoess. translated by Hazel E. Barnes 
(London: Methuen, 1969), p.633.
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Ontology will therefore limit itself to declaring that everything 
takes place as if the in-itself (unconsciousness) in a project 
to found itself gave itself the modification of the for-itself 
(consciousness). [9]
However, Sartre interprets his ontology as two modes of being 
"pour-soi" (for-itself) and "en-soi" (in-itself) (we shall see the explanation of 
these terms later). In his book A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Ontology. 
Maurice Natanson points out that Sartre:
...is attempting to cut across the traditional positions of 
idealism and realism in founding a radically new ontology. He 
is attempting to determine if phenomenology is competent 
to resolve the problems of ontology. [10]
For Sartre, ontology searches to determine the nature of being 
through an investigation of man’s being. In his book L’Ontolooie de 
Sartre. Gilbert Varet asserts that: "For Sartre the point of departure is not 
human reality, or existence, or Bad Faith, or atheism. (But is 
ontology)".[11] Thus, the term ontology occupies Sartre’s novels and 
books, and his existentialism is the philosophical meaning of the ontology. 
Sartre’s ontology can only furnish a duality of term and of essences, as 
he writes:
The for-itself without the in-itself...cou!d not exist any more 
than a colour could exist without form or a sound without 
pitch and without timbre. [12]
And his duality is not only in favour of the for-itself but also in primacy 
of the in-itself, as he emphasizes:
9. Ibid, p.621.
10. Maurice Natanson, A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Ontology (The 
University of Nebraska, 1951), p. 13.
11. Gilbert Varet, L’Ontoloqie de Sartre (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 
1949), p.2.
12. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.621
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The ontological problem of knowledge is resolved by the 
affirmation of the ontological primacy of the in-itself over 
the for-itself. [13]
Ontology is the main concept in determining the human condition 
in Sartre’s philosophy, and the "search for Being" is the key to the 
essential problem with which he is concerned in his attempt to formulate 
a new ontology. In fact, Sartre, like all French philosophers, is Cartesian, 
he asserts to derive a certain idea of human consciousness as thinking 
from Ren6 Descartes. More specifically, he begins with the Cartesian 
"Cogito" (I think therefore I am), which is taken to be the root of all 
judgements and cognitions. Like Descartes, Sartre thinks that we all are 
aware of our ideas and of the outside world to which these ideas are 
related. He agrees with Descartes that we know our own mind better 
than anything else. Indeed in Being and Nothingness. Sartre discusses 
consciousness as unity, and he attempts to build this consciousness as 
the unity of "cogito" and the "pre-reflective Cogito" which is known as the 
basis for the reality of consciousness. Thus, this unity is recognized by 
Sartre as the ontological sphere of origin of derivative structure of 
consciousness. [14] However, the "pre-reflective cogito", for Sartre, is 
primary consciousness. But I am not going to discuss Sartre’s argument 
on the Cartesian "cogito" in more detail as I am primarily concerned in this 
chapter with his modes of being.
In the introduction to Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre explains
A A
being-for-itself (Etre-pour-soi) and being-in-itself (Etre- en-soi) and he
13. Ibid, p.619
14. Ibid, p.xxix
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offered a preliminary distinction between them. This distinction is between 
two beings: the being-for-itself which is the being of consciousness and 
the being-in-itself which is the being of inanimate (unconsciousness). The 
for-itself needs the in-itself in order to be complete. But the in-itself does 
not need the for-itself because this being for Sartre is fullness. 
Being-in-itself is one mode of being. It exists in itself apart from its 
presence to consciousness. Whereas, the being-for-itself is human reality 
and consciousness. Both being-for-itself and consciousness are often 
used interchangeably with human reality by Sartre. For him, human reality 
is freedom.
The most important of Sartre’s modes of being is the being-for-itself, 
and the main characteristic of this being is a lack. The for-itself is 
incomplete. It needs something to complete it. This lack is seen by 
Sartre from different angles. As consciousness is an emptiness, there is 
a distance between the for-itself and its object, that is, between thought 
and its object, and this distance is a gap for Sartre. This gap is 
responsible for the power that makes the consciousness affirm or deny, 
that is, accept what is true for its object. Freedom consists in this ability 
to affirm or deny. Therefore, freedom constitutes the gap between 
thought and object, which is the core of consciousness. At the centre of 
the consciousness, both freedom and an emptiness are found.
It seems that these terms (for-itself and in-itself) are borrowed from 
Hegel who referred to them as "Ftlr-Sich" and "An-Sich". In his book The 
Phenomenological Movement. Herbert Spiegelberg affirms that:
One might suspect this even more in the case of Sartre’s 
concepts of the in-itself, (En-Soi), the for-itself (Pour-soi), 
and the in-itself-for-itself (en-soi-pour-soi), which may seem
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to be taken immediately from Hegel’s system. [15]
Seemingly, Sartre was influenced by Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Mind, and the dialectic of Master and Slave, which is concerned with 
the development of self-consciousness. The master is recognized by the 
slave as a self-conscious human being. As the master is a 
consciousness, the slave is an unconsciousness. The master is therefore 
being-for-itself. The slave who works for the master is being-in-itself. 
However, Sartre’s definition of the two modes of being is different from 
Hegel’s. Moreover, Sartre took the term intentionality from Husserl in 
order to distinguish the for-itself from the in-itself. This intentionality is an 
essential aspect of consciousness. For Sartre, the distinction of the two 
beings do not mean their infinite separation. They are in permanent 
relation with each other and this relation is the most important for their 
existence.
In addition to being-for-itself and being-in-itself, Sartre also discusses
A
being-for-others (Etre-pour-Autrui). He defines being-for-others in two 
related ways. Firstly, the human being is aware of his own bodily 
existence as something which is known to other people. Secondly, he is 
aware of the bodies of other people and of their existence in the world. 
Moreover, Sartre thinks that we do not only exist for ourselves but we 
also exist for others. The realization that I am an object of attention for 
myself-reflective self-awareness cannot be separated from my knowledge 
that I am an object of attention for others. This object, in Sartre’s view, 
cannot be compared with the being-for-itself. For instance, when I am 
ashamed of having done something, is a shame of myself before the
15. H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. Vol.ll (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1965), p.472.
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other. My being-for-myself and my being-for-others are related to each 
other by means of being-in-itself. For people, I am a physical object in 
the world. Therefore, for people I am a being-in-itself. For myself I am 
a being-for-itself. These two modes of being combine to define the third 
mode which is being-for-others. Thus, being-for-others is an aspect of 
being in which my self exists outside as an object for others.
For Sartre, the situation of the for-itself means its existence in the
world of objects and human beings. Both the objects and human beings
constitute the for-itself. In other words, the way of conceiving the objects
which are in the world depends originally on the choices and decisions
of the individual. Certainly, in Sartre’s view, it is the individual’s freedom
which decides first whether his situation is free or alienated, the fact that
the situation which seems as a factor of determination depends on man’s
freedom, as he affirms:
...the for-itself is the free foundation of its being; the for-itself 
is free but in condition, and it is the relation of this condition 
to freedom that we are trying to define by making clear the 
meaning of the situation...the for-itself cannot constitute an 
external limit of its freedom. [16].
In fact, Sartre’s concept of the situation is revealed by the 
confrontation of the for-itselfs freedom with the objects which Sartre terms 
in Being and Nothingness, as "existent brut". In this confrontation, the 
objects of the world do not appear to the for-itself as a "datum", as a 
"pure" in-itself, both are described as an "existent brut", he says that: "It 
is only when there is no choice that freedom stops existing."[17] It 
should be noted that Sartre maintains the absolute freedom of the for-itself 
in the source of its situation because the for-itself has originally chosen 
such choice and it has decided to accomplish a particular project and that 
the external world becomes a condition to freedom.
16. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 519.
17. Ibid, p. 544
15
Sartre’s most important factor which constitutes the situation of the 
for-itself is represented by the existence of the other. In its relations with
others, the freedom of the for-itself is not passive, and the for-itself
decides according to the project whether the other is subject or object, 
as Sartre affirms that:
The for-itself, i.e. man-in rising up, does not merely suffer the 
other’s existence, he is compelled to make the other’s
existence manifest to himself in the form of a choice. For it
is by a choice that he will apprehend the other as The-
other-as-subject or as The-other-as-object.[18]
According to Sartre, the for-itself’s relation with others is based on its 
freedom. To accept passively the other’s existence means first of all that 
the for-itself chooses to be object in its relation with others and this choice 
is due completely to its decision. However, in his concept of others, 
Sartre recognizes a limited freedom of the for-itself in the other’s freedom, 
but I am not going to discuss Sartre’s being-for-itself and being-for-others 
in detail as I am only concerned with his freedom.
(b) SARTRE’S POLITICAL FREEDOM
Now let us discuss Sartre’s concept of freedom. To understand 
Sartre’s freedom before and after the Second World War, I shall examine 
first the source of Sartre’s freedom, when it started, from where it derives 
and what are the reasons for which Sartre experienced it?
Although Sartre did write about his childhood and adolescence in
18. Ibid, p. 520.
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autobiography which comes out later as a book, Les Mots 1964 (Words), 
there is only a little evidence about his childhood, because this book 
seems to take his life up only until his early adolescence. From then until 
his mid-twenties there are only a few fragments of writing (referred to by 
Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka)* and some isolated reminiscences of 
Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.
In Words. Sartre could remember that he kept out of school until 
after the age of ten and he was compelled to live at his grandfather’s 
home (Charles Schweitzer), after his father’s early death, together with 
two women namely Louise, his grandfather’s wife, and Anne-Marie, his 
own mother. Sartre as a boy related to images and words rather than 
children and things. Thus, he felt that he belonged:
Le moment ou il decouvre son alterite est le moment ou il 
decouvre qu’il n’est pas le personnage principal dans la vie 
de sa famille...Quand Jean-Paul decouvre qu’il compte "pour 
du beurre", il vit “dans le malaise". [19]
These feelings of uselessness within his family circle are even clearer 
when Sartre says: "I was nothing: an indelible transparency”.[20]
This fact was so important to the child that it was going to affect 
and influence his whole career and life. Indeed, from the very beginning, 
Sartre felt that he had no right to exist when he asserted that:
*  It should be pointed out that Contat and Rybalka have faithfully and 
painstakingly collected and ordered virtually everything Sartre has 
written and said from his childhood to adulthood. So, I shall not 
hesitate to quote from their writings on Sartre in my thesis.
19. Claire Elmquist, "Lucien, Jean-Paul et la mauvaise Foi: line etude 
sur Sartre", Orbis litteraturum. VolXXVI, 1971, p.221.
20. Sartre, Words, translated by Irene Clephane (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1964) p.63.
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"Naturally, I see only mists...the crude intuitions of my existence dwell side 
by side, neither warring nor mingling".[21] In fact, the child-shaping 
years were spent in a sequestred unreal inner world, entirely cut off from 
other children. He was, therefore, left with just one solution: writing. At 
first sight, it seemed to him that writing might help him communicate with 
people and accordingly it might make him necessary to them. After a 
long period as a writer, however, Sartre confessed that he had changed, 
and yet not when he asserted that: "One gets rid of a neurosis, one 
doesn’t get cured of one’s self'. [22]
Indeed, Words represents his own account of his apprenticeship to 
the imaginary as a small boy, and of his immersion in an element from 
which he had never escaped. This book was not meant to reminisce 
about Sartre’s brilliant career but to meditate on the origins of his 
illusions. As such, it could be considered as a confession and the 
author’s acknowledgement that something had gone wrong rather than a 
celebration. However, it could be concluded that Words was bad 
psychotherapy for Sartre. In other words, as Philip Thody put it:
Les Mots was a search for self which became an escape 
from self into Art, as the source of the writer’s neurosis itself 
became literary. [23]
In their book Sartre. Alexandre Astruc and Michel Contat report 
these following words of Sartre; he says, referring to this particular 
period:
21. Ibid, p.167.
22. Ibid, p.5.
23. Philip Thody, Sartre: A Biographical Introduction (London: Studio 
Vista, 1971), p.130.
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II y avait des ce moment-la I’idee de la liberte. D’ou elle me 
vient, je n’en sais rien, parce que ga, c’est certainement une 
pensee dont j’ai du parler avec les camarades a la Rochelle 
mai je me rappelle tres bien de longues conversations dans 
la cour avec Nizan, qui lui, etait profondement deterministe 
a ce moment-la - ensuite il a ete dialecticien, c’est different 
- et moi je sais que je soutenais la liberte. [24]
And when Michel Contat insisted on knowing the first time that Sartre
gives this thought the term "freedom", Sartre replies:
A quel moment ga a eu ce nom-la, je n’en sais rien. Peut-
etre faut-il quand meme que j’aie ete en classe de philo,
dans ce cas ce serait a Paris; mais certainement je le 
sentais avant: liberte et responsibil'rte. Et ce peut-etre venu 
du fait que j’etais solitaire a la Rochelle, c’est a dire repousse 
et voulant m’integrer. Ce qui vient a ce moment-la, si vous 
voulez, de Popposition entre mon enfance ou je voulais etre 
un ecrivain et puis I’adolescence ou j’ai connu la 
contingence, la violence, les choses comme elles sont. II est 
vraisemblable que ga a compte.[25]
In the late twenties Sartre was a student at the Ecole Normale 
Supirieure; as he admitted in an interview some thirty years later, at that 
time:
I was young, of good family and had the impression that the 
world could be mine without having to undergo the 
compulsion of want and work. [26]
Indeed Sartre spent a great deal of his time engaged in political and 
philosophical debate with his fellow students, and particularly Paul Nizan, 
with whom he had been at school. Nizan, who was a student at the
24. Astruc, A. and Contat, M. Sartre (Paris: Gallimand, 1977) p.31.
25. Ibid, p.32.
26. Playboy, interview: Jean-Paul Sartre, Playboy. May, 1965, p.70.
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Ecole Normale Superieure (1924-1929), joined the Communist Party in 
1927, became secretary of the editorial committee of the journal 
Commune (1933-1939) and director of Ce Soir (1937), and finally he left 
the party In 1939, after the signature of the pact between Germany and 
the Soviet Union. He was killed in 1940. However, Nizan, in fact, seems 
to have acted as a sort of intellectual counter-weight to Sartre in that he 
formulated his own views and attitudes in response to Nizan’s more 
concrete certainties, which later led his relationship with the French 
Communist Party to vacillate between agreement and disagreement. But 
Sartre appears to have felt the need to adopt a position on every issue 
in relation to such definite opinions, though he had some doubts about 
Nizan’s reasons for holding them. As he put it later: "Je detestais qu’il 
1ft de la politique parceque je n’avais pas le besoin d’en faire".[27] Simone 
de Beauvoir for her part tells us that Sartre at that time:
"was interested in social and political questions; he 
sympathized with Nizan’s position; but as far as he was 
concerned the main thing was to write and the rest would 
come later". [28]
It should be noted that what his faithful friend Nizan thought of 
Sartre’s viewpoint was somewhat ruefully recounted by Sartre in 1960, as 
he asserts that: "Je lui repetais que nous etions libres: il ne repondait 
pas, mais son mince sourire de coin en disais long". [29]
27. Sartre in his preface to Paul Nizan’s Aden-Arabie p.20.
28. Simone de Beauvoir, Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, p.342.
29. Sartre in his preface to Paul Nizan’s Aden-Arabie. p.20.
20
However, Sartre refused to back down from this idea, and he would not 
admit to himself that such personal freedom as he had might result from 
his particular way of life.
In 1938, Sartre wrote his novel Nausea which plays an important 
role in the general development of his work. Certainly, Nausea presents 
a key to his subsequent writings. It is in this novel that the idea of 
freedom was first deployed. The notion of freedom here is revealed in 
the way that Sartre employs the word. The most significant examples of 
its usage are the following: at the beginning of the story, Antoine
Roquentin, the hero of Nausea, says he is worried because:
As I was leaving the Hotel Printania to go to the library, I 
tried to pick up a piece of paper lying on the ground and 
didn’t succeed...Yes, but to tell the whole truth, it made a 
profound impression on me: it occurred to me that I was no 
longer free. [30].
Having failed to touch the paper, he said: "I straightened up, empty- 
handed. I am no longer free, I can no longer do what I want". [31]
Towards the end of the novel, Roquentin decided to abandon his
projected biography of the Marquis de Rollebon, which has been the chief
project in his life. As he declared:
I am free: I haven’t a single reason for living left, all the ones 
I have tried have given way and I can’t imagine any more. 
I am still quite young, I still have enough strength to start 
again. But what must I start again? Only now do I realize 
how much, in the midst of my greatest terror and nausea, 
I had counted on Anny to save me. My past is dead, 
Monsieur de Rollebon is dead, Anny came back only to take 
all hope away from me. I am alone in this white street lined
30. Sartre, Nausea. Translated by Robert Baldick (London: Penguin 
Books, 1965), p.20.
31. Ibid, p.22.
with gardens. Alone and free. But this freedom is rather like 
death.[32].
However, Satre was moving beyond this idea by 1936, when he 
finished Nausea, as is shown in the last extract cited: "Alone and free. But 
this freedom is rather like death". This was an alienated freedom which 
had been achieved by throwing overboard the very aims and 
responsibilities which could provide the individual with some direction. 
Moreover, at the end of the novel, Roquentin decides also to turn to Art, 
though at the beginning of his novel he attacks the use of Art as 
consolation. He wants to write a "book". He thinks that his act will help 
him to overcome weaknesses and absurdity, and to achieve freedom in 
his life. Indeed, Roquentin decides to write in order to justify his own 
existence. He is not going to write about history as he did before. For 
him, history discusses what has existed and it is not useful for him any 
more. He wants to create something above existence, as he claims:
Another kind of book. I don’t quite know which kind - but 
you would have to guess, behind the printed words, behind 
the pages, something which didn’t exist, which was above 
existence. The sort of story, for example, which could never 
happen, an adventure. It would have to be beautiful and hard 
as steel and make people ashamed of their existence. [33].
Sartre might have thought of his next novel - at least when he began 
writing it - as a direct continuation of his earlier work. Contat and Rybalka 
cite in their book:
32. Ibid, p. 223.
33. Ibid, p. 252.
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In the next novel Roquentin will discover that he is free, but 
it will take a great upheaval in the world to let him do it...He 
imagines him called up and discovering in this break with his 
past his total and intoxicating freedom...it is nevertheless a 
profound moral reconstruction of the individual which is 
involved here, a true resurrection...from nausea to zeal, from 
suicide to a taste for life, for unique, irreversible, free life. [34]
However, Roquentin as presented in Nausea characterised Sartre’s 
own ideas of this period, not only in his description of the notion of 
freedom, but also in his decision to write a book which was to become
A
L’Etre et le Neant. Certainly, about this project Sartre declares towards the 
end of his life:
I thought that the aim of literature was to write a book that 
would reveal to the reader things he had never thought of 
before. For a long time that was my idea - the idea that I 
should succeed in saying things about the world, not just 
what anyone could see of it, but things that I should see. I 
did not know them yet, but I was going to see them, and 
they would reveal the world. [35].
Indeed throughout his writings Sartre presents freedom as 
developing into projects rather than as an achievement. In Being and 
Nothingness. Sartre’s claim for an absolute freedom results to a great 
extent from his rejection of the existence of God and his focus on the 
phenomenological aspect of being. The key concept, however, is the idea 
of freedom that Sartre states in Being and Nothingness:
34. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre. 
Vol II. Translated by Richard C. McClearly (Evanston, III: 
Northwestern University Press, 1974). pp. 57-8.
35. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre1 Translated by 
Patrick O’Brien (London: Andre Deutsch and Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1984), p. 139.
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...it is necessary to point to "common sense" that the formula 
“to be free" does not mean "to obtain what one has wished" 
but rather "by oneself to determine oneself to wish" (in the 
broad sense of choosing). In other words success is not 
important to freedom. The discussion which opposes 
common sense to philosophers stems here from a 
misunderstanding: the empirical and popular concept of 
“freedom" which has been produced by historical, political, 
and moral circumstances is equivalent to "the ability to obtain 
the ends chosen". The technical and philosophical concept 
of freedom, the only one which we are considering here, 
means only the autonomy of choice. [36]
Mary Warnock in her introduction to Sartre’s The Psychology of 
Imagination (1940), rightly asserts that:
Not only in Being and Nothingness, but even in his later 
works, he insists that man’s freedom to act in the world is 
a function of his ability to perceive things not only as they 
are, but as they are not. If man could not, first describe a 
present given situation both as it is and as it is not; and if 
he could not, secondly and consequently, envisage a given 
situation as possibly being otherwise than how it is then he 
would have no power to intervene in the world to change 
it...lt is thus absolutely appropriate that Sartre’s first serious 
philosophical work should have been concerned with what 
turns out to be the foundation upon which freedom itself 
rests. [37]
It should be pointed out that the concept of absolute freedom 
derives from Sartre’s idealism that characterized him since his experiences 
of childhood. On the subject of this concept Simone de Beauvoir writes 
her book The Prime of Life referring to Sartre and herself, therefore: 
"...Our mistake was to assume that freedom of choice and action is a 
universal..."[38]
36. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 483.
37. Mary Warnock in her introduction to Sartre’s Psychology of
Imagination (London: The Philosophical library, 1972), p.xvii.
38. Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life. Translated by Peter Green,
(London: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 44.
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Sartre’s description of absolute freedom developed from 1924 to 1943; 
since that period he has rejected this freedom, as he explained to Le 
Nouvel Observateur:
L’autre jour, j’ai la preface que j’avais ecrite pour une edition 
de ces pieces - Les Mouches. Huis Clos - et j’ai ete 
proprement scandaliser. J’avais ecrit ceci: "quelles qui soient 
les circonstances, en quelque lieu que ce soit, un homme est 
toujours libre de choisir s’il sera un traftre ou non". Quand 
j’ai lu cela, je me suis dit: "c’est incroyable: je le pensais 
vraiment!" j’en ai conclu que dans toute circonstance il y 
avait toujours un choix possible. C’etait faux. [39]
Satre shows clearly the rejection of the notion of the absolute 
freedom which was dominating him in the first stage of his thought. The 
use of the word "scandaleuse" by Sartre is that to express his reaction 
against his words written earlier. Indeed, the reaction explained how far 
Sartre’s thought has developed after Being and Nothingness (1943). And 
the most important discussion in Le Nouvel Observateur is based on the 
rejection of Sartre’s concept of absolute freedom, and the evolution of his 
thought which is based on the limited freedom of the human being, as we 
shall see later in this section.
Sartre’s new concept of freedom after Nausea was developed in his 
novel, The Age of Reason (1945), the opening volume of his project of the 
Roads to Freedom.* In the latter novel the notion of freedom is more
39. Sartre in Le Nouvel Observateur. January 26, 1970.
*  The first two volumes of Les Chemins de la Liberte (Roads to 
Freedom). L’Aoe de Raison and Le Suesis. were published in Paris 
in 1945 and La Mort dans L’ame in 1949. Part of a projected fourth 
volume, "La Derniere Chance", was published in Les Temps 
Modernes. Nos. 49 and 50, November and December, 1949. The first 
three volumes have been translated respectively as: The Age of 
Reason. The Reprieve, and Iron in the Soul.
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developed than In any other work. Indeed one can easily detect that the
character of the protagonist in this novel is Sartre himself who is
searching for freedom. Through his character Sartre is now clearly
envisaging freedom as being concerned with action. Mathieu, the hero of
The Age of Reason, has a bourgeois brother, Jacques who is against his
acts. Jacques attacks Mathieu’s irresponsibility and his selfish view of
freedom. However, anticipating the position towards which Sartre was
moving, he says that:
"I should myself have thought11, said Jacques, “that freedom 
consisted in frankly confronting situations into which one had 
deliberately entered, and accepting all one’s responsibilities. 
But that, no doubt, is not your view: you condemn capitalist 
society, and yet your are an official in that society; you 
display an abstract sympathy with Communists, but you take 
care not to commit yourself, you have never voted. You 
despise the bourgeois class, and yet you are a bourgeois, 
son and brother of a bourgeois, and you live like a 
bourgeois". [40]
It should be noted that Sartre, here, is not concerned with moralizing 
but with describing the ideas of freedom, and also show that the ultimate 
goal of the hero Mathieu is freedom from responsibility and from the 
results of his past actions. However, in Nausea, the imagination of 
Roquentin led him to write a book as he promised at the end of the 
novel, in order to attain his freedom, and in The Age of Reason. Mathieu, 
the hero, became aware that he was "free for nothing" through his acts. 
Thus, it is neither writing a book nor being aware of his condition which 
helps the character to attain his freedom. But in December 1945, Sartre 
offered an interview to Paru. and he provided a good account of his 
intentions in writing Road to Freedom and of the conception that underlies 
it:
40. Sartre, The Age of Reason. Translated by Eric Sutton. (London: 
Penguin Books, 1961), p.107.
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Man is free in the fullest and strongest sense. Freedom is 
not within him like a property of his human essence. He 
does not exist first, to be free later. He is free for that alone 
is what he is. There is no distinction between his being and 
his freedom. But his man who is also condemned to freedom 
must, however, free himself because he does not immediately 
recognize himself as free or because he is mistaken about 
the meaning of freedom. This journey of the free man 
towards his freedom is the paradox of freedom and is also 
the theme of my book. It is the story of a deliverance and 
of a liberation. [41]
Sartre’s concern was with the issue of the Road to Freedom in which 
he traces an evolution of man without social ties finds himself nevertheless 
linked to others through the reality of a war common to them all. In an 
interview of 1948, Sartre summed up the position he had held during the 
Second World War as follows:
It is not a question of knowing what we are free for but what 
are the roads to freedom. And on this score we agree 
completely with Hegel, who said, "No one, no man can be 
free unless all men are free"...Our concrete goal - which is 
a very up-to-date, contemporary one - is human 
liberation. [42]
So, in this way Sartre’s theory was accommodated to the categorical 
imperative of the war: the necessity for the individual to commit himself to 
the struggle against Nazism and Fascism. By striving for the liberation of 
others, a man was taking possession of his own freedom which would be 
completely realized only when that of all men was established. Thus, 
Sartre’s emotional commitment to the fight was reinforced and given a 
conceptual underpinning by the theory of freedom he developed.
41. Sartre, interview with Paru. Monaco, No. 13, December, 1945.
42. "Jean-Paul Sartre a Berlin: Discussion autour des Mouches1. Verger 
(Baden-Baden), Paris, Vol. 1, No.5, 1948. pp. 109-23. Excerpt in 
Contat and Rybalka, pp. 199-200.
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It should be pointed out that in another significant development 
Sartre accepts for the first time that his existence cannot be completely 
independent from other people, and also he realized that he becomes 
part of a society that is constituted by the inter-relationship of human 
beings. He assumes that the individual’s free actions inevitably affect other 
people and their situations. In Being and Nothingness. Sartre argues:
...from the moment that I exist I establish a factual limit to the 
other’s freedom. I am this limit, and each of my projects 
traces the outline of this limit around the other. Charity, 
laisser-faire, tolerance - even an attitude of abstention - are 
each one a project of myself which engages me and which 
engages the other in his acquiescence. [43]
According to Sartre, only freedom can limit itself and man himself as a 
free being or other free beings can restrict his liberty. Thus, the existence 
of other people does bring a factual limit to man’s freedom. He affirmed 
that:
...the other’s freedom...is the limit of my freedom...lt is given to me 
as a burden which I carry without ever being able to turn back to 
know it...lf there is another...then I have an outside, I have a 
nature. [44]
In the autumn of 1946, Anti-Semite and Jew appeared by Sartre. In 
this book, Sartre examines the problem of Anti-Semitism from two different 
perspectives: firstly, by analyzing the psychology of the individual Jew and 
Anti-Semite, which is much in the style of his earlier writings. Secondly, by 
making a new departure in his thought, he analyses socio-economic class. 
Also, he attempts to reconcile the two approaches in his work. Indeed,
43. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 409.
44. Ibid, pp.262-3.
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Sartre seems to take action as a writer in a sustained way, and it revealed 
for the first time his deep attachment to the oppressed. Though, Sartre 
studies Anti-semitism and the Jewish response to it as instances of 
individual choice, and he uses authenticity and Bad Faith,* freedom and 
the situation, as his main analytic categories. However, Sartre describes 
the psychological motivation of individuals who have chosen to be Anti- 
semites, which is seen to result from their attitude to freedom. The Anti- 
semite, claims Sartre: "fears every kind of solitariness, that of the genius 
as much as that of the murderer; he is the man of the crowd”. [45]
It should be noted that the evolution of the limited freedom is 
revealed in Sartre’s Anti-Semite and Jew, as he emphasized the idea of 
the limited freedom of the Jewish people:
Only the freedom in question is carefully limited: the Jew is 
free to do evil, not good, he has only as much free will as 
is necessary for him to take full responsibility for the crimes 
of which he is the author, he does not have enough to be 
able to achieve a reformation. Strange liberty, which instead 
of preceding and constituting the essence, remains 
subordinate to it, is only an irrational quality of it, and yet 
remains liberty. [46]
The Jew’s freedom is thus limited by the Anti-semite: he is free as long 
as he is engaged with crimes and assumes responsibility for them. As he 
flees from freedom and responsibility, he believes that he possessed a 
weak nature by birth. It may fill the absence of freedom he experiences. 
However, the Jew is not free to act because he cannot change the
*  Bad Faith, "Mauvaise Foi" is a lie to oneself which is a kind of self- 
deception. See more information in author’s M. Litt. Thesis, Jean- 
Paul Sartre’s Conception of Bad Faith. Department of Philosophy, 
University of Glasgow, 1985.
45. Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew. Translated by George F. Berker (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1965). p.22.
46. Ibid, p.39.
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judgement of society. Further, the limited freedom of the Jew is developed 
by Sartre later in Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr (1952). But now I am only 
concerned with the character of the Anti-Semite as Sartre describes him.
Sartre sums up the character of the Anti-Semite as a man,
who is afraid. Not of the Jews, to be sure, but of himself, of 
his own consciousness, of his liberty, of his instincts, of his 
responsibilities, of solitariness, of change, of society, and of 
the world - of everything except the Jews. [47]
Further, he says that the Anti-Semite is: "a murderer'', "a coward" and "a 
malcontent" who chooses "total irresponsibility" and "a Good that is fixed 
once and for all, beyond question, out of reach".[48] Sartre argues that 
Anti-Semites form themselves into groups which are no more than mobs 
in which individuals are not differentiated by functions. What secures them 
together: "is anger; the collectivity has no other goal than to exercise over 
certain individuals a diffused repressive sanction". [49]
Here, it seems the individual in Sartre’s view, "is drowned in the 
crowd, and the ways of thinking and reacting of the group are of a purely 
primitive type".[50] Thus, the individual Anti-Semite disowns responsibility 
for himself by surrendering himself to the group, which denies any 
responsibility for its members’ actions. As Sartre put it so well:
47. Ibid, p.53.
48. Ibid, p.53.
49. Ibid, p.30.
50. Ibid, p.30.
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...[the Anti-Semite] who represses and censures his tendency 
to murder without being able to hold it back, yet who dares 
to kill only in effigy or protected by the anonymity of the 
mob.Jn espousing Anti-semitism, he does not simply adopt 
an opinion, he chooses himself as a person. He chooses the 
permanence and impenetrability of stone...He chooses to 
acquire nothing, to deserve nothing; he assumes that 
everything is given to him as his birthright - and he is not 
noble...Anti-Semite is a man who wishes to be pitiless stone, 
a furious torrent, a devastating thunderbolt - anything except 
a man.[51]
Sartre goes further, asserting that Anti-Semitism is a phenomenon of 
the middle class and not of the working class, and he explains this in 
terms of the characteristic kinds of thinking of each class which derive 
directly from their respective economic and social structures. The working 
class, apparently, as Sartre describes:
...sees ensembles in terms of economic function. The bourgeoisie, 
the peasant class, the proletariat - those are the synthetic realities 
with which it is concerned, and in those complexes it distinguishes 
secondary synthetic structures - labour unions, employers’ 
associations, trusts, cartels, parties. Thus, the explanations it gives 
for historical phenomena are found to agree perfectly with the 
differentiated structure of a society based on division of labour. 
History, as the working class sees it, is the result of the play of 
economic organisms and the interaction of synthetic groups. [52]
It appeared that Sartre sees the working class as people who tend to 
reject the Anti-Semites’ claim in order to represent the "real nation" 
because such a conception of an undifferentiated society not divided into 
clearly visible groups would not accord with their way of understanding 
the world.
51. Ibid, pp.53-4.
52. Ibid, pp.35-6.
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However, this particular aspect of the Jew’s limited freedom is 
developed by Sartre with reference to Genet when he asserts that in Saint 
Genet. Actor and Martyr: Free to be guilty, Genet is not to be
changed. [53]
In Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr. Sartre claims that the limited 
freedom of Genet is determined by society. Indeed, it is society which 
obliged Genet to commit crimes and to act. When Genet searched for 
being, he found himself without property and parents. For Sartre, Genet 
is a victim in a society which defines being as having, and Genet wants 
to be, but he must have in order to be. So, Genet has received an 
inferiority complex from others and his freedom consisted of taking it upon 
himself. When, therefore, society accused him of being a thief, Genet 
denied the accusation. An internal voice was shouting inside him 
confirming that he was not a thief. His wish to be and to be free led him 
to play the role of a thief. It is this voice which reveals the gap between 
Genet’s acts and intention. However, in the existence of others, this voice 
disappeared and Genet becomes a thief in spite of his intention and his 
will, as Sartre states that:
A shy voice still protests within him: he is a stranger to his 
purpose. But soon the voice dies: the act is so clear so 
neatly defined that its nature cannot be mistaken. He 
attempts to go backwards to understand himself but it is too 
late for he does not find the way to himself. [54]
In his later writings, particularly in the Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(1960), Sartre becomes more concerned with political freedom because
53. Sartre, Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr. Translated by Bernard 
Frechtman (New York: Braziller, 1963), p.25.
54. Ibid, pp.23-4.
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he distinguished sharply between three types of freedom. These types are 
metaphysical freedom, artistic freedom, and social political freedom with 
which he becomes more concerned in his later writings. In a discussion, 
"The Flies in Berlin" (1948), Sartre said:
Our concrete goal, which is highly actual and modern, is to 
liberate man. This has three aspects. First, metaphysical 
liberation: to make him conscious that he is completely free 
and that he must fight against everything which contributes 
to limiting this freedom. Artistic liberation: to further the free 
man’s communication with other men through art and, aided 
by this, to place them [the communications] in one and the 
same atmosphere of freedom. Thirdly, political and social 
freedom: liberation of the oppressed and other men...[55]
For Sartre, man’s metaphysical freedom is a necessary condition of 
his political freedom. Sartre emphasized that in one of this interviews he 
said: "But what would it mean to liberate a man whose actions were 
determined? If man were not free, it would not be worth moving a finger 
for him".[56] Although Sartre is primarily concerned with political and 
social freedom in his main later work, Critique of Dialectical Reason, he 
still holds his original phenomenological existentialism.
First let us see what Sartre’s metaphysical freedom is, as it is a 
necessary condition of man’s political freedom. In acting, man creates 
himself as he wants to be, and creates an image of himself as he thinks 
he should be. Choosing is to affirm the value, for instance, of that which 
is chosen. According to Sartre, when man chooses, he not only chooses 
for himself, but for all men and he is responsible not only for himself but 
for all men. His responsibility is great, since in committing himself he
55. "Jean-Paul Sartre a Berlin. Discussion autour des Mouches",
Verger (Baden-Baden) Paris, 1, No. 5 (1948): 109-23.
56. "A la Recherche de I’Existentialisme: M. Jean-Paul Sartre s’explique", 
interview by Jean Duche, Le Litteraire. April 13, 1946.
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commits all of humanity. Responsibility is, therefore, an important and 
integral part of freedom. To be free is to choose and to be responsible. 
For Sartre, to claim that God exists is to deny man’s absolute freedom. 
Thus, to say God exists is to limit man’s freedom. To say that there is a 
universal mortality and all men are subjected to it, is to limit one’s 
freedom. But Sartre seems to miss the point when he says that man 
chooses for the whole human race. I would say that man could not 
choose for others as every man is required by Sartre to choose for 
himself. To choose for others is to go against their choice and freedom.
In several of his writings, Sartre writes "existence precedes 
essence".[57] In Existentialism and Humanism. Sartre stresses existence 
rather than essence. But what does he mean by essence? If by essence 
one means a universal human nature designed by God prior to man’s 
existence, Sartre would be right in saying existence precedes essence as 
he rejects the existence of God. Everyman would then be unique and 
different from others, since there is nothing pre-determined for him that he 
should become. Man’s life depends on him and him alone. He has the 
free choice to make it significant or not. He is free to make his own nature 
and create his own values. For Sartre, man must exist first then create his 
own essence afterwards. Further, man is from the start free. He is born 
free. Sartre introduced an absolute freedom which is the most 
fundamental of all human essence.
By rejecting the idea of universal human essence, Sartre arrives at 
this well known doctrine "existence precedes essence". For Sartre, as seen 
in the preceding discussion, man has to make his own nature of essence 
through his own projects, choice, actions, etc...However, Sartre seems to
57. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism. Translated by Philip Mairet 
(London: Methuen, 1948), p.28.
34
reject human essence on one hand and acknowledges it on the other 
hand - an objection because he does not agree with the traditional view 
on man’s nature, and acknowledgement in the sense that he sees the 
nature of man as being universal in more than one aspect.
Up to this point, it would be useful to provide a summary of Sartre’s 
view of alienation in order to understand his philosophical and political 
writings. The alienation which was dominated by Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness had been developed in the Critioue of Dialectical Reason 
where he exposed the new meaning of this concept:
...I’homme qui regarde son oeuvre, qui s’y reconnart tout 
entier, qui, dans le meme temps, ne s’y reconnart pas du 
tout, qui peut dire a la fois: "je n’ai pas voulu cela" et "je 
comprends que c’est cela que j’ai fait et que je ne pouvais 
rien faire d’autre". Dirons-nous qu’il s’agrt d’une alienation? 
Certainement puis gu’il revient a soi comme autre. f581
It is in the separation of the man from his work, from his act, from his self 
that Sartre introduced his new notion of alienation. This separation is seen 
by a feeling of estrangement that the individual, for Sartre, experiences 
under special conditions towards his act, his labour and his self. For 
Sartre, alienation is presented by a lack of recognition which separated 
the labourer from his labour. The worker from his work. The human being 
from his act. In this case, to feel strange towards one’s own labour, to be 
separated from one’s own work is, to be alien to oneself. In Plavbov. 
Sartre, however, emphasized his view on the alienation clearly when he 
was asked:
It takes a lot to change a destiny. That destiny has got to be 
intolerable. And when it’s tolerable, it’s really worse. This is 
what I call "alienation". In our social order a man is always 
dominated by material things, and these things are
58. Sartre, Critioue de la Raison Dialectigue (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 
p. 285.
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themselves produced, created and exploited by others. 
These others do not confront him face to face. No. They 
impinge on him through the agency of objects. [59]
This notion of alienation has been adopted by Sartre from Marxist theory. 
Certainly, self-alienation was an important concept in Marx’s thought. Marx 
affirmed that: 'The immediate task of philosophy which is in the service of 
history is to unmask human self-alienation... [60]. The most important 
concept in Marx’s alienation was presented in his first manuscript of 
Capital, in the section entitled "alienated labour" therefore:
The externalization of the worker in his product means not 
only that his work becomes an object, an external existence, 
but also that it exists outside him independently, alien, an 
autonomous power, opposed to him. The life he has given 
the object confronts his as hostile and alien. [61]
Thus, the meaning of alienation in Marx’s view is externalization. For Marx, 
externalization is the term which he used for the labour of the labourer 
which became separated from him, outside him, strange to him, isolated 
from him, opposed to him, and therefore, alien to him.
It should be noted that the meaning of Sartre’s concept of alienation 
is identical to the one given in Marx’s theory, because both ideas implied 
separation, estrangement, isolation and externalization from one’s work, 
although the use of the terms are different. Moreover, Sartre’s concept of 
alienation before and during the Second World War was concerned with 
the dimensions of the consciousness, that is, with beings rather than with 
individuals themselves, as in Marxist theory. Indeed, Sartre’s concept of 
alienation became, after the war, the most important of his political 
writings.
59. Playboy interview Jean-Paul Sartre, Playboy. May 1965, p. 72.
60. Karl Marx, Writing of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society. 
Translated and edited by Uoyd D. (Euston and Kurt, H. Guddat, 
1967), p. 251.
61. Ibid, p. 290.
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The concept of alienation in Sartre’s thought had been developed 
from Being and Nothingness (1943) to Critioue of Dialectical Reason 
(1960). In Being and Nothingness, alienation was expressed by one of the 
individuals who was in relation with the other, the conflict was particularly 
between individuals. Also, the alienation was controlled by an individual, 
as it was represented by the impossibility of the for-itself (consciousness) 
to recover his being-for-others. In the Critioue of Dialectical Reason. 
Sartre’s alienation was expressed by both the individuals and the other, 
and the conflict was between the individual and matter. Whereas, in 
Being and Nothingness. Sartre did not offer any solution to the problem 
of alienation, in the Critioue of Dialectical Reason, however, he proposed 
one which was related to a new mode of existence of individuals.
(C) THE LEFT-WING INFLUENCE ON SARTRE.
Now let us see Sartre’s relation with politics which became the most 
important development in his writings. In addition to philosophy and 
psychology, politics has also dominated his thought and life, particularly 
in his later writings and activities. The main political events which have 
affected Sartre’s writings in France between the two World Wars concern 
the French Communist Party. Sartre’s relation with politics, mainly with the 
Communist Party, developed from the time when he was a student in the 
Ecole Normale Superieure (1924-1929). At that time, he had been 
influenced by most of his friends especially Paul Nizan, a member of the 
Communist Party. Perhaps, Annie Cohen-Solal is right when she said:
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"...The Ecole Normale brought him a feeling of freedom, and 
euphoric lightness that might be sufficient explanation for 
everything that happened there". [62]
Indeed, at the beginning of 1930s, Sartre wrote:
a series of events - the advent of Nazism, incidents in China, 
the Spanish Civil war, the World crisis - came to wake us up; 
we felt as if the rug was pulled out from under our feet and, 
suddenly, we found ourselves caught in a big lie. Suddenly, 
we realised that the first years were in fact only the last 
years between two wars. [63]
When the French Communist Party started its activities in December, 
1920 there were only four workers as members of the directing committee 
and the main part was represented by intellectuals. In France as a whole 
the Right-wing was dominant, as Alfred Cobban stated in his book A 
History of Modern France:
In the feverish dawn of victory after a night of misery and 
bloodshed, the Right-wing, which had stood for the fight to 
a finish and total victory, was bound to win. [64]
However, towards 1924, the Left-wing which was represented by the
Radicals and the Socialists dominated the country after an election where:
The Cartel des Gauches won 270 seats against 210 to the 
Bloc National, with about 50 of the Gauche Radicale in the 
middle, and a flanking group of some 30 Communists. It was 
not a safe majority but sufficient to enable the Cartel des 
Gauches to take over the Government. [65]
62. Annie Cohen-Solal, Sartre: A Life. Translated by the author herself. 
(London: Heinemann, 1987) p.63.
63. Ibid, pp.125-26.
64. Alfred Cobban, A History of Modern France. Vol. 3 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1961), P. 121.
65. Ibid, p.127.
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It should be noted that within the Communist Party, membership declined 
at the end of the twenties to attain its minimum in 1933, as Daniel Brower 
pointed out in his book, The New Jacobins: The French Communist Party 
and the Popular Front (1968):
Membership declined from 50,000 in 1928 to 29,000 in 1933, 
the lowest in the Party’s history. The major Communist 
newspaper, L’Humanite. was at an all-time low in 1932 and 
1933, printing between 100,000 and 110,000 copies on an 
average per day and actually selling 70,000 to 80,000. [66]
Besides L’Humanite. the most important journals which presented the 
political ideas of the Communist Party in the twenties and thirties were: 
Clarte. Bulletin Communiste. Monde. Nouvel Age. Europe. Commune, and 
Pensee.
According to Daniel Brower, the first positive contact between the 
Communist Party and other parties of the left was in 1932 when Maurice 
Thorez* agreed, as Brower said:
...to initiate discussions with the socialist leaders on the 
questions of the proletarian unity, in the hopes probably of 
manoeuvring the Socialist Party into an unfavourable position 
in the eyes of the workers. But it was the Socialists who 
outmanoeuvred him. [67]
*  Maurice Thorez was born in a poor miner’s family in the north of 
France. He joined the Socialist Party in 1919 and the Communist 
Party in 1920. In 1924 he became a member of the Central 
Committee, in 1926 a member of the Secretariat Committee and in 
1928 the Secretary for the Party’s organisation.
66. Daniel Brower, The New Jacobins: The French Communist Party and 
The Popular Front (Cornell Univ, Press, 1968), p.15.
67. Ibid, p. 22.
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However, in 1934 the Communist Party changed its policy and appealed 
for a united front against fascism. At that time the pact for unity of action 
was signed between the Communists and the Socialists as Brower 
affirmed in The New Jacobins:
By July 27, the pact for unity of action was ready to be 
signed. The Communist Party had agreed to all the major 
socialist demands. In its final form, the pact provided for a 
campaign of joint meetings and demonstrations in order to 
"mobilize" the working population against the fascist 
organisations". It also called for support of "democratic 
liberties" and for opposition to "war preparations," the decree- 
laws and fascist terror in Germany and Austria. [68]
It should be noted that the pact between the Socialists and the 
Communists was signed on 27 August 1934, and the Amsterdam World 
Congress was held as a step towards the constitution of the Popular 
Front. In his book Communism and the French Intellectuals. David Caute 
claims that out of 2,200 delegates, the Communists were 830, and the 
Socialists were only 291. [69] Actually, this congress presented the 
constitution of the Popular Front which is considered to be the first event 
which attracted Sartre towards politics.
Before discussing Sartre’s relationship with politics let us consider 
the relationship between the Communist Party and the intellectuals. In fact, 
the Communist Party never recognized the intellectuals for their own 
originality. It might be understandable when David Caute refers to the 
underestimation of the intellectuals by Maurice Thorez, the leader of the 
French Communist Party:
68. Ibid, p. 65.
69. David Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals 1914-1960
(London: Andr6 Deutsch, 1964), p. 107.
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In declaring that the working class alone could guide 
intellectual movements, Thorez momentarily took theory to an 
opposite, and absurd, extreme in order to rub in a tactical 
lesson. Since the working class could directly be identified 
with the party, the intellectual had to "place himself entirely, 
without any reserve, in the ideological and political positions 
of the working class". [70]
Accordingly, we may say that the intellectuals were considered by the 
Communist Party to be a means in order to attain its goals. Indeed, the 
party asked for the support of the anti-fascist intellectuals in 1934 when 
Maurice Thorez was still a General Secretary of the Party and in 1936 
when Paul Vaillant-Couturier, a member of the political bureau;
...showered sympathy on the scientists, educators, doctors, 
artists and writers who were striving to safeguard UEspr'rt in 
a society enslaved by the tyranny of money, assuring them 
that: "the Communist Party listens to them. It hears them. It 
understands their fears, it collects them together. It is more 
than its duty. It is one of the reasons for its existence". [71]
Also in July 1937, Georges Cogniot, a member of the Central Committee 
of the French Communist Party, appealed for all intellectuals to join the 
party.
However, despite the policy of the Communist Party towards the 
intellectuals, the anti-fascist intellectuals founded the "Association des 
Ecrivains et des Artists Revolutionnaires" (AEAR) in 1932, with Vaillant- 
Couturier as General Secretary and with Paul Nizan and Andr6 Malraux 
who later become in De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic government Minister of 
Culture, among the organisation’s members. The journal of the
70. Ibid, p. 114.
71. Ibid, p. 27.
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organisation was Commune which appeared for the first time in July 1933. 
Moreover, another intellectual organisation was founded in 1934, in order 
to support the Communist Party and the Popular Front, and this 
organization was "ComitS de Vigilance des Intellectuels Anti-fascistes" 
(CVIA). This committee was also constituted of writers and artists like Paul 
Rivet and Paul Langevin.[72] But what is Sartre’s attitude towards the 
French Communist Party?
Sartre’s relationship with politics started early in his life when he was 
a student in the Ecole Normal Superieure (1924-1929), as we have seen 
previously. He was more attracted by literature and philosophy than by 
politics; and his political attitude towards the conflict between the political 
parties after the First World War was as he stated during an interview with 
Francis Jeanson:
Je n’etais pas du tout communiste, et je n’etais pas non plus 
socialiste: je pensais que certaines reformes pourraient 
permettre k la societe bourgeoise de se maintenir. J’etais 
plutot un reformiste.[73]
Therefore, Sartre’s interest in politics was not more than a passive 
judgement. Certainly, his friendship with Nizan did not affect his political 
passivity. This friendship helped Sartre to confirm the superiority of his 
literary writings over any other activities.
It should be noted that Sartre refused to join the Communist Party 
because of its weakness at that time. In 1934, when the "Comite de 
Vigilance des Intellectuels anti-fascistes" was organized and the pact of 
action with the Socialists was signed, Sartre was occupied by his literary
72. Ibid, p. 114.
73. Francis Jeanson, Sartre dans sa Vie (Paris: Le Seuil, 1974) p.294.
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and philosophical writings, preparing his essays L’lmaaination and writing 
his novel La Naus6e. But he was in favour of the Popular Front, and of 
any union between the Communist and Socialist parties to fight fascism, 
though his attitude did not go beyond moral support. In their book, Sartre. 
Contat and Astruc reported what Sartre thought at that time about his 
political attitude in 1935:
On etait contre la bourgeoisie, on etait contre les nazis ou 
les croix-de-feu...on etait sympatisant aux communistes, il 
n’y a pas Pombre d’un doute, on ne s’engageait pas, on 
n’avait pas I’idee de s’engager.[74]
In fact, Sartre was relying on the Popular Front to maintain peace in 
France and the external world. Although he did not even bother to vote 
in the election, he was hoping for a Popular Front victory. In a discussion 
of 1972, Sartre reported that in 1936:
I was entirely favourable to the Popular Front but did not see 
the need to vote, to give the sense of a decision to my 
opinion. I felt myself attracted by the crowds which made the 
Popular Front, but I did not really understand making myself 
part of them and that my place was in the middle of them. 
I saw myself as solitary. The positive element in that was an 
obscure repugnance towards universal suffrage, and the 
vague idea that a vote could never represent the concrete 
thought of a man.[75]
However, Sartre’s attitudes did not go beyond verbal expressions of 
friendship. In The Prime of Life. Simone de Beauvoir wrote of Sartre and 
herself:
74. Astruc, A. and Contat, M., Sartre, p.45.
75. On a raison de se revolter (Paris: 1974). This is a record of 
conversation between Sartre, P. Victor and P. Gavi from November 
1972 to March 1974 (pp. 23-24).
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...our individualism hampered our more progressive instincts, 
and we still maintained the attitude which had restricted us 
to the role of witness on 14 July 1935.[76]
The Second World War (1939-1945) is the most important mutation
and metamorphosis of Sartre’s life as he put it:
"La guerre a vraiment divise ma vie en deux. Elle a 
commence quand j’avais trente - quartre ans, elle s’est 
terminee quand j’en avais quarante et ga a vraiment ete le 
passage de la jeunesse a Page mur.[77]
Later, Annie Cohen-Solal wrote: "The Sartre of 1945 is no longer the
Sartre of 1939".[78] Indeed, the outbreak of war on September 1939,
"dramatized for Sartre the precarious nature of his liberty". [79] In the
following months, he was captured with 14,000 other French soldiers in
the hands of the Germans, and eventually transferred to Stalag XIID at
Trier, where he remained as a prisoner of war until 1941, and from where
he wrote and acted in a play called Bariona which was committed drama.
Bariona is set in Palestine on the even of Jesus’ birth, and the hero of the
play is the thief of a poverty-stricken village. Later in 1954, Sartre
described the feeling of close community induced by the prison camp:
J’ai compris ce que c’etait, un soir d’Avril 41: j’avais passe 
deux mois dans un camp de prisonniers, autant dire dans 
une borte a sardines et j’y avais fait I’experience de la 
proximite absolute; la frontiere de mon espace vital, c’etait 
ma peau; jour et nuit j’avais senti contre moi la chaleur d’une 
epaule ou d’un fianc. Cela ne ganait pas: les autres, c’etait 
encore moi. [80]
76. Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life p. 264.
77. Sartre, Situations. X (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 180.
78. Annie Cohen-Solal, Sartre: A Life, p. 131.
79. James D. Wilkinson, The Intellectual Resistance in Europe. 
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80. Sartre, "les Peintures de Giacometti", Les Temps Modernes. No 103, 
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In 1939 Sartre wrote to Simone de Beauvoir and said: "I have never 
felt such freedom of thought", and explained:
And it is not just because of the war and all it has thrown 
into question, but because of this little notebook; its free, 
fragmentary style liberates me from the slavery of previous 
ideas. I write on the spur of the moment, leaving any 
conclusions for later. [81]
Several years after Sartre’s death, Arlette Elkaim, Sartre’s adopted 
daughter (an Algerian Jew), had published this notebook as The war 
diaries. In this notebook, Sartre wrote about the major events of his life - 
his readings, his barrack companions, his experiences at Le Havre, Laon, 
Berlin, his friendships with women, his unhappy loves, and his relationship 
with politics - described through the eyes of a soldier. [82] It should be 
noted that after gaining his release from the prison camp, Sartre claimed 
that his imprisonment marked "the beginning of my ideological 
commitment1, [83] that is, when he "became conscious of what true 
freedom is".[84] But how did Sartre become involved in the resistance?
Sartre decided after his imprisonment and release (on pseudo­
medical grounds) from prison in 1941, to commit himself politically. Shortly 
after, he said that we had to unite and to organize a resistance movement 
against Nazism. As Simone de Beauvoir related this critical event in 
Sartre’s political life in her book The Prime of Life:
81. Letter to Simone de Beauvoir, October 26, 1939, quoted in Cohen- 
Solal’s Sartre: A Life, p. 140.
82. Ibid, p. 140.
83. Sartre par lui-mTme. Transcript of a film directed by A. Astruc and M. 
Contat (Paris: Gallimard, 1977). Translated as Sartre by himself, by 
Richard Seaver. (New York: Urizen Books, 1978). p. 50.
84. Les Nouvelles litteraires. February 1, 1951.
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The first evening he gave me yet another surprise. He had 
not come back to Paris to enjoy the sweets of freedom, he 
told me, but to act. How? I inquired, taken aback. We were 
so isolated, so powerless! It was precisely this isolation that 
had to be broken down, he said. We had to unite, to 
organize a resistance movement. [85]
This is the first step which can be seen in Sartre’s political life, and 
which resulted from his imprisonment. Indeed, after his imprisonment 
Sartre decided for the first time to become personally involved in political 
activities. He helped the foundation of a small resistance group which was 
called "Socialism and Liberty", as he reported later: 'We founded 
Socialism and Liberty’". I had chosen that title because I thought that 
socialism or liberty might exist". [86] It seems that the name is significant 
since it shows that Sartre was now adding concern for the community to 
his assertion of individual freedom. Simone de Beauvoir writes that 
reconciling these, "posed vast problems".[87] In 1941, Sartre tried for the 
first time to contact the Communists who were in the forefront of the 
resistance at that time, in order to work with them. But the Communists 
at first rejected his overtures, claiming that he was an agent-provocateur. 
As he ruefully recounts in his Entretiens Sur la Politique (1949):
I tried a first rapprochement with the communists and they 
replied to my message "Don’t trust Sartre, he had been freed 
for services rendered to the Germans". He is a spy who 
comes to get information on the inside workings of the 
resistance. [88]
85. Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, p. 264.
86. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p. 392.
87. Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, p. 482.
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In 1943, Sartre was invited by the Communist Party to join the "Comit6 
National des Ecrivains" (CNE) with apologies for what had been said 
earlier. This committee was represented by its journal "Les Lettres 
Francaises Clandestines". This new political orientation is illustrated in 
Sartre’s first play Les Mouches (1943). The play was written for political 
reasons, as he explained later:
Apres notre defaite de 1940, trop de Frangais 
s’abandonnaient au decouragement ou laissaient s’installer 
en eux le remords. J’ai ecrit Les Mouches et j’ai essaye de 
montrer que le remords n’eta'rt pas I’attitude que les Frangais 
devaient choisir apres I’effondrement militaire de notre pays. 
Notre passe n’etait plus. II avait coule entre nos mains sans 
que nous ayons le temps de le saisir, de le tenir sous notre 
regard pour le comprendre. [89]
From the prison camp, Sartre wrote to Simone de Beauvoir a letter 
in which he said: "I shall take up politics",[90] and when he returned to 
Paris he stated that:
I came back to France with the idea that other Frenchmen 
did not realize all this - that some of them, those who came 
back from the front and were liberated, realized it, but there 
was no one to make them decide to resist. That’s what 
seemed to me the first thing to do on coming back to Paris - 
to create a resistance and thus bring into being a violent 
movement that would expel Germans. [91]
For Sartre, resistance implied strict and important norms, like secret 
work and dangerous missions. In May 1944, the "top secret" file that
89. Sartre, Un Theatre de Situations. Edited by M. Contat and M. 
Rybalka (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), p. 228-9.
90. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p. 390.
91. Ibid, p. 390.
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arrived at Algiers and later re-appeared among the papers of Georges 
Andord, head of the resistance group, was the only token of Sartre’s 
presence in the underground and the text was titled "La Resistance: la 
France et le monde de demain - par un philosophe".[92] At that period 
Simone de Beauvoir asserted that Andre Malraux "...was relying on 
Russian tanks and American planes to win the war". [93] It should be 
noted that the group of "Socialism and Liberty" was on the side of the 
Communists during the resistance until the end of the war, though the 
group attempted to provide a third option between two powerful 
resistance machines: the Gaullists and the Communists. However, 
"Socialism and Liberty" was swept away by the active resistance and the 
members would gradually be absorbed into the ranks of the Communist 
Party. While Sartre refused to work both with the Communists and the 
Gaullists. [94]
Sartre’s work in the resistance and his collaboration with the 
Communists on "Les lettres Frangaises", and in the CNE, has been the 
subject of many critical discussions. However, he detested the 
"bourgeoisie" and longed for its overthrow, and opposed fascism and 
capitalism. While he: "regarded the working class as pursuing one of the 
most exemplary forms of human activity",[95] and he believed, above all, 
in individual freedom: freedom to be oppositionists in principle, freedom 
to formulate the aims of his work and life. Man exists first and defines 
himself afterwards. "L’homme n’est rien d’autre que ce qu’il se fait".[96]
92. Oudard file, French National Archives, quoted in Solal’s Sartre: A Life, 
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In 1945, Sartre published his first periodical, Les Temps Modernes 
which was edited originally by Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Raymond 
Aron, Michel Leiris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Albert Ollivier and Jean 
Paulhan. Sartre declared his main purpose in his first article of this journal, 
entitled "Presentation": "En resume, notre intention est de concourir a 
produire certains changements dans la societe qui nous entoure".[97] This 
was the initial goal for which Les Temps Modernes was initiated. 
Furthermore, the political writings of the Left-wing writers in Les Temps 
Modernes were not controlled by its directors. In other words, the journal 
became politically independent of its directors, Merleau-Ponty who was 
responsible for the political writing and Sartre who was only the editor of 
the journal.
Now let us give a birds-eye view of the elections of October 1945 
which made the Socialists and Communists meet together two months 
before the elections in order to consider the possibility of joint action. 
Though the Communists were interested in this union, the Socialists 
refused. On October 21, the French voted for a tripartite regime 
(Tripartism) - the Communists, the Socialists and the "Mouvement 
Republican Populaire" (MRP) - the political temporary agreement which 
ended in May 1947. In the elections the Communists had been given five 
million votes (approximately 26% of the total cast) and the other two major 
parties - Socialists and MRP - had four and one half million votes 
(approximately 24% of the total cast). Thus, the Socialists and 
Communists together constituted a majority and could have governed 
together.
In 1947, France began to move further to the right. At that time, the
97. Sartre, "Presentation", Les Temps Modernes. No. 1, 1945, p.7.
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French Government was fighting a war abroad and suffering from inflation 
at home. The outcome of the tripartite regime was that 20,000 Renault 
workers went on strike on April 30, 1947 as a protest against the rising 
cost of living supported by the Communists, though Premier Paul 
Ramadier (January 21, 1947 - November 19-23, 1947) reorganised his 
government with a "third force" coalition of Socialists, MRP’s and Radicals 
which ended in May 9. In this difficult political situation, De Gaulle was the 
first to take advantage and in April 1947, he organized "Rassemblement 
du Peuple Frangais" (RPF), trying to bring together all the anti­
communists, including the Radicals who, in fact, joined the Gaullists. The 
power of the RPF became more remarkable in the municipal elections of 
October 19 and 25. In his book, Merleau-Pontv. Existentialist of the Social 
World. Albert Rabil reported the results which made the triumph of De 
Gaulle’s organization:
When the election was finally held, the RPF polled 39 per 
cent of the vote; the Communists, against whom the whole 
campaign had been directed, held their own with 31 per 
cent; the Socialists remained in the running with 19 per cent; 
and the MRP and the Radicals, received only 9 per cent, 
being virtually replaced by the RPF. [98]
In October 1947, Premier Paul Ramadier’s government suggested 
to Sartre that he hold a weekly forum on the free radio, helped by his 
friends of Les Temps Modernes. The first broadcast was entitled 'We must 
campaign against believing that war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is 
inevitable", in which Sartre rejected the cold war politics of the two blocs. 
The second broadcast was entitled "De Gaulle" and "Gaullism" as seen by 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Les Temps Modernes staff. In his free speech, 
Sartre denounced his belief in the inevitability of war on which Gaullist
98. Albert Rabil, Merleau-Pontv. Existentialist of the Social World. (New 
York: Columbia, U.P., 1967) p. 92.
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politics was based. In the course of the discussion, Sartre and his friends 
said "When one looks at those RPF’s posters glaring from every wall of 
the city",...-Alphonse Bonnafe, Sartre’s former colleague and friend from 
the Lyc6e at Le Havre, said - "...you know what I am talking about, the 
huge portrait of the GeneraL.the little mustache, the heavy eyelids...not 
to mention the lock across the forehead...lt’s all there, I tell you! And the 
people who pass by say: feut that’s* - "Don’t say it!" another panelist 
interrupted him. [99] Also they compared De Gaulle to Hitler and spoke of 
De Gaulle’s scorn for the masses, but the members of the RPF defended 
their leader on the radio and in the press:
M. J. P. Sartre is talking about General De Gaulle in an 
indecent way, and his comparison of the liberation of our 
country, the restorer of our freedom and our republic, to 
Marshal Petain, not to mention the comparison to Hitler, is 
impermissible and worthy of public scorn. [100]
Moreover, the Gaullists said about this stormy encounter:
Monsieur Sartre’s broadcast about General De Gaulle was 
an attack on the probity and the dignity of the spirit...The 
author constructed a false De Gaulle, which he then 
compared to Petain and Hitler; such a thing could only 
deserve the contempt of the public. Given the circumstances, 
there was no need for an answer. Such an infamy deserved 
only silence. [101]
Sartre replied: "A citizen has the right to say what he thinks, 
always..."[102] However, Sartre’s disagreement with De Gaulle’s policy will 
be discussed in chapter four when De Gaulle came to power on the 
Algerian war.
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On the other hand, neither had De Gaulle’s new organization attained 
sufficient popularity nor did the Communists succeed in organizing the 
workers’ strike, as Rabil said:
Neither the extreme left nor the extreme right could muster 
a majority. Consequently in 1948 France settled down under 
third force rule. [103]
In this political situation, the "Rassemblement D6mocratique 
Revolutionnaire" (RDR) was organized in 1948 to unite both right and left. 
In forming and creating this organization, Sartre was completely separated 
from the Communist Party which he attacked later in Entretiens Sur la 
Politique, particularly when he said:
les cellules du Parti Communiste, par exemple, sont 
rigoureusement isolees les unes des autres, aucune d’elle ne 
sait ce qui se passe dans les autres. A mon avis, une 
premiere tache est de mettre en contact tous les Elements, 
c’est-a-dire, ce que nous appelons les sections - entre 
eux.[104]
One of Sartre’s aims was to liberate the workers ideologically from the 
alienation (the explanation of this term will be given later) which had 
dominated the workers’ life by the organization of a political group. But 
when this political group failed in 1949, Sartre contacted the Communist 
Party, because he thought that it was the only political organization which 
could liberate the workers from their alienation, although the Communist 
Party was against Les Temps Modernes and insulted Sartre for his own 
writings. In The French Communist Party Versus the Students. Richard 
Johnson affirmed this attack:
103. Albert Rabil, Merleau-Pontv. Existentialist of the Social World p. 104.
104. Sartre, "Entretiens Sur la Politique", Les Temps Modernes. No. 37, 
September 1948, p. 395.
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Jean Kanapa, editor of La Nouvelle Critique and a former 
student of Sartre, referred to him as a "Fascist abscess" and 
a "cop-intellectual". Roger Garaudy expressed his disgust 
over the intellectual fornications of the existentialists. In 1947 
Pravda accused Sartre of being "a service executor of a 
mission entrusted to him by Wall Street". [105]
These attacks made Sartre think about his relations with the party. In fact, 
Sartre’s attitude towards the French Communist Party was vacillating 
between two attitudes, disagreeing with its policy on one hand, and 
appealing for its friendship on the other hand. Certainly this was the 
reason for the Communist Party being against him and considering him 
a petit-bouraeois intellectual.
Since 1945, Sartre had been attacked by the French Communist
Party as an agent of the government and also for his role in the RDR, and
when his play Les Mains Sale (1948) (Dirty Hands) appeared, L’Humanit6
reviewed it as the work of a "nauseating writer" a "scandalmongering
playwright" a "hermetic philosopher" third-rate demagogue: such are the
stages of M. Sartre’s Career".[106] Also, a Russian critic wrote: "For thirty
pieces of silver and a mess of American pottage, Jean-Paul Sartre has
sold out what remained of his honour and probity". [107] Sartre’s Les
Mains Sales, the anti-Communist play had been the subject of many
critical discussions. However, Sartre claimed that:
My play is not intended as an apologia, but rather as a 
critical support of the socialist movement, and it exercises its 
criticism precisely by attacking the Stalinist methods that 
were then being used. [108]
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It should be noted that later in 1964 Sartre gave an interview to 
Paolo Caruso, the Italian translator of the Critique de la Reason 
Dialectiaue about Les Mains Sales which remains Sartre’s most successful 
play and which was used as a cold-war weapon. Sartre was greatly 
irritated of this use, and in 1952 he:
"decided to permit its performance only if the Communist 
Party in the country where it was to be performed agreed. 
Dirty Hands was banned, therefore, in Vienna (in 1952 and 
1954)..."[109]
Many interviews and comments were made by Sartre and reported by 
critics and journalists, among them Simone de Beauvoir who understood 
Sartre’s thought. She attempted to make us believe that Les Mains Sales 
was not intended as a political play at all. She claimed that:
"he had imagined a young Communist, born into the middle 
classes, seeking to erase his origin by an act, but unable to 
tear himself away from his subjectivity, even at the price of 
an assassination; in opposition to him he had created a 
militant politician utterly devoted to his objectives". [110]
However, Le Mains Sales might be called "peripolitical" as Paolo Caruso 
put it:
'To be quite accurate, a play about politics.Jn other words, 
you cannot be in politics - of any sort - without getting your 
hands dirty, without being forced to compromise between the 
ideal and the real". [111]
But let us see some characters of Les Mains Sales, who appeared
109. Ibid, p. 210.
110. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, pp. 159-60.
111. Sartre, Sartre on Theatre, p. 207.
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to take political action. Hoederer, one of the leaders of the Proletarian 
Party, who is planning political action which is not in keeping with the 
party line, and Hugo, young intellectual who has joined the Proletarian 
Party. Hoederer warns Hugo that it is not enough for him to support the 
goals of the Communist Party on paper, he must be prepared to get his 
hands dirty, that is, not to talk, but to act, as Sartre wrote:
Comme tu tiens a ta purete, mon petit gars! Comme tu as 
peur de te salir les mains. En bien, reste pur! A qui cela 
servira-t-il, et pourquoi viens-tu parmi nous? La purete, c’est 
une idee de fakir et de moine. Vous autres, les intellectuels, 
les anarchistes bourgeois, vous en tirez pretexte pour ne rien 
faire, rester immobile, serrer les coudes contre le corps, 
porter des gants. Moi j’ai les mains sales. Jusqu’aux coudes. 
Je les ai plongees dans la merde et dans le sang. [112]
From 1948, trials and conflict concerning Les Mains Sales continued 
throughout the world until 1956, though Sartre declared that:
I do not disavow Dirty Hands. I only regret the way it was 
used. My play became a political battlefield, an instrument of 
political propaganda. Given the tense atmosphere of our 
time, I don’t think that its performance in sensitive spots such 
as Berlin or Vienna would benefit peace. [113]
The development of Sartre’s political writings started to take sides on 
the early 1950’s. For him such
"intellectual games...by pushing things to extremes, revealed 
to each man the necessity to choose, and the consequences 
of his choice. [114]
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Also, comments made by Sartre and later reported by Simone de 
Beauvoir: "After ten years of rumination, I had reached breaking point: one 
light tag was all that was required".[115] This "tap" came after the U.S. 
General Matthew Ridgeway, former head of command in Korea and 
promoter of this new form of warfare, arrived in May 1952 to Paris to take 
up his duties as NATO Commander. On May 28, 1952, a violent anti- 
Ridgeway demonstrations was organized by the Communists: twenty to 
thirty thousand people marching illegally through the streets of Paris, 
accusing him of direct responsibility for practising biological warfare in 
Korea. The police retaliated with suppression of the riots and arrested 
Jacques Duclos in his car, the Secretary of the Communist Party. [116]
It should be noted that during these events, Sartre was in Rome and 
he had learned from the Italian newspapers of Duclos’ arrest. He wrote:
In the name of those principles which it had inculcated into 
me, in the name of its humanism and of its humanities, in the 
name of liberty, equality, fraternity, I swore to the bourgeoisie 
a hatred which would only die with me. When I returned 
precipitately to Paris, I had to write or suffocate. Day and 
night,I wrote the first part of "Les Communistes et la 
Paix".[117]
The most important fact to be noted was that when Sartre wrote an 
article, "Les Communistes et la Paix" in 1952, he attacked the bourgeois 
government in a way that he did not do before, and he considered the 
Communist Party the only party suitable for the workers. In this article, 
Sartre attacked the French government:
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Mais ce qui semble clair, en tout cas, c’est que le regime 
democratique n’est plus aujourd’hui qu’une fagade: tout les 
vrais conflits se deroulent en dehors de lui.[118]
What is more, of this attack he added:
Notre societe ne peut justifier la greve sans reconnartre 
d’abord et hautement qu’elle est une societe 
d’oppression.[119]
Indeed, in "Les Communistes et la Paix", Sartre defended the French 
Communist Party and the Soviet Union’s policy against various 
accusations made by the right and the non-Communist left. That was the 
essential political choice in Sartre’s view. For him, as he explained later:
it was essential to reject this accusation if one did not wish 
to find oneself on the side of the Americans. Afterwards, it 
was shown that the USSR, by behaving in Budapest as 
Stalin did not behave in 1948, in relation to Yugoslavia, and 
then by repeating the operation in Czechoslovakia, was 
acting in the manner of an imperialist power. [120]
In this article, Sartre was concerned to find out the extent to which the 
Communist Party was the "necessary" expression of the working class and 
the extent to which it was the "exact" expression of it. Because he 
acknowledged that the Party represented the will of the majority of the 
French working class, so, he announced his total agreement with that 
Party in a specific way, "en raisonnant a partir de mes principes et non 
des leurs..."[121] Also, he said that Soviet Union desired peace and 
proved it everyday, and he believed that the Russians could take Europe
118. Sartre, "Les Communistes et la Paix", Les Temps Modernes. No. 81- 
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"in a week" and win a war, despite American bombs. [122] However, 
through his experience Sartre discovered the class struggle when he said 
that through Simone de Beauvoir:
"...I discovered the class struggle in that slow 
dismemberment that tore us away from them (the workers) 
more and more each day...l believe in it, but I did not 
imagine that it was total. J  discovered it against myself' [123]
As the Korean War angered the Communist intellectuals and enabled 
them to pose as the champions of peace, Joseph Malik, the Soviet 
Ambassador to the U.N., reported from New York that the real issue of a 
Civil War in Korea was American intervention. [124] Further, the intellectual 
Roger Garaudy quoted from the Korean declaration of October 31st 1949, 
in Mesaventures de L’anti-Marxisme: "If it is necessary to unify Korea by 
war, I will make war, but, for that, I will need American aid".[125] But what 
is Sartre’s view on the Korean war?
Sartre’s position on the Korean War was that "the revolutionary 
consciousness of the Korean masses became an objective element in the 
calculations of the Russian leaders"[126] and also "the Koreans were for 
themselves the conscious agents of history, and, for the Russians, a tool 
manoeuvred from outside"[127] that was before the anti-Ridgeway 
demonstration. At that time Sartre, described himself as being among 
those "who are neither Communist nor properly speaking Communist 
sympathizers", because the Communist party was the only major force
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in France opposing the war, not only the Korean war but also the Indo- 
China war. Sartre, as might be expected, had always felt passionately 
on colonial questions, as he did in the late 1940’s when he accused the 
Communist Party of opportunism over Indo-China and in the late 1950’s 
over Algeria, as will be discussed in the following chapters. Indeed, Sartre 
was the first one to condemn the war in Vietnam and he asserted later: 
"we were the first to condemn Indo-Chinese war, in Les Temps Modernes. 
We were friends with a number of Vietnamese".[128] Also he believed 
that:
Hitler had openly proclaimed his deliberate intention of 
exterminating the Jews. He used genocide as a political 
means and did not disguise the fact. The Jew had to be put 
to death wherever he came from...simply because he was 
Jewish...can we say,...that the American armed forces are 
killing the Vietnamese for the simple reason that they are 
Vietnamese?...the structure of war change with the 
infrastructures of society. [129]
It should be pointed out that Sartre claimed that when he wrote "Les 
Communistes et la Paix", he did not have any communication with the 
Communist Party. He acted according to the freedom for which he was 
fighting, but in October 1952 some Communists had asked Sartre to be 
a member of the Committee for the liberation of Henri Martin, a 
Communist sailor, who had been arrested in May 1950 and condemned 
to five years in prison for his political activities, for passing out peace 
leaflets against the war in Indo-China. [130] He agreed to attend the 
meeting and write a book calling for the release of Henri Martin.
Sartre collaborated on a book L’Affaire Henri Martin making the facts 
of the matter public. Simone de Beauvoir reported during that year:
128. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p. 397.
129. Sartre, Between Existentialism and Marxism, p. 67.
130. Annie Cohen-Solal, Sartre: A Life, p. 325.
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...he (Sartre) was happy that the first step towards a 
reconciliation had been made. Circumstances had convinced 
him that the only path still open to the Left was to find a way 
back to unity of action with the Communist Party. [131]
But the book was not published until July 1953, after Henri Martin’s 
release. The book contained a number of letters and documents of Martin 
detailing the whole matter, edited and with commentary by Sartre.
In the meeting, Sartre’s speech strongly defended Henri Martin’s 
case and he said that Martin was a positive hero, good son, good 
student, good resistance fighter, good worker, good sailor. Among the 
letters which had been sent by Martin from Saigon to his parents, he 
wrote:
My dear Parents,
We can be proud of today’s toll:
one child dead and one woman wounded, without 
considering all other bodies we have left in the rice- 
field...Now that we have killed his child and wounded his 
wife, our Annamite is certainly going to turn to the Viet Minh, 
if he isn’t already one. This is how we pacify them. Aside 
from this, peace everywhere. This is all for tonight. Lots of 
kisses, Henri. [132]
However, Sartre’s friendship with the Communist Party was 
destroyed after the occupation of Budapest by the Soviet Union in 1956. 
This particular event surprised Sartre, then gradually it transformed his 
friendship with the Communist Party into hostility. In his article "Le 
Fantome de Staline", Sartre affirmed that, referring to the Soviet Union:
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...quand vous tiriezy dans ces joumges d’octobre, quand les 
chars de I’armee communiste k 1’appel d’un chef communiste 
massacraient des ouvriers communistes, c’etait le socialisme 
lui-meme que vos balles et vos obus faisaient voler en 
eclats. [133]
It should be pointed out that Sartre adopted several positions with 
respect to Marxism both in his writings and in his politics, that was, from 
the end of the Second World War until the Soviet intervention in Hungary. 
At that time Marxism was represented in France by the Communist Party 
which had its relationship with the Soviet Union. When "les Communistes 
et la Paix" appeared in 1952, Sartre was not only giving his full support 
to the politics of the Communist Party but he was defending Marxism. 
Sartre’s discovery of Marxism and the French Communist Party certainly 
arrived with a vengeance. The development of Sartre’s Marxism took a 
greater depth after 1952. But in this development he did not give such 
strong support to the French Communist Party. Sartre’s approach to 
Marxism, however, encountered several difficult obstacles. The first 
obstacle was the Soviet Union which was against Sartre’s view of 
Marxism. The second obstacle was the French Communist Party which 
followed the ideas of the Soviet Union without developing Marxist theory. 
The third obstacle was the difficulty of Marxist theory which became an 
official doctrine in Stalin’s view. What can be noted in Sartre’s writings 
from 1945 to 1957 was an effort to find the revolutionary core of Marxism 
within its Stalinist shell.
For Sartre, Marxism was "an unveiling of being, and at the same 
time...an unanswered question as to the validity of this unveiling"[134]
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Marxism organized the priority of being beyond knowledge without 
pointing out the nature of this knowledge. In the post-war popularity of 
existentialism and Marxism, Sartre reduced his view on human freedom. 
He quoted from Capital by Marx in order to consolidate his position: This 
reign of freedom cannot be until there is an end to the work imposed by 
necessity and external finality.[135] Sartre went on:
As soon as there will exist for everyone a margin of real 
freedom beyond the production of life, Marxism will have 
lived out its span; a philosophy of freedom will take its place. 
But we have no means, no intellectual instrument, no 
concrete experience which allows us to conceive of this 
freedom or of this philosophy. [136]
In his book, Marx’s Concept of Man. Erich Fromm claimed that 
Marx’s thought is "a spiritual existentialism in secular language", and also 
he pointed out that "Marx is primarily concerned with the emancipation of 
man as an individual, the overcoming of alienation, the restoration of his 
capacity to relate himself fully to man and to nature". [137] Sartre 
considered existentialism as the contributing ideology and Marxism as the 
philosophy which we cannot go beyond. Marxism was now "the 
philosophy of our time"[138] whereas existentialism was only an external 
"ideology" that was useful only because of the failure of Marxism to 
develop properly as an intellectual system. Does this explain why many 
writers claim that Sartre was trying to reconcile Marxism with 
existentialism? If the two modes of thought were united in experience,
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that meant that the project of reconciliation was possible. Sartre claimed 
that existentialism can be reconciled with historical materialism but is 
irreconcilable with dialectical materialism. Moreover, he considered the 
Marxists, who criticized his existentialism comparing it to an ideology of 
"petit bourgeois" as philosophers of dialectical materialism. Thereby, Sartre 
believed in the possibility of reconciling his existentialism with Marx’s 
theory of historical materialism. Although, Sartre claimed to be a Marxist 
in his social thought he borrowed the materialist conception of history 
from Marx and rejected dialectical materialism. Then, he explained the 
Marxist philosophy as historical materialism. In fact, materialism for Marx 
was based on the consideration of the practice of the individual to be not 
only determined by circumstances but also to have the possibility to 
change these circumstances.
For Sartre, Marxism is a way of understanding the objective 
dimension of human history from the perspective of the results of human 
action. Existentialism is a way of understanding the subjective individual 
lived experience within the general framework that Marxism provides. As 
he put it 'We were convinced". [139] Also Sartre emphasized that:
At one and the same time that historical materialism furnished 
the only valid interpretation of history and that existentialism 
remained the only concrete approach to reality. [140]
In his article "History and Existentialism in Sartre", Leonard Krieger 
pointed out that Sartre did not always have a historical method, that 
certainly his first writings deliberately repudiate the possibility of acquiring 
a certain type of knowledge to be a historian. This was an important
139. Ibid. p. 21.
140. Ibid, pp 21-64.
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subject of Sartre’s first work Nausea where the amateur historian 
protagonist found that "Every existing thing is born without reason, 
prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance". This historian seeks 
a meaning which does not exist, he imposes one of his own. According 
to Krieger, Sartre adopted this view:
Sartre’s immediate response to the opacity of existence was 
aesthetic. The note of hope on which La Nausee ends, holds 
forth the prospect of escaping “the sin of existence" not by 
penetrating it but by going "behind" it and "above" it to create 
an intangible something to which existence refers but which 
itself has being, duration, and therefore no existence. This 
something, exemplified in La Nausee by a tune and a novel, 
is generalized in L’lmaainaire into any work of Art. [141]
The experience of the Second World War had a fundamental 
importance for Sartre. Immediately after this War, Sartre abandoned what 
he called abstract philosophical contemplation, and he claimed that:
It was the war which shattered the worn structures of our 
thought - war, occupation, resistance, the years which 
followed. We wanted to fight at the side of the working- 
class; we finally understood that the concrete is history. [142]
Therefore, on these counts the experience of this war gave to Sartre a 
new understanding of history as real and knowable, and of groups of 
solidarity. In Force of Circumstance. Simone de Beauvoir emphasized that: 
"The war had effected a decisive conversion...First of all, it had shown him 
his own historicity1.[143] Whereas, Sartre wrote towards the close of the 
war:
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Jamais nous n’avons ete plus libres que sous I’occupation 
allemand. Nous avions perdu tous nos droits et d’abord celui 
de parler;...Et le choix que chacun faisa'rt de lui-meme 6tait 
authentique puisqu’il se faisart en presence de la mort,...Ansi, 
dans I’ombre et dans le sang, la plus forte des Republiques 
s’est constitute. Chacun de ses c'rtoyens savait qu’il se 
devait a tous et qu’il ne pouvait compter que sur lui - meme; 
chacun d’eux realisait, dans le delaissement le plus total, son 
role historique. Chacun d’eux, contre les oppresseurs, 
entreprenait d’etre lui-meme dans sa liberty, choisissait la 
liberte de tous. [144]
Moreover, by the late fifties he stated that:
Thus the plurality of the meaning of history can be 
discovered and posited for itself only upon the ground of a 
future totalization - in terms of the future totalization and in 
contradiction with it. All is obscure, and yet everything is full 
light. To tackle the theoretical aspect, we have the 
instruments; we can establish the method. Our historical task, 
at the heart of this polyvalent world, is to bring closer the 
moment when history will have only one meaning, when it 
tends to be dissolved in the concrete men who will make it 
in common. [145]
It should be noted that Sartre was clear and honest when he said that he 
did not fully understand history. But he had found a method by which it 
could be understood. Apparently, understanding history does not imply 
that the historian has got power to influence history. His understanding 
could simply be his own powerlessness and alienation that is, brilliant in 
theory but impotent in action.
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From now on, the investigation of the character of man in society 
and political action were to be one of his interests, as Sartre later realized: 
"For revolution is not a state of a soul. It is a daily practice illuminated by 
a theory". [146] This assertion was made manifest as early as 1945, with 
the publication of Les Temps Modernes which supported anti-colonialist 
such struggles as the struggle of the Vietminh and Algeria.
Therefore, as the Algerian revolution which started late in 1954 began 
to demonstrate its seriousness, Sartre found himself facing a new difficult 
political situation, as he had a dual obligation: obligation towards his 
nation (France) and the obligation imposed by his position in the Left- 
wing, and on his theory of freedom. On the one hand, as a theoretician, 
he had to comprehend the historical structure of the conflict. On the other, 
as an activist, he was to become engaged in contributing to a form of 
revolution which would make the outcome of the struggle a political 
success for the peoples of both Algeria and France. Basically, these two 
commitments were aspects of one another. But later Sartre declared that 
he was free to say "yes" or "no" and he always felt free to agree or refuse. 
In his interview with Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre said:
Take my attitude during the Algerian war...That was the time 
at which I separated myself from the Communist Party 
because the party and we did not want exactly the same 
thing. The party did envisage the independence of Algeria 
but only as one possibility among others, whereas we 
agreed with the FLN* in calling for that independence in the 
immediate future. [147]
*  FLN: le Front de liberation National. The Party of the nationalist 
revolutionary struggle formed on November 1, 1954. It became the 
only political party which ruled Algerian people after independence. 
(We shall see more information about this party in the following 
chapters).
146. Sartre, Situations (IV). Translated by Benita Eisler and Maria Jolas as 
Situations. (New York: G. Braziller, 1965), p. 177.
147. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p. 367.
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Furthermore, French intellectuals were engaged in a debate over the 
nature and function of the intellectual in modern society. These anti­
colonialist intellectuals are Jean-Marie Domenach, Claude Bourdet.Frangois 
Mauriac, Albert Camus, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Francis Jeanson 
and his wife Colette Jeanson and Frantz Fanon.[148] Further, details of 
these intellectuals will be given in the next chapters as they are referred 
to. Their opinions were expressed in prestigious non-communist 
periodicals that usually published anti-colonialist writings; like Les Temps 
Modernes. Esprit. France-Observateur and L’Express. Among these 
intellectuals there was Sartre who was wholeheartedly with the Algerian 
people, as he claimed later in his interview in Plavbov:
I’m an intellectual, not a politician. But as a citizen, I can join 
pressure group. That explains why I was wholeheartedly with 
the Algerians. These are the duties of a citizen. Since my 
skills are intellectual, I can serve as a citizen by writing. [149]
Sartre must set no limits within himself, and also he must let no limits 
be set for him. Moreover, Sartre thinks that:
"La Verite reste toujours a trouver, parce qu’elle est infinie. Ja  
Verite entiere...est atteignable - encore que personne ne soit 
capable, aujourd’hui, de Patteindre".[150]
However, the role of the French intellectuals particularly Sartre towards the 
Algerian revolution will be discussed at length in the following chapters.
148. Paul Clay Sorum, Intellectuals and Decolonization in France. (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina. 1977, p. xii.
149. Plavbov. interview Jean-Paul Sartre, Plavbov. May, 1965, p. 74.
150. Sartre, Situations X. (Paris: Galimard, 1976), pp. 148-9.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE OUTBREAK OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION ON 
NOVEMBER 1, 1954 AND THE FRENCH INTELLECTUALS
(a) The emergence of the FLN on November 1, 1954 in Algeria.
(b) The aim of the FLN.
(c) The attitude of the French intellectuals toward the Algerian War.
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The essential is not what others have made of man, but what he has
made from what others made of him...
Our age will be an object for those future eyes whose gaze haunts us. 
And a guilty object. They will reveal to us our failure and guilt. Our age, 
which is already dead, already a thing, though we still have to live it, is
alone in history, and this historical solitude determines even our
perceptions; what we see will no longer be; people will laugh at our 
ignorance, will be indignant at our mistakes. What course is open to us?
Jean-Paul Sartre, Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr.
Translated by Bernard Frechtman.
(New York: G. Braziller, 1963).
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I shall attempt to discuss the outbreak of the Algerian 
revolution on November 1, 1954. I will examine especially, in the light of 
the emergence of the FLN in Algeria, how the organized revolution began, 
and also, the aim of the new organization. I shall also examine how the 
French administration reacted to the Algerian revolution.
In order to understand the emergence, and the aim of the FLN, it is 
first necessary to review briefly the events of 8 May 1945 and how they 
indirectly related to the November uprising. The next step will be to look 
at the attitude of the French intellectuals toward the Algerian War, as this 
may help us to understand how Sartre gradually became involved in the 
Algerian problem. As the whole thesis is devoted to investigating Sartre’s 
political writings on the Algerian War, it will be useful to examine only the 
intellectuals who were close to him, Albert Camus, Francis Jeanson, Frantz 
Fanon and also who were actively and practically involved in the Algerian 
revolution.
(a) THE EMERGENCE OF THE FLN ON NOVEMBER 1, 1954 IN 
ALGERIA.
Before discussing the emergence of the FLN in the Algerian 
revolution it will be worthwhile to give a birds-eye view of the events of 8 
May, 1945 as a background to All Saints’ Day, 1954.
When the French invasion of Algeria on 5 July 1830, settlement, and 
integration were celebrated, it was assumed that Algeria no longer had 
any life apart from France. By the turn of the century, the number of 
Europeans was about 1,200,000, including the Jewish community of
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140,000. They had settled there to guarantee that Algeria should remain 
French and ensure that it should develop along modern western lines. But 
Algeria had never been entirely peaceful under French rule. However, the 
first organized and modern political protest against the colonial regime 
began in the inter-war period among Algerians in Paris. After the Second 
World War, the Algerian drive toward self-assertion gained momentum, as 
did nationalist movements elsewhere. The two "founding fathers" of 
Algerian nationalism were Messali El-Hadj and Ferhat Abbas. First, let us 
take a close look at both men.
El-Hadj Abdel-Kader (known as Messali El-Hadj) came from a 
working class family and was by temperament both a mystic and an 
extremist. A soldier in the First World War and an early member of the 
French Communist Party, he broke with the Communists later in his 
political career. In 1930, he attended the Communist International congress 
in Moscow, then returned to Paris where he founded a nationalist 
newspaper, El-Ouma (The Nation) which was banned by the French 
authorities later. He was arrested in 1933, for attempting to reconstitute 
the banned "Etoile Nord Africaine" (North African Star). In 1935, he 
founded the "Union Nationale des Musulmans Nord Africains", which in 
turn was banned in 1937. In 1937, he formed his "Parti du Peuple 
Algerien" (PAA) (the Algerian Popular Party), and immediately obtained a 
large following among the poorer Moslems. His victory over Ferhat Abbas 
at the 1945 congress of the "Les Amis du Manifeste et de la Libert^" 
(AML) (A Moslem integrationist party) founded by Ferhat Abbas in 1944 
to change the social and economic situation of the Algerian population 
was important. The events at Setif in 1945, led to Messali’s deportation to 
Brazzaville where he remained until 1947. Since 1945, he has been an 
important figure-head in Algerian history.
71
Ferhat Abbas was born on 24 October 1899 at Tahir in the 
department of Constantine, son of an influential pro-French Bachagha.* 
Abbas went to Algiers to enrol in Algiers University Chemistry School. He 
was made aware of material French achievements in Algeria and of the 
modernity of European life. Abbas was first and foremost a professional 
student politician. He was a good mixer, an excellent debater. On 10 
February, 1943, Ferhat Abbas and fifty-five Moslems (lawyers, doctors, 
teachers and professional politicians) signed the "Manifeste du Peuple 
Algerien" (MPA). In 1944, Abbas made contact with Messali El-Hadj, 
himself under house arrest near Algiers, and Abbas announced the 
creation at Setif of the "Les Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte" (AML) 
which included Messali and a number of nationalists. Since then Ferhat 
Abbas has been as important a figure-head in Algerian political history as 
El-Hadj Messali. In September 1958 Abbas became the first President of 
the "Gouvernement Provisoire de la R§publique Algerienne" (GPRA) in exile 
(September 1958-August 1961).[1]
The most important event in the development of Algerian nationalism 
occurred on the morning of 8 May, 1945 in Setif (East of Algeria). The 
population of this largely Moslem town were preparing for a mass march. 
It was VE Day, the first day of peace after the Second World War. The 
demonstrators started walking from the main Mosque at 9.15 a.m., several 
of them appeared that morning carrying French, British, Russian and 
American flags, signs reading "down with colonialism", "free Messali" "Vive 
Messali" (at that time, Messali was packed off into exile to the desert, then
* Bachagha: one who worked for the French administration in Algeria
as an intermediary between the European and the native population.
1. Jean Lacouture, Cinq Hommes et la France (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1961), pp. 265-324.
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deported to Brazzaville), "we want to be your equals", "for the liberation 
of the people, long live free and independent Algeria".[2] A group of them 
carried for the first time the green and white flag which later became the 
FLN flag. Cheering and shouting, they ran into the police. Then, the 
demonstrators were shot indiscriminately. By noon the movement had 
spread to Guelma, Azaba and Kharatta.
The number of the victims in these events has never been accurately 
given. One could ask how and why the Setif, Guelma, Azaba and Kharatta 
explosions occurred? They have never been satisfactorily explained by the 
French authorities. A French investigating committee reported that 103 
Europeans were killed, plus another hundred wounded, with a high 
proportion of officials. According to the official French source the true 
figure of Algerians killed in these events at Setif, Guelma, Azaba and 
Kharatta was 1,005. But from private sources, French Army officers with 
direct experience of the repression suggested about 8,000 Algerians were 
killed in these villages. Some international reporters like the New York 
Times, reported the figure of the Algerian victims at between 18,000 and
20,000. While Algerian nationalists themselves claimed that between 45,000 
and 50,000 Algerians were killed. [3]
However, the French authorities have never provided the information 
about the Setif bloodbath, as Simone de Beauvoir recalled: "we heard very 
little about what had happened at Setif1, [4] and L’Humanit6. the 
Communist newspaper, reported only a hundred or so casualties, while
2. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (London: 
Macmillan, 1977), p. 25.
3. In an interview with Alistair Horne in October 1973, President Habib 
Bourguiba of Tunisia persisted in the belief that "more than 50,000" 
had been killed after Setif. I have quoted this from Alistair Horne, A 
Savage War of Peace, p. 27.
4. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p. 39.
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the Algerian Communist Party (PCA)* described the uprising as "Hitlerian". 
Amar Ouzegane, Secretary-General of the Algerian Communist Party, 
wrote in Liberte. the party journal, "the organisers of these troubles must 
be swiftly and pitilessly punished, the investigators of the revolts put in 
front of the firing squad".[5] On the eight day of May, the Algerian liberal 
leader, Ferhat Abbas was in Algiers to congratulate the Governor-General 
on the Allied Victory in Europe. He was nevertheless arrested and jailed. 
In his book The Algerian Problem. Edward Behr affirmed that:
An event which, in one form or another, has marked every 
Algerian Muslim alive at the time...Everyone of the "new wave" 
of Algerian nationalists prominent in the National Liberation 
Front today traces his revolutionary determination back to 
May 1945...Each of them felt after May 1945 that some sort 
of armed uprising would sooner or later become 
necessary. [6]
The French government reacted by making considerable efforts 
towards a liberal framework for Algeria. In September 1947, the French 
government founded the Algerian Assembly and the Europeans would 
control the whole assembly. [7] Further, Algeria remained under the 
responsibility of the Governor-General which was under the rule of the 
Interior Minister.
It should be pointed out that the reason for these events of the 8th 
May 1945, seems to be ignored by Western historians. It was because the 
French administration took Algerian Moslems to fight beside the French
*  PCA: "le Parti Communiste Algerien" (The Algerian Communist Party), 
composed largely of Algeria’s European residents. An adjunct of the 
French Communist Party, the party was banned after independence.
5. Amar Ouzegane in Liberte. May, 1945.
6. Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 
p.49.
7. Ibid, 57.
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against Germany, and promised the leaders of some parties to give 
Algeria freedom if France won the war. But all this was forgotten and 
never mentioned. Furthermore, the Algerians realized the complex of 
inferiority in which they had lived for more than one century. The French 
had created the complex of inferiority of the Algerians as the white man 
had created the "Negro Problem". Let me explain. Before the Second 
World War, Algerians thought that they were inferior to the European race. 
After colonizing Algeria the French set about the destruction of everything 
(books, manuscripts) proving that Algeria has a different culture from 
France, but not an inferior one. France fuelled the feeling of inferiority by 
not providing education for the Algerians. At that time people used to 
accept French rule because they thought the French knew better than 
they. In 1942, the French took the Algerians to fight with them against 
Germany. But there, the Algerians experienced not only their equality with 
the French, but their superiority in some cases. Their experience with the 
French revealed to them that they could not only fight against them, but 
also send all the French back to France and liberate Algeria. However, I 
am not going to discuss the Setif event and the development of Algerian 
nationalism between 1945 and 1954 in detail as I am primarily concerned 
with the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion on November 1, 1954.
Now let us give a birds-eye view of the background to the Algerian 
revolution which started at 1.00 am on November 1, 1954. Conditions in 
Algeria on the eve of the revolution were highly discriminatory against the 
Algerian majority. Only about 4% out of the European population were 
wealthy "colons", (European-Settlers in North of Algeria) while the 
remainder were urban, middle or lower class or small farmers, the "pied-
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noir".* While 73% of Algerians’ land was divided into less than 10 
hectares, 80% of colon land was divided into more than 100 hectares (25 
hectares is needed, on average, to feed at least one family). 
Approximately 20% of the Algerian population controlled 65% of its 
revenue, and the annual per capita income for Europeans in Algeria was 
almost 28 times that for Algerians. Over 500,000 Algerians, particularly 
males, worked in the French metropole. Most Algerians, with the exception 
of a small elite bourgeoisie, were deprived of all opportunity for 
advancement. One Algerian child out of 10 went to elementary school; 
all Europeans did. One in 175 Algerians and one in three Europeans went 
to secondary school (Lycee).[8] Consequently, there were only 99 Algerian 
doctors, 17 dentists, 44 pharmacists (including Ferhat Abbas), 161 
lawyers, and 5 architects in Algeria. Also, out of 25,000 of the French 
government officials in Algiers, only 183 were Algerians, for the most part 
Janitors and Night Watchmen. [9]
*  Pied-noir: as defined by Edmond Jouhaud, this is a term of relatively 
recent vintage, and first came into use in the Second World War. It 
designates those early colonists who, while reclaiming marshy land 
in the Mitidja region (the best land in north of Algeria), burnt the 
scrub that covered it. Their naked feet were blackened by the 
cinders. Edmond Jouhaud, Ce que ie n’ai pas drt (Paris: Artheme 
Fayard, 1977) p.8.
Pied-noir: small shopowners, artisans, builders, fishermen, miners and 
low-level civil servants, aided and abetted by sympathizers within the 
police and the army, would provide grassroots support for the 
nascent counter pro-FLN groups. Most of them are Alsatians. The 
wealthy "pied-noir" in north Algeria are "colons" (settlers), excluding 
Jews Community, who taken the best land from the native 
population. Thus, this community of "pied-noir41 later became the base 
of support for OAS (Organization Secret Army) which we are going 
to see in the last chapter in detail. However, I have to refer to the 
European settlers as "pied-noir41 in my thesis as described by French 
and Algerians.
8. Ferhat Abbas, Autopsie d’une Guerre (Paris: Gamier Freres, 1980), 
pp. 222-3.
9. Ibid, p. 223.
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Nine years after the Second World War and the Setif bloodbath and
the destruction of France militarily and economically in the war, the
country was still in difficulties. Demands for change in both Tunisia and 
Morocco started early in the 1950s. Also the victory of Indo-China in the 
capitulation of Dien-Bien-Phu in May 1954, destroyed the French Army 
psychologically and politically. These reasons led Algerian nationalists to 
unite into one party and to the emergence of the "Front de Liberation 
Nationale" (FLN) (National Liberation Front) which brought together the 
whole spectrum of nationalist groups and activities. The new group, 
named "Comite Revolutionnaire d’Unite et d’Action" (CRUA) (the 
Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action) was founded in March 1954, 
by Mohammed Boudiaf, Mustapha Ben-Boulaid, Mourad Didouche,
Belkacem Krim, Rabeh Bitat, and Mohammed Larbi Ben-M’hidi. In his
book Le Meilleur Combat. Amar Ouzegane (a former Secretary of the
Algerian Communist Party) wrote:
Le CRUA a fait table rase du pass6, en rompant avec 
I’ideologie politico-maraboutique du nationalisme
conventionneL.Continuateur et heritier d’OS,* nourri de la
seve du MTLD**, le CRUA n’est plus le reflet d’une
tendance, d’un parti, d’un certain nationalisme, mais
I’interprete fidele d’un patriotisme transcendant, s’identifiant 
avec I’ame du peuple entier.[10]
*  OS: "L’Organisation Speciale". A Moslem paramilitary force that 
preceded the CRUA, created by Algerian revolutionaries in 1947.
* *  MTLD: Le Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertes democratiques.
A militant nationalist party organized by Messali in 1946.
10. Amar Ouzegane, Le Meilleur Combat (Paris: Julliard, 1962), p. 158.
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The new group CRUA restyled itself and formed the FLN, which took up 
responsibility for the political direction of the revolution.
Before preceding to action the FLN divided Algeria into six "willaya"*
(zones or sections) and appointed one leader to each "willaya":
Willaya I: Aur&s, Mustapha Ben -Boulaid 
Willaya II: Constantine, Mourad Didouche 
Willaya III: Kabylia, Belkacem Krim 
Willaya IV: Algerois, Rabeh Bitat
Willaya VI: Sahara (not designated yet) [11]
Mohammed Boudiaf acted as liaison between the internal and external 
groups. In addition, Ahmed Ben-Bella (who later became, after 
independence, the President of Algeria [1962-1965], Mohammed Khider 
and Hocine Ait Ahmed, formed the external delegation in Cairo [Egypt] in 
order to gain international support for the rebellion. However, these nine 
leaders were referred to in the period of the revolution and the early years 
of independence as the "historic nine", the "historic chiefs" or the "nine 
fathers of the Algerian revolution".
At 1.00am on 1 November, 1954 each leader with his group of 
rebels attacked French installations, the private property of "grands 
colons", French military personnel, police headquarters, and Moslem 
collaborators in different parts of Algeria introduced All Saints’ Day. The 
rebellion launched seventy separate attacks on French posts and other 
strategic targets throughout the country, [12] but the rebels’ main activities 
were concentrated on the region of the Aures mountains in the East of
*  Willaya: each district of operations was called a willaya. The correct
transcription should be "wilaya", but the French form has been kept 
because it is used today by Algerians.
11. Abedlkader Yefsah, Le Processus de Legitimation du Pouvoir Militaire 
et la Construction de L’Etat en Alaerie (Paris: Anthropos, 1982), p.26
12. For an account of this event by a participant, see Mohamed Boudiaf, 
Ou Va L’Alaerie. (Paris: Editions librairie de L’Etoile, 1964).
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Algeria; as Rene Mayer, deputy of Constantine, reported later, the Aures 
was "practically in a state of insurrection".[13] Among these attacks were 
the seizure of a police barracks in Khenchela and temporary control of 
several small areas such as Batna and Arris. Also, the explosion of a 
reservoir of the "Societe Alg6rienne du P6trole Mory" in Algiers. However, 
each leader with his group in each "willaya" carried out that night action 
at the same time, indicating the beginning of revolution. The reasons for 
starting this action in all the main cities of Algeria were: first, to surprise 
French authorities by an organized revolution. Second, so that they will 
not retaliate on one "willaya" or one single city which would facilitate the 
task for them. Third, to involve all the parts of Algeria in this revolution, 
and also to get all the organizations influenced by the FLN’s goal. Fourth, 
to mislead the French Army, so that it did not concentrate on one single 
"willaya" which would destroy the revolution.
At first, the reaction of the French administration seemed to be to 
ignore the attacks of the FLN on her army bases and strategic targets. 
Gradually, France recognized the new situation in Algeria had to be faced, 
that is, the beginning of a general insurrection. The first reaction in France 
and Algeria was Messali’s MTLD, and they had arrested about 160 
supporters who had had no part in planning the revolution. But the
reactions of the "pied-noir" in Algeria were strongly sharp toward the
Algerian Moslems. The Deoeche Quotidienne wrote on November 2:
The evil must be pursued where it is to be found and the
ringleaders rooted out where they are...The security
measures must be reinforced...[14]
13. Quoted in Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem, p. 67.
14. La Depeche Quotidienne. November, 1954.
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It should be pointed out that earlier Chailly Bert, the "pied-noir" deputy of 
Algiers, affirmed that:
The natives do not love us, and can never love us. They 
should not be asked to love us. And I refuse to believe those 
who pretend that the native feels affection for us. Their 
association is neither natural nor probable; it is a dangerous 
illusion that must be carefully avoided. [15]
While Cairo Radio said that: "At one o’clock this moming...Algeria 
began to live a worthy and honourable life"[16] and also Le Monde had 
not ignored the action: "Their spontaneity...gives rise to the belief that one 
is in the presence of a concerted action". [17]
In France, however, the press remained calm. This is, why the revolt 
in Algeria did not excite any attention among the Republic. L’Humanite "at 
first reacted by condemning both the adventurism of the attackers and the 
colonization policies of the government".[18] But the dimensions of the 
event were appreciated by other intellectuals like Frangois Mauriac who 
said:
15. Quoted in Vincent Conifer, France and Algeria, the Problem of Civil 
and Political Reform (1870-1920). (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1966).
16. Quoted in Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem, p. 67.
17. Le Monde. November 3, 1954.
18. L’Humanite. but by November 3, the French Communist Party organ 
began to denounce cases of torture.
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I did not believe that the worst was so close. But my friends 
know that I am overwhelmed by it. The immediate 
responsibility of the Fellaghas* does not in any way attenuate 
the responsibility that has weighed on us for the last 120 
years, a burden that has increased in each generation. The 
horror of what is about to break out must be completely 
softened by a concentrated offensive against low salaries, 
unemployment, ignorance and misery and by the structural 
reforms the Algerian people are calling for. And, at any cost, 
the police must be prevented from torturing. [19]
Now let us see how the Pierre Mendes France government reacted. 
The news could hardly have come at a worse time for it. On November 
1, 1954, at 9am Mendes France received a telephone call from Frangois 
Mitterrand, Minister of the Interior. Mr Mitterrand explained that several 
dozen terrorist attacks had taken place in Algeria the night before. These 
attacks were in the three Algerian departments**: their simultaneity and 
the choice of targets like police stations and French military personnel 
showed that an ambitious plan was being carried out. Therefore, for 
Mitterrand, if it was not a general uprising, it was at least a concerted 
action. Because of his position, the Interior Minister had complete control 
over Algeria and he warned that France’s only negotiation would be war. 
When Mendes France had originally appointed him as the Interior Minister, 
Mitterrand said: "I think we should concern ourselves with Algeria 
immediately if we want to avoid an explosion".[20] Certainly, the 
response, for Mendes France and Mitterrand, was first of all military (force 
with force). For the French government, it seemed necessary to react first 
of all by reaffirming the force of law. During the evening and night of the
*  Fellaghas: singular of Fellagha, rebel defined by French propaganda 
as "voyou" who slaughter innocent people.
* *  French Administration divided Algeria into three parts: department of 
Algiers, department of Oran, and department of Constantine, while 
the FLN divided Algeria into six "willaya".
19. Frangois Mauriac, Bloc-Notes. Vol. I. (Paris: Flammarion, 1958), 
p.133.
20. Franz-Olivier Giesbert, Mitterrand ou la Tentation de L’Histoire (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1977), p. 120.
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first of November, three companies of "Compagnier R6publicaines de 
Security" (CRS) landed at Oran, Algiers and Constantine. The next day, 
a battalion of parachute troops was sent to Algeria. [21] On 2 November, 
the Premier sent this eloquent note to the Cabinet.
First: we must make sure that the troop movements have 
been carried out. Second: we must at least triple the number 
of troops and CRS sent to Algeria...we must act on them in 
the most energetic way so that they do not lose a 
moment. [22]
On 12 November, in a fighting speech to the National Assembly, Mendes
France declared:
One does not compromise when it comes to defending the 
internal peace of the nation, the unity and the integrity of the 
Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French 
Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they 
are irrevocably French...Between them and metropolitan 
France there can be no conceivable secession.
This must be clear once and for all, in Algeria and in 
metropolitan France as much as in the outside world.
(Applause from left, centre, right and extremist right).
Never will France - any French government, or parliament, 
whatever may be their particularistic tendencies - yield on this 
fundamental principle.
Mesdames, Messieurs, several deputies have made 
comparisons between French policy in Algeria and Tunisia. 
I declare that no parallel is more erroneous, that no 
comparison is false or more dangerous. "L’Algerie, c’est la 
France". [23]
21. Jean Lacouture, Pierre Mendes France. Translated by George Holoch 
(New York, London: Holmes and Meier, 1984), p. 305.
22. Pierre Rouanet, Mendes France au Pouvoir (Paris: Robert Laffont, 
1965). p. 376.
23. Ibid, pp. 383-4.
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In reaction, the spokesmen for colonial interests attacked the Mendes 
France Cabinet for their policy. It was firstly proclaimed that "liberties are 
not appropriate for insufficiently evolved peoples", secondly, that 
"repression comes first", thirdly that "the Fellahs* want bread, not political 
rights", fourthly that this was a government of "national surrender". And 
also the spokesmen agreed that it was the policy of "concessions" in 
Tunisia for instance, that had "provoked the troubles" and "shattered 
harmony"[24] in Algeria. However, these criticisms turned into accusation 
later, when Claude Bourdet published an article in France-Observateur 
entitled "Votre Gestapo Algerien" (Your Algerian Gestapo), which 
characterized the method of torture and the frightful conditions in the 
prisons of Tizi-Ouzou, and Aures of the Mendes France government. The 
end of the article was a slap in the face; Bourdet concluded:
Can our statesmen...calmly stand for what is happening? It 
is the great colonial interests that are giving the orders, but 
it is M.M. Mendes France and Mitterrand who are responsible 
before public opinion and before history.
When you allow such crimes to be committed you do not 
save yourself by saying: "others would do worse".[25]
It should be noted that twenty six years later, Mendes France 
pointed out:
Unlike what had happened in Tunisia and Morocco, French 
colonization in Algeria had destroyed the indigenous elites. 
There was thus no one to negotiate with. What I tried to 
make people understand was that we had to begin with a
*  Fellahs: Peasants; most people in Algeria are Fellahs.
24. Jean Lacouture, Pierre Mendes France, p. 307.
25. Claude Bourdet, "Votre Gestapo Algerien", France-Observateur. 13 
Janvier, 1955.
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procedure that would allow the Algerians to designate 
spokesmen with whom we could carry on a dialogue. We 
had to begin with acts under French law: juridically, Algeria 
was France. We could do nothing but consider it as part of 
France with which it is necessary to carry on a debate.
But a debate with whom? The 1947 statute, never applied, 
had created the Algerian Assembly. God knows that it was 
open to criticism, but it existed. The statute provided for the 
creation of a sort of government, the Executive Council, 
made up of three Europeans and three Algerians, and never 
set up...[26].
Here, Mendes France seemed to present a "new deal" for Algeria because 
it was clear to him that colonial rule in Algeria would have to end sooner 
or later, as it was ending in Tunisia, Morocco, and Indo-China. The 
question was, when? And with whom to negotiate? In Indo-China, Tunisia, 
and Morocco there had been the leaders who were present in the 
negotiation (Ho Chi Minh, Habib Bourguiba, and Sultan Sidi-Mohammed). 
But in Algeria, there was no one to negotiate with according to Mendes 
France. If negotiation was the key to the Algerian problem in November 
1954, why did France not negotiate on May 8, 1945 with the leader of 
MTLD, Messali El-Hadj? Probably, Mouloud Feraoun, the Algerian liberal 
writers, is right when he said:
This sad day...For Frenchmen who refuse to understand, for 
the Algerians who refuse to explain...[27]
26. Quoted in Jean Lacouture, Pierre Mendes France, p.307.
27. Mouloud Feraoun, Journal. 1955-1962.
(b) THE AIM OF THE FLN
Now let us see the FLN’s initial proclamation. To understand the 
FLN’s aim, it will be better first, to know the proclamation of the FLN 
which addressed the Algerian people and the militants of the national 
cause. Indeed, there were many demands in the proclamation of the 
FLN, but the most important aims could be summed up as goals of 
independence and the liberation of Algeria. [28]
The FLN rebellion, which the French authorities initially dismissed as 
a minor affair has a number of elements. First, the FLN as a new 
organization with its twin aims of liberation and independence had its 
military component called the "Armee de Liberation nationaie" (ALN) 
(National Liberation Army). Second, the FLN’s appeal for unity and 
organization in order to achieve its aims did not succeed because Messali 
did not join, and the Messalists refused to rally to the FLN. They claimed 
that the FLN was an organization of political supremacy. Linder this 
situation Messali formed "Le Mouvement National Algerien" (MNA) 
(Algerian National Movement), to vie with the FLN for control of the 
nationalist movement. In France, the MNA gained support from the 
emigrant Algerian workers through its "Union syndicate des Travailleurs 
Algeriens" (USTA) (Union of Algerian Workers). However, the FLN’s aims 
had destroyed Messali’s movement, and he himself escaped the country, 
never to return, and some of his supporters became Harkis (pro- 
French).* The FLN also established later a strong organization in France
28. See more information about the proclamation of the FLN on 
November 1,1954 in Ferhat Abbas La Guerre et Revolution d’Alaerie 
(Paris: Julliard, 1962) pp. 220-4.
*  Harki: The Moslem Algerians who supported "L’AIgerie Frangaise", 
and helped the French Army to destroy the FLN’s aims.
85
in order to oppose the activities of MNA. One pro-FLN group in Britain, 
for instance, continued to refer later to Messali El-Hadj as "...a tragedy of 
a man passed by history, retreating into bitterness to the counsel of false 
advisers". [29] The only organizations maintaining friendly neutrality toward 
the FLN for the first year of the war were the UDMA, the Association of 
Reformists ULAMA,* and the Algerian Communist Party.
When it became clear that the FLN was not going to break down
under French military forces, both leaders, Ferhat Abbas of UDMA, and
Towfik El-Madani of ULAMA went to support the FLN in Cairo later in
April, 1956. Despite this show of support, the FLN could not forget the
historical mistake of Abbas when he denied the existence of Algeria as a
nation earlier in 1936. He said:
If I had discovered the "Algerian Nation", I would be a 
nationa!ist...But I will not die for the Algerian fatherland 
because it does not exist. I have questioned history, the 
living, and the dead...Nobody spoke to me about it. Of 
course, I did discover the "Arab empire", the Muslim empire 
which honoured Islam and our race, but these empires are 
dead...Therefore we have cast aside all foggy ideas and idle 
fancies to bind our future definitively to that of French 
endeavour in this country. [30]
Furthermore, what surprised the French authorities as well as the Algerian 
people was when he demanded in the Cairo meeting the withdrawal from
* ULAMA: The religious reformist movement and nationalism. In 1931, 
the Association of the Reformist ULAMA of Algeria was formed under 
Abdel-Hamid Ben-Badis. The goal of the nationalist-oriented religious 
movement was to overcome the degenerative tendencies that had 
appeared in the Islamic faith.
29. Free Algerian. April 15,1960, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Published monthly by the 
British Friends of the Algerian Revolution).
30. Ferhat Abbas, "La France, C’est Moi", L’Entente ("The Assimilationists" 
journal), Fevrier 23, 1936. Translated by Roger Le Tourneau in 
Evolution Politique de TAfriaue du Nord Musulmane. (1920-1961) 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1962) p. 314.
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Algeria of the French Army, a manoeuvre that has been termed “...an act 
of political artistry that enabled him to survive". [31].
It should be noted that the French administration did not miss the 
implications of the ULAMA’s position when they had warned the French 
government in Algeria of its importance in 1933. The idea of ULAMA 
movement had been gaining force in the Moslem world since the early 
colonial period. In his book Politics in North Africa. Henry Clement Moore 
affirmed that it:
"...emerged partly in response to the challenge of the West, 
and as a consequence of the crisis that Islam was 
experiencing in that century". [32]
Beside UDMA and ULAMA, the Algerian Communist Party had a different 
political and ideological basis from the FLN. It remained friendly with the 
FLN and decided to participate in the action against the colonial 
regime. [33] The leader of the Algerian Communist Party Amar Ouzegane 
stated that:
The PCA (the Algerian Communist Party) engaged only 
thirteen combatants for the zone of Algiers, 150-200 for the 
whole Algerian-Saharan territory, a figure which is a bit 
meagre for a revolution on the very soil of the fatherland 
when the same PCA was able - once upon a time - to find 
two thousand Algerian volunteers to fight in the International 
Brigade". [34]
31. Paris, AFP (Broadcast, April 8, 1958, 1729 GMT-E).
32. Henry Clement Moore, Politics in North Africa (Boston: Little, Brown 
& Co., 1970), p. 322.
33. Henry F. Jackson, The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a 
Revolutionary Society, (London: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 29.
34. Amar Ouzegane, Le Meilleur Combat (Paris: Julliard, 1962), p. 185.
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However, like Moslem dissidents, the FLN accepted Communists into 
the movement individually, not as a party. According to Henri Alleg, editor 
of the Algerian Communist Party newspaper Alger- Ftepublicain. the 
Algerian Communists as individuals made a great contribution to the 
national struggle, particularly with their political writings in the latter 
newspaper. Indeed Alleg was the one who gave moral support and 
encouragement to the militants. But the police did not accept the realities 
of Henri Alleg and banned the newspaper in 1955. Two years later, they 
threw Alleg into an internment camp. From the prison, he supported the 
FLN struggle, by writing his famous book La Question (1958) (The 
Question).[35] (I shall discuss this point in detail in the next chapter).
The strength and unity of the FLN leaders worked to persuade the 
Algerian masses - sometimes through coercion - to gain greater Moslem 
popular support for the revolution. FLN-related associations, such as 
labour unions, student organizations, and women’s organizations. The 
most important of these were "Union Generate des Travailleurs Algeriens" 
(UGTA) (the General Union of Algerian Workers) and the "Union Generate 
des Etudiants Musulmans Algeriens" (UGEMA) (the General Union of 
Algerian Moslem Students). All these organizations had to be under the 
FLN rule and to recognize the aim of the revolution, the liberation and 
independence of Algeria.
Gradually, the popular aspects of the FLN’s political administration 
were organized throughout Algeria. Both the ALN and the civilians created
a war council, "Le Comite de Coordination et d’Execution" (CCE)*
*  CCE: The executive organ of the FLN in war, established by the
Soummam Valley Congress in August, 1956. (We shall see more 
information about this congress in the next chapter).
35. Henri Alleg, La Question (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1958), translated
as The Question by John Calder. Preface by Sartre (London: Calder,
1958).
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controlled the general direction of this movement which extended down 
to the Mechta,* Douar,** village, and the large cities. During 1955-1956, 
the ALN and the civilian group continued to carry out sporadic sabotage 
and harassment against French installations like police headquarters and 
military bases, and attack the European communities, and also Moslem 
collaborators, who supported "L’Algirie Frangaise". For the second year 
of the war, these tactics were carried out with a high degree of 
success. [36] The ALN started with an army numbered in hundreds and 
poorly armed with hunting rifles and other light weapons. As Ahmed Ben- 
Bella claimed later, the FLN started the revolt with only 350 to 400 
miscellaneous firearms, and virtually nothing heavier than a machine gun. 
Soon, however, the ALN had developed a disciplined and well-organized 
force of over 3,000 men. But it was impossible for them to confront the 
French Army in a direct military action. Their hit-and-run tactics were the 
most successful way of fighting French colonialism. It should be noted that 
the FLN’s intention was to spread the revolt as soon as possible all over 
Algeria and gain the support of international public opinion. Indeed, they 
had to rely on rebellion activities of the ALN first, and second, on the 
diplomacy of the FLN.
In 1956, the Algerian revolution was greatly supported by most 
important international developments, which increased its chance of 
victory. First, the independence of Tunisia and Morocco in March, 1956. 
In his book Algeria in Turmoil. Michael Clark claimed that Tunisia had
*  Mechta: A community of people living together in a Douar. A Mechta 
is a part of a Douar.
**  Douar: A part of "Willaya". A Douar is divided into many Mechtas.
36. Neville Barbour, A Survey of Northwest Africa: (Maghrib) (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 234-35.
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become, by the end of 1956 as "...a huge drill ground, rest camp and 
arms depot for rebels". [37] According to Clark, there were about 200,000 
Algerians living in Tunisia at this period, over 5,000 were armed and 2,000 
were receiving military training.[38] Also, Clark stated later in the New York 
Times, as a correspondent:
...but for the aid and protection afforded it by Tunisia and 
Morocco, the rebellion would have been circumscribed and 
perhaps crushed before the end of 1957. But as the United 
States learned in Korea, it is singularly difficult to destroy an 
enemy enjoying the sanctuary of an inviolable frontier. [39]
Second, the revolution was greatly aided by Nasser, the Egyptian 
President, who supported the FLN since November, 1954. As the arms 
and funds from Egypt were sent through Libya and Tunisia, Nasser 
claimed that he would support the Algerian revolution in many ways, 
including advice on strategy and planning. However, in the support 
provided by Egypt and some of the Arab countries, the Algerian revolution 
caused Nasser’s seizure of the Suez-Canal in 1956 and castigated the 
"...obstinate French opposition to the forces of historic change..."[40] as 
Cairo became the frequent headquarters for Algerian revolution meetings 
and planning in order to achieve international support, Jacques Soustelle 
wrote about the two revolutionary forces:
37. Perhaps Michael K. Clark is right when he says that these figures 
included the exterior army under Colonel Houari Boumedienne who 
became later in the independence President of Algeria (1965-1978), 
which never saw combat during the revolution.
38. Michael K. Clark, Algeria in Turmoil. (New York, Grosset and Dunlap
1959), p. 353.
39. Michael K. Clark, New York Times. February 12, 1958.
40. Resistance Alqerienne. August 9, 1956. Edition 5, Number 5. N.P. 
Organe de Front de Liberation Nationale Algerienne pour la defense 
de L’Algerie du Nord.
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Algerian activism and Egyptian expansionism tended to 
create jealousy and rancour between the veteran Algerian 
leaders and the ambitious Nasser. [41]
Third, the Algerian revolution became the subject of international 
interest and concern when the Bandung Conference was held in April 
1955. The most important discussion of the Asian-African nations was first 
to consolidate their non-alignment with the major powers and to state their 
support for independence movements. Among the points discussed, was 
the Algerian problem. Prime Minister of India, Ne hru made a statement 
about the right to independence of the Algerian people. Further, the most 
important support to the history of the FLN’s movement was the speech 
by Premier Chou En-Lai, senior delegate of the People’s Republic of 
China, who asserted that:
...however, we cannot help being aware that the people 
of...A!geria and other dependent peoples who have been 
fighting for independence have never ceased to be 
suppressed with violence. [42]
And also, he declared, China’s full sympathy and support to the struggle 
of the Algerian people for full support.
Fourth, there was increasing international support for the Algerian 
struggle. On July 29, 1955, Algeria recognized concrete evidence of this 
support, when delegates from Asia and Africa during the session of the 
United Nations General Assembly requested the Security Council to place
41. Jacques Soustelle, Aimee et Souffrante Alaerie. I have quoted this 
translation from Michael Clark, Algeria in Turmoil, p. 96.
42. Survey of China Mainland Press. American Consulate General, Hong 
Kong, (No. 1031, April 20, 1955), p.3.
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the Algerian question on the agenda. Immediately the FLN sent their 
representatives to the United Nations, Abdel-Kader Chanderli and 
M’hamed Yazid. Chenderli had fought in the Second World War with the 
French Army against Germany as other Algerians did. In 1942 he escaped 
to Britain, joined De Gaulle, fought through Italy and ended the war in 
Stuttgart. In 1948, he had reported on Palestine for French newspapers 
and then worked for UNESCO in Montevideo. In 1954, he went to Cairo 
where he worked as an external delegation for Ahmed Ben-Bella, and he 
was in charge of arms procurement from Yugoslavia to the FLN. Whereas 
M’Hamed Yazid had been educated at University in Paris. At that period, 
he became Secretary-General of the Association of Moslem Students in 
France. He joined the PPA. In November 1954, he switched to the FLN, 
and attended the Bandung Conference. Alistair Horne affirmed:
...the FLN at the United Nations...were fortunate in the 
exceptionally good choice they had made by sending in 
1956 their two best-fitted talents to New York: Abdel-kader 
Chanderli and M’hammed Yazid.[43]
As we have seen the FLN divided Algeria into six "willaya" in order to 
organize the revolution and to carry out action against French colonialism. 
The numbers of ALN increased to surprisingly high levels, after the 
independence of Tunisia and the resettlement of the FLN directorate in 
Tunisia. [44] The FLN created new "willaya" under the title of "Base de 
L’Est", close to the Tunisian border in order to supply arms and funds to 
the other "willayete" (plural of "willaya"), and also to communicate with the 
external world. In each "willaya", they had military bases, sanctuaries and
43. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 244-5.
44. George Armstrong Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Armv and Empire 
in Crisis: 1947-1962 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Mit Press, 
1965), p. 169.
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also they had a sufficiently large area for recruiting.[45] For the first year 
of the war, the FLN started with 3,000 militants. In 1956, they claimed to 
have 42,000 men under arms. It could be that the ALN had reached its 
greatest strength of military effectiveness in Algeria. In his book Les 
Rebelles Alaeriens. Serge Bromberger claimed the figures as follows.
"Willaya" VI Sahara had by this time been suppressed and divided 
between "willaya" IV Alg6rois and "willaya" III Kabylie.[46] It appeared that 
the FLN had by now acquired the ability to influence the population and 
to create close ties between the civilian and the ALN, and also to mobilize 
the area of war.
Now let us see how the French administration reacted to the Algerian 
revolution which had increased gradually since November 1954 and 
gained international support in the short time. As the Algerian war was 
officially a "War of reconquest" against the colonialists and imperialists for 
the Algerians. But for the French authorities, particularly the army, it was 
the war that, even against the will of God, could not be lost. [47] The 
French government remarkably increased the forces in order to maintain 
their slogan: "L’Alg^rie Frangaise" in reaction to the Algerian military forces,
45. Otto Heilbrunn, ,rThe Algerian Emergency, 1954-1962", Journal of 
Royal United Services Institute. 1966, p.231.
46. Serge Bromberger, Les Rebelles Alaeriens (Paris: Plon, 1958), p.249.
47. George Armstrong Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Armv and Empire 
in Crisis: 1947-1962. p. 145.
Tunisie et la Base de I’Est 
Willaya I Aures-Nementchas 
Willaya II Nord-Constantinois
8,000
5.000
5.000
8.000
7.500
8.500
Willaya III Kabylie 
Willaya IV Algerois 
Willaya V Oranie
42.000 Total
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the French had considerably strengthened their forces too, from 50,000 
soldiers in 1954 to 200,000 in March 1956, totalling more than 400,000 
[48] with the help of NATO, of course. They ruled by decree, in order to 
bring the ALN under control through military forces.
However, the French authorities claimed that they had killed 36,000 
Algerians and lost 4,000 of their own forces in two years. [49] Perhaps, 
they were right because of their shooting indiscriminately. Indeed the 
Algerian warriors paid a price for their revolution against the French 
government. The following quotation clearly states the number of the ALN 
soldiers who were killed:
At the beginning of the struggle "rebels" were being killed at 
the rate of 200 per month: in 1956 the figure had reached 
1,400 a month, and in the first four months of this year, 
2,600 a month. The news last week that 1,000 "rebels" had 
been killed in two days would indicate that the killing is 
becoming less discriminating: that all Algerians are being 
considered as "rebels". [50]
On January 25, 1955, the French administration appointed Jacques 
Soustelle as Governor-General of Algeria in order to reinforce her policy 
and to break the deadlock in Algeria, and also to destroy the strength of 
the FLN. The new Governor-General was designated by Mendes France 
himself, because he thought that Soustelle was the man who seemed to 
fill the lack of leadership in colonized Algeria. In 1935, Soustelle became 
one of the leaders of the "Vigilance Committee of Anti-fascist Intellectuals". 
In 1940, he was designated by De Gaulle as Chief of the Free France 
Secret Service. After the Liberation he became De Gualle’s Minister of the
48. Selected Articles, Freedom. V, 4-10 (1954-63), p. 148.
49. Ibid, p. 148.
50. Ibid, pp. 148-9.
94
Colonies. However, ten days after his nomination as Governor-General of 
Algeria, Soustelle was told by Mend&s France:
you will need courage to confront those big panjandrums in 
Algiers who, up to now, have decreed rain or shine...your 
mission will be difficult. [51]
On February 6-7, Jacques Soustelle landed in Algiers, keeping in his 
mind all the instructions:
In north Africa...either there will be a policy of reconciliation, 
or the policy of repression and force - with all its horrible 
consequences... [52]
After an extensive tour of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle realized that the 
Algerian revolution was far more widespread than recognized in France, 
as he reported:
The rebellion was then tending to become an endemic evil, 
that of permanent and diffuse guerilla warfare with ambushes, 
isolated attacks and individuals assaults...at first, these 
attacks on Moslems soon became more and more frequent 
and atrocious, by gruesome effects: revolting mutilations, 
threatening messages pinned to the clothes of victims. [53]
It should be pointed out that the attitude of Soustelle towards the 
Algerian revolution, was like Mendes France who had reinforced the army. 
He claimed that:
51. Jacques Soustelle, Aimee et Souffrante Alaerie (Paris: Plon, 1956), 
p.23.
52. Jacques Soustelle, La Page n’est pas Tournee (Paris: Plon, 1965), 
p.13.
53. Jacques Soustelle, Aimee et Souffrante Alaerie. p.39.
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No uncertainty must be allowed to remain as to our inflexible 
determination to preserve Algeria from the terrible destiny 
that some are seeking to prepare for it. France is at home 
here, or rather, Algeria and all her inhabitants form an 
integral part of France, one and indivisible. All must know, 
here and elsewhere, that France will not leave Algeria any 
more than she will leave Provence and Brittany. Whatever 
happens, the destiny of Algeria is French. This means that 
a choice has been made. The choice is called "integration"; 
it is to make Algeria each day more completely a province, 
different from the others, certainly, but fully French. [54]
It should be noted that the French political leaders and people who 
supported "L’Algerie Frangaise" felt a passionate attachment to Algeria for 
a number of reasons. First, if Algeria were lost, probably France would 
be the poorest power in Europe. [55] Second, strategically, Algeria was 
just across the Mediterranean, "un bassin Frangais", which made the 
French politicians say "La plus grande France, de Dunkerque k 
Tamanrasset", and also the French people believed that Algeria had been 
built by them, and it was impossible to leave it. Third, in contrast to the 
nationalist movements with whom the French were used to dealing, in 
Africa and Indo-China for instance, the FLN in Algeria appeared as 
barbaric and fanatical resistance. It was extremely difficult for French 
people to imagine Algeria ruled by such men. Fourthly, the oil and gas 
that were discovered in the Sahara in 1956, which created a great
54. Ibid, p.43.
55. 1954 French Trade in Milliards of Francs:
Export Import Balance
Algeria 172.28 115.76 +56.62
Morocco 77.63 51.30 +26.33
Tunisia 42.02 28.75 +13.27
W. Germany 123.13 119.69 + 3.44
USA 54.07 113.31 -79.24
Iraq 1.29 77.70 -76.41
Source: Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1954. (Paris: 1955), p.245. 
I have quoted this from Christopher Harrison, "French attitudes to 
Empire and the Algerian War". African Affairs. Vol. 82, 1983, p.76.
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enthusiasm to keep Algeria French, at least for a short time. [56] Up to 
this point, I shall discuss the most important events in the Algerian War 
in the next chapters. From here on, only the attitudes of the French 
intellectuals toward the Algerian War since November 1954 are to be 
considered.
(c) THE ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH INTELLECTUALS TOWARD THE
ALGERIAN WAR.
Now let us see the attitude of the French intellectuals in the Algerian 
War, and how their ideas had been influenced by the development of the 
revolution, as it appeared that there were many thinkers of high intellectual 
standing who were actively involved in the Algerian revolution since 
November 1954, from both sides Left-wing and Right-wing. But I am only 
concerned with Left-wing writers in my discussion, though they expressed 
quite different points of view toward the Algerian War. As the whole thesis 
is devoted to examining Sartre and the Algerian revolution, I have to 
concentrate only on the intellectuals who were close to Sartre and who 
appeared frequently in his political writings. First, I have to focus on the 
writings of those intellectuals, Albert Camus, Francis Jeanson and Frantz 
Fanon, who were actively and practically involved in the struggle of the 
Algerian people. Second, the characteristic of Sartre’s writings and political 
activities on the Algerian revolution to be examined in detail in the 
following chapters.
56. Compare Raoul Girardet, L’ldee coloniale en France de 1871 h 1962 
(Paris: La Table Ronde, 1972), p.249.
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The first intellectual to be investigated is Albert Camus who was long 
one of Sartre’s friends after the Second World War and before the 
outbreak of the Algerian revolution in November 1954. Indeed, the 
relationship between Camus and Sartre was very interesting, but in 1952 
their friendship broke down because of their well-known debate.
Before discussing Camus’ political writings on the Algerian revolution 
it will be useful to take a close look at him first. Albert Camus was born 
in 1913 of working class "pied-noir" in "willaya" of Constantine and had 
been raised in Belcourt, one of the working class neighbourhoods of 
Algiers, and his early essays reflect the ease and beauty of "pied-noir" life. 
In many ways, he was typical of an Algerian Frenchman, football was 
important to him, and also he was fascinated by the Algerian sea. Both 
his novels L’Etranqer (1942), and La Peste (1947), mirror "pied-noir" 
prejudices. In L’Etranqer. the central incident is the senseless killing of an 
Arab (Algerian), which is revealing even if it is supposed to symbolize 
man’s inhumanity on a large scale. As for La Peste. it has been noted that 
there are no Algerian Moslems in a story which takes place in Oran. It is 
true that La Peste was written for Europeans and has been interpreted as 
an allegory of the Second World War. But the lack of Arabs fits in too 
perfectly with the "pied-noir" way of life in Algeria to go without mention. 
However, Camus was a Left-wing "pied-noir" and he joined the Algerian 
Communist Party in 1930s and strongly criticized the administration in an 
essay on poverty in Kabylia area written in 1939. Furthermore, he made 
his name known by writing different articles in Combat, the underground 
newspaper during the Second World War. After 1945, Camus had
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emerged as the intellectual conscience of the post-war generation of the 
left-of-centre Frenchmen. Indeed, his position in the resistance, his 
philosophy of the absurd, his essay on revolt had marked him as a 
humanitarian leftist and gave him the reputation of a man of conscience.
First let us make a comparative evaluation of the political thought of 
Sartre and Camus mainly during their 1952 debate. According to Simone 
de Beauvoir, the relationship between Sartre and Camus was stormy after 
1945, and the reason for the breakdown of their friendship which seemed 
to explode so violently was for a long time because of the political and 
ideological differences which already existed since 1945, and it had 
intensified from year to year. Camus was an idealist, a moralist and anti­
communist, forced to yield to history, while Sartre had laboured since 
1940 to repudiate idealism, to free himself from his original individualism 
and to live history. Sartre’s scrupulously qualified justification of 
Communism and colonial revolution were close to Marxism. His desire 
was an alliance with the Communists. While Camus was fighting for great 
principles (as was known before the Algerian War), perhaps that is why 
he refused to participate in the particular and detailed political actions to 
which Sartre committed himself. Sartre believed in the truth of Socialism, 
as it appeared in his political writings, whereas Camus became a more 
resolute champion of Bourgeois values, particularly in The Rebel which 
was a statement of his solidarity with bourgeois society. But both Sartre 
and Camus had been involved in the resistance and had been influenced 
by that experience in the direction of political commitment, required 
adjustments to their philosophical premises.
Sartre attacked Camus in his article, "Reponse k Albert Camus", he 
argued that one must act in history:
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Car nous aussi, Camus, nous sommes encag6s, et si vous 
voulez vraiment empecher qu’un mouvement populaire ne 
degenere en tyrannie, ne commencez pas par le condamner 
sans recours et par menacer de vous retirer au desert, 
d’autant que vos deserts ne sont jamais qu’une partie un 
peu moins frequentee de notre cage; pour m6riter le droit 
d’influencer des hommes qui luttent, il faut d’abord participer 
a leur combat; if faut d’abord accepter beaucoup de choses, 
si I’on veut essayer d’en changer quelques-unes.[57]
Sartre interpreted Camus’ The Rebel as denying any meaning to 
history and social commitment. He emphasizes that history would work 
to create free men in a society of freedom. Thus, he thought that Camus 
- philosopher of the absurd - was supporting a retreat into art as an 
individual solution to the absurdity of human existence. When Sartre asked 
for a volunteer to review Camus’ The Rebel. "He wouldn’t let anyone say 
anything bad about it because of their friendship; unfortunately none of 
us could think of anything good. We wondered how we were going to get 
out of the dilemma". [58] Sartre persuaded Francis Jeanson to take the 
responsibility of doing the comment on The Rebel. Jeanson had promised 
to write his comment circumspectly.
In fact, in his review published in Les Temps Modernes under the 
title, "Albert Camus ou Tame Revoltee" Francis Jeanson, sharply attacked 
these assertions. [59] Later Sartre himself rebuked Camus:
L’Histoire a-t-elle un sens? demandez-vous, a-t-elle une fin? 
Pour moi, c’est la question qui n’a pas de sens: car 
L’Histoire, en dehors de I’homme qui la fait, n’est qu’un 
concept abstrait et immobile, dont on ne peut dire ni qu’il 
a une fin ni qu’il n’en a pas. Et le probleme n’est pas de
57. Sartre, Situations. IV. p.110.
58. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p. 271.
59. Francis Jeanson, "Albert Camus ou I’ame Revoke," Les Temps 
Modernes. Vol. 7, No. 75-80, 1952. pp.2070-90.
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connaftre sa fin, mais de lui en donner une...II ne s’agit pas 
de savoir si L’Histoire a un sens et si nous daignons y 
participer, mais, du moment que nous sommes dedans 
justqu’aux cheveux, d’essayer de lui donner le sens qui nous 
parart le meilleur, en ne refusant notre concours, si faible 
soit-il, a aucune des actions concretes qui le requi£rent.[60]
Perhaps this is the spirit of engagement which gives Sartre’s work 
as an historian of contemporary events its character. However, in the 
above quotation, some would argue that Sartre distorted Camus’ position 
in his response, but Camus did not give us his social commitment. Even 
Sartre was able to reaffirm in a somewhat different context his principle 
that the meaning of human freedom is found in history and through social 
commitment. And when Camus replied to Jeanson’s article, he affected 
to ignore Jeanson’s existence and he referred to him only as "your 
collaborator" Camus sent a letter not to Jeanson, but to "Monsieur le 
Directeur" "which was comic...there was no Monsieur between us"[61], said 
Sartre. So, Sartre replied and everything was over between two 
intellectuals. Later Sartre said that:
I retained a liking for him although his politics were 
completely foreign to mine, particularly his attitude during the 
Algerian War. [62]
The outbreak of the Algerian War placed Camus in a terrible 
dilemma for he could neither dissociate himself from the "pied-noir" nor 
ignore the injustices of "L’Algerie Frangaise". After the event of Skikda
60. Sartre, Situations. IV. pp.124-25.
61. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p.269.
62. Ibid, p.269.
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when the FLN made an "attentat"* in the stadium in 1955, Camus wrote 
to the Algerian Communist Party, saying that he was "ready to despair". 
He was characterized as a man of principle, a "just man". But he betrayed 
his principle in the last year of his life during the Algerian War. Here, 
Camus became "that just man without justice", as described by Simone 
de Beauvoir. Because he was an exemplary figure for the democratic left, 
in 1957, Camus was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature.
Before the outbreak of the Algerian revolution in November 1954, 
Camus condemned the long history of French abuses in Algeria. Now he 
condemned the tactics of the FLN (hit-and-run). For him, the only solution 
for both Moslems and "pied-noir" was the creation of an Algerian 
federation in which two groups would be given full protection under 
French law. Here, Camus seemed to ignore the aim of the FLN which lay 
in the independence and liberation of Algeria. But in 1956, on his return 
from Algiers, Camus wrote:
I have come back from Algeria almost in despair. What is 
happening confirms my convictions, it is for me a personal 
misfortune. But we must not give up; everything cannot be 
compromised. [63]
It might be "a personal misfortune" since his mother and brother were still 
living in Algeria.
*  "Attentat" means an assassination attempt by the FLN against the 
French colonialists in Algeria. For the Algerians, the word "attentat1 
means the use of violence in the struggle for right and liberty; they 
considered it a justifiable activity in their revolution, and they saw it 
as a weapon against the existence of French rule in Algeria. But for 
the Europeans, "attentat1 means an act of terrorism against humanity.
63. Albert Camus, "Lettres a Jean Gillbert", Revue d’Histoire du Theatre. 
No.4 (October-December 1960), p.359.
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After 1956, Camus refused to comment on the Algerian War, until the 
publication of Actuelles. Ill Chronigues Alaeriennes (1939-1958). As might 
be expected, most of the Left-wing intellectuals condemned Camus for 
his silence towards the Algerian revolution and for not speaking out 
against the use of torture. Camus refused: "one cannot ask me to protest 
against a particular repression, which I have done and to justify a 
particular terrorism, which I shall never do".[64] Moreover he claimed: 
"...ce n’est apparemment pas le gouvernement de la m£tropole qui 
gouverne en Algerie, ni m§me M. Robert Lacoste, mais n’importe qui. [65]
When the "pied-noir", Albert Camus published his Actuelles. Ill 
Chronigues Alaeriennes (1939-1958) in 1958, he selected all his reports 
on the Kabylian famine, a study of conditions in Algeria after the Setif 
event in 1945 and some of his articles printed in L* Express in 1955-56, 
and also he had written an essay "L’Alg6rie 1958" as a preface to his 
Actuelles. Ill, and he never entertained the idea of independence. In the 
latter, Camus claimed that the only solution to the Algerian problem was 
to tie close to France. Camus more or less denied that there was any 
such thing and was rather patronizing concerning the pan-lslamic Arabist 
fervour of the FLN as he declared:
64. Albert Camus, "Letter of Reply to Peter L  Caracciola", Encounter. 8 
(June, 1957), p.68.
65. Albert Camus, Actuelles. Ill Chronigues Alaeriennes (1939-1958), 
(Paris: Gallimand, 1958), p.192.
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J’ai essaye, a cet egard, de definir clairement ma position. 
Une Algerie constitute par des peuplements fedtrts, et 
reliee a la France, me parait preferable, sans comparaison 
possible au regard de la simple justice, h une Algerie relite 
a un empire d’lslam qui ne rtaliserait a I’intention des 
pueples arabes qu’une addition de miseres et de souffrances 
et qui arracherait le peuple Frangais d’Algerie a sa patrie 
naturelle.[66]
It should be noted that Camus exaggerated when he presented his 
plan for setting up a quasi-independent Algeria linked to metropolitan 
France, and considered Algerian nationalism without historical basis and 
politically unsound. According to Camus, there had never been an 
Algerian nation, and the Moslem population was by no means 
homogenous. The "pied-noir" had the full right to consider themselves 
indigenous to Algeria. With understandable weariness he claimed that:
"c’est le dernier avertissement que puisse formuler, avant de 
se taire a nouveau, un ecrivain voue, depuis vingt ans, au 
service de PAIgerie.[67]
In 1955, writing for L*Express. Camus declared his support for 
Mendes France as a man who might be able to solve the Algerian 
problem and for Aziz-Kessous, member of the Algerian Communist Party, 
and the "Communaute Algerienne" group who were seeking a federal 
solution. In 1956, he supported the idea of a round-table conference and 
the movement for a civil truce. He condemned torture and violence by 
both the French and the FLN, as he claimed:
66. Albert Camus, Actuelles. Ill Chronigues Alaeriennes (1939-1958).p.28.
67. Ibid, p. 212.
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Si un terroriste jette une grenade au marche de Belcourt 
que frequente ma mere et s’il la tue, je serais responsable 
dans le cas ou, pour defendre la justice, j’aurais 6galement 
defendu le terrorisme. J’aime la justice mais j’aime aussi ma 
mere. [68]
Moreover, Camus said that:
...la torture: Celle-ci a peut-etre permis de retrouver trente 
bombes, au prix d’un certain honneur, mais elle a suscite du 
meme coup cinquante terroristes nouveaux qui, operant 
autrement et ailleurs, feront mourir plus d’innocents 
encore. [69]
It should be noted that Camus’ writings on Algeria are flawed and 
ambiguous. In 1957, at a press conference in Stockholm, he declared: Je 
crois a la justice, mais je defendrai ma mere avant la justice"[70] which 
amounted to saying that he was on the side of the "pied-noir" who were 
killing and torturing in order to keep "L’Algerie Frangaise" since 1945. 
Finally, in his involvement, Camus restated and reaffirmed his position, and 
concluded his Actuelles, III: "Void mon temoignage, auquel je n’ajouterai 
rien".[71]
However, when Pierre Stibbe, Left-wing lawyer of Ben-Saddok (we
shall see more information about Saddok in the next chapter) called
several Left-wing intellectuals as witnesses for the defence, Camus was in
Stockholm and later in a private letter written on behalf of Ben-Saddok,
he declared that:
In particular, I do not want in any case to give a good 
conscience, by declaration without risk for me, to the stupid
68. Letter to Emmanuel Robles, Essais. (Paris: NRF, Gallimard, 1965) 
p.1843.
69. Albert Camus, Actuelles. HI Chronigues Alaeriennes (1939-1958).
p.16.
70. Albert Camus, Essais. p. 1882.
71. Albert Camus, Actuelles. Ill Chronigues Alaeriennes.(1939-1958). 
p.901.
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fanatic who in Algiers might fire on a crowd in which my 
mother and family might be found. This reason which could 
seem naive in Paris, has for me the force of a passion 
approved by reason. [72]
In justification of his position, Camus wrote in his introduction to 
Actuelles. Ill:
Quand sa propre famille est en peril immediate de mort, on 
peut vouloir la rendre plus genereuse et plus juste, on doit 
meme continuer a la faire, comme ce livre en t6moigne, mais 
(qu’on ne s’y trompe pas!) sans manquer a la solidarity 
qu’on lui doit dans ce danger mortel, pour qu’elle survive au 
moins et qu’en vivant, elle retrouve alors la chance d’etre 
juste. A mes yeux, c’est cela I’honneur, et la vraie justice, ou 
bien je reconnais ne plus rien savoir d’utile en ce monde.[73]
Certainly, there were many people who supported Camus’ justice 
toward the Algerian question. Among them Jules Roy, "pied-noir", a friend 
of Camus, he wrote in his book dedicated to Camus’ memory:
I agree that one should render justice to one group without 
depriving others of justice at the same time. But I respect an 
order based on urgency: I yield to the injustice that cries out, 
since the other, for the moment only constitutes a 
hypothetical injustice. [74]
But later, after Camus’ death, Roy went to a FLN refugee camp in Tunisia 
and his trip had convinced him that his primary solidarity was not with his 
own community of "pied-noir" in Algeria but with the struggle of the
72. Quoted in Herbert R. Lottman, Albert Camus. (Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1978). pp.619-20.
73. Albert Camus, Actuelles. Ill Chronigues Alqeriennes (1939-1958). 
pp.14-15.
74. Jules Roy, La Guerre d’Alqerie. (Paris: Julliard, 1960), p.207.
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Algerian people. He concluded in reply to Camus: "It is not a question of 
preferring your mother to justice. It is a question of loving justice as much 
as your own mother11.[75] As it appeared that Camus had a negative 
position on the aim of the FLN. He refused to accept the authenticity and 
legitimacy of Algerian nationalism and he did not reject the colonial 
situation, and further he insisted that it had to be reformed. Camus had 
sharply reacted to the struggle of the Algerian people, like the other 
defenders of "L’Algerie Frangaise", he rejected even negotiations with the 
FLN. He claimed that:
Those who, in purposely vague terms, advocate negotiation 
with the FLN cannot fail to be aware, after the precise 
statements of the FLN, that this means the independence of 
Algeria under the direction of the most relentless military 
leaders of the insurrection - in other words, (under the 
Algerian flag) the eviction of 1,200,000 Europeans from 
Algeria and the humiliation of millions of Frenchmen, with all 
the risks that such a humiliation involves. [76]
Although the Algerian students in both France and Sweden 
attempted to persuade Camus about the independence of Algeria and the 
aim of the FLN, he rejected even the discussion of the liberation and the 
independence of Algeria. Later, after Algerian independence, I think 
Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, the politician writer and ex. Algerian Minister of 
foreign affairs, is right when he stated in his book de la decolonisation a 
la revolution culturelle (1962-1972):
75. Ibid, p.208.
76. Albert Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. Translated by Justin 
O’Brien (New York: Knopf, 1961), p.90.
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Camus n’a pas 6te a la hauteur de cet ideal. Pourtant les 
Algeriens lui auraient volontiers confere, eux le titre de 
"Camus I’Algerien"... c’eut ete a nos yeux comme un autre 
prix Nobel, quelque chose comme un prix Nobel de la 
decolonisation, c’est-a-dire du plus grand mouvement de 
I’histoire actuelle. Camus ne I’a pas merite. II restera done 
pour nous un grand ecrivain ou plutot un grand styliste, mais 
un etranger.
Albert Camus vu par un AIgerien.[77]
It should be pointed out that Camus did not comment on the 
Algerian revolution until 1958. He told Jean Bloch-Michel in October 1959, 
that if a referendum on the independence of Algeria took place he would 
campaign for self-determination but against full independence of Algeria 
in Algerian newspapers. [78] Unfortunately, he did not live to see peace, 
when the "pied-noir" did go back to France, or Israel and Argentina.
The second intellectual to be investigated is Francis Jeanson who 
was long one of Sartre’s closest collaborators as well, from January 1951 
to November 1956. When Jeanson refused to support Sartre in his harsh 
condemnation of the Russian intervention in Hungary in 1956, he broke 
his relationship with Sartre. However, the opposition to the Algerian War
77. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, de la decolonisation a la revolution culturelle: 
(1962-19721 (Algiers: SNED, 1981). p.184.
78. Jean Bloch-Michel, "Albert Camus et la Nostalgie de L’lnnocence", 
Preuves. No.110 (April 1960), pp.3-9.
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brought them together again in May 1959.[79]
Francis Jeanson is an intellectual Left-winger. In addition to being a 
philosopher, he is a Marxist, politician, professor, publisher and editor. 
During the Second World War Jeanson had escaped into Spain to join 
the Free French. There he had been thrown into a concentration camp, 
which had ruined his health. When he was released he went to Algeria 
and he made many nationalist friends. When he returned to France, he 
warned that France was "sitting on a volcano". In 1955, Francis and his 
wife Colette Jeanson had published a book L’Alaerie hors la Loi (1955) 
(Lawless Algeria) which explained and defended the cause of the FLN in 
the Algerian revolution and criticized the atrocities of the French Army in 
Algeria. [80] Both Jeanson and his wife argued that:
...continued suppression of Algerian independence would 
cost French citizens their civil liberties and French workers 
their remaining bargaining power. [81]
It seems that this is the first important Left-wing statement on the
79. Francis Jeanson, Le Probleme Morale et la Pensee de Sartre (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1965), p.298.
80. It should be pointed out that later in the Algerian independence 
Ferhat Abbas Commented on behalf of this book:
Ce livre vulgarisa les donnees du probleme Algerienne et rendit 
explicable, a la conscience du peuple Frangais, I’insurrection du 1er 
Novembre 1954. Ferhat Abbas, Autopsie d’une Guerre, p. 198.
81. Francis Jeanson and Colette Jeanson, L’Alqerie hors La Loi (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1955), p.17.
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Algerian problem to appear after the outbreak of the war. Jeanson himself 
was well known in Left-wing circles. Also, he made his reputation as a 
disciple, interpreter and associate of Jean-Paul Sartre’s thought.
Jeanson’s familiarity with the existentialist concept of responsibility
suggested his close relationship with Sartre. For years, Jeanson had
worked with Sartre on Les Temps Modernes. where he was best
remembered before the Algerian War started on November 1954 as the
author of the article of Albert Camus’ Rebel (1952) which ended Camus
and Sartre’s friendship. However, Jeanson had established a reputation
independently of Sartre for his political concern with the Algerian question.
But their major ethical argument demonstrated Jeanson’s close
relationship with Sartre as Jeanson stated:
You are French, you "demand" that the army of your country 
pursue its actions only in accord with certain well-defined 
conditions, no longer torture militants and suspects, no 
longer "regroup" and exterminate the Algerian population. 
Your existence remains dead letter...you are reduced to 
impotence... [Nevertheless] you support a cause, whether you 
wish to or not. And the timid words that you pronounce in 
one direction will never equal the practical consequences, in 
the other direction, of your submission and of your 
abstention. You are on the side of the oppressors...you must 
choose, and not half-heartedly, and you have only your 
lifetime to make a human choice, men against all conformity, 
against all legality, against all the "good reasons" which will 
ceaselessly flow from your need for security, your fear, 
"raison d’etat" and its blind disciplines of cult or party which 
you make into a duty for yourself in order to avoid your true 
duties. [82]
Up to this point both Jeanson’s and Sartre’s attitude contrasted sharply 
with Camus who strongly refused to find France guilty:
82. Francis Jeanson, Notre Guerre (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1960), 
pp.59-60. See also Sartre, "Vous etes Formidables" in Les Temps 
Modernes. No.135, May, pp.1641-7, where he speaks of avoiding the 
theory of "Bad Faith".
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La France est un etat de peche historique,...il me parart 
degoutant de battre sa couple, comme nos juges - penitents, 
sur la poitrine d’autrui, vain de condamner plusieurs sfecles 
d’expansion Europeenne,...Je crois en Algerie a une politique 
de reparation, non a une politique d’expiation.[83]
Jeanson supported the FLN’s aim of independence and liberation for
Algeria, and he suggested that the French Left would gain from an
alliance with the FLN not only material support but also inspiration. Thus,
Jeanson and his supporters who gave illegal clandestine support to the
Algerians in France formed later a network of support for the FLN political
movement, not only by writing and struggling outside the underground,
but also by acting and working for the FLN’s political activities. The
Clandestine and illegalism of the network was a form of political
expression. Originally the "Jeanson network" was named by the press in
September 1960, when the trial of Jeanson’s collaborators took place, as
we are going to see in the last chapter, (indeed the "network" was named
after its leading spirit), and later called V6rites Pour... (Truths For...), as
illustrated in the following quotation:
Depuis 1956...La Federation de France du FLN, on Fa vu, 
s’est mise en quete de Frangais susceptibles de participer 
materiellement, directement - et clandestinement bien sur - 
a certains aspects de ses activites: transport ou - dela des 
frontieres Frangaises de fonds destines au combattants du 
FLN, hebergement, protection de militants operant sur le sol 
Frangais, creation de filieres permettant le passage a 
I’etranger, etc. Plusieurs reseaux de soutien, a partir surtout 
des annees 1957-1958. Je plus connu et le plus important est 
celui qui est organize, a la fin de 1957, par Francis 
Jeanson,... [84]
83. Albert Camus, Actuelles. Ill, p.22-3.
84. La Guerre d’Alaerie. Sous la direction d’Henri Alleg, Jacques de 
Bonis, Henri J. Douzan, Jean Ferreire et Pierre Houdiguet collection 
realisee avec la collaboration de Gibertt Alleg. (Paris: Temps Actuels, 
1981), p.232-33.
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It should be noted that the main work of the network was to collect 
money and funds from the Algerian workers and the French collaborators 
and send it to the Algerian revolution in France via Tunis and Switzerland 
in order to buy arms and aid homeless people.[85] as Jeanson stated:
"...des services & la federation de France du FLN: "Au debut 
les gens faisaient surtout partie du milieu dans lequel je 
naviguais moi-meme puisque c’est moi qui a commence & 
constituer les premiers dispositifs d’aide. On sait bien que, 
par exemple, il y a eu tout un travail de recrutement dans 
le milieu des comediens a un moment donn£ pour des 
hebergement...ll y a eu toute une p£riode ou je ne couchais 
pas deux soirs durant au meme endroit et je me souviens 
d’avoir ete heberge par des gens qui etaient tres differents 
les uns des autres..."[86]
Also, they hid the Algerians wanted by the police, since the police had 
strong racist attitudes toward the Algerian workers (until now). They were 
stopping and searching Algerians including the FLN militants, that is, any 
Algerian acting as courier would at once attract suspicion. Jeanson and 
his collaborators acted as couriers, instead of Algerians, from France to 
Switzerland, Belgium and Tunisia. As Jeanson claimed later in his book 
La Revolution Alqerienne. Probl&mes et Perspectives (1962): "yes» the 
arms financed might have been used to shoot French soldiers in the 
back".[87] Perhaps Jeanson is right because the method of the FLN in the 
main cities particularly in Algiers, was to surprise the French military forces 
by shooting them in the back. However, for three years, Jeanson 
struggled with the FLN in illegal clandestine activities without receiving any
85. Francis Jeanson, Sartre dans sa Vie (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1974), 
p.231.
86. La Guerre d’Alqerie. Sous la direction d’Henri Alleg, Jacques de 
Bonis, Henri, J. Douzan, Jean Ferriere et Pierre Houdiquet. Collection 
realisee avec la collaboration de Gibertt Alleg. p. 233.
87. Francis Jeanson, La Revolution Alqerienne Problemes et Perspectives 
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962), p. 19.
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pay or direct orders from them. In one year, he managed to smuggle out 
ten billion French Francs with six Algerians to Swiss banks. [88] This point 
will be discussed at length in the last chapter. In Sartre and the Problem 
of Morality. Robert V. Stone, the translator, affirmed that:
How to maintain the ambiguity between individual authenticity 
and revolutionary liberation was for Jeanson as much a 
practical as it was a theoretical problem. His most noteworthy 
effort was not in his philosophical works, nor in his role...but 
in his political action during the Algerian War 1954-1962. [89]
Although the network was organized and directed as a politically 
serious enterprise, it gave moral explanations of its actions independent 
of a political analysis of its success. Jeanson and his supporters saw that 
the first effort to "maintain the chance for Franco-Algerian friendship",[90] 
and second, the desire, 'to save the honour of France and its most 
valuable traditions".[91] Here, Jeanson’s supporters affirmed their
patriotism and their conviction that it was acting in the best interests of the 
French people by its action. Jeanson used language in order to maintain 
his notion of Franco-Algerian friendship. In Notre Guerre. Francis Jeanson 
stressed that:
In order to save the last chances of a Franco-Algerian 
friendship we had no time for delay...An Algeria hostile to 
France is a Maghreb hostile to France, is a black Africa 
hostile to France: it is the radical break between our old 
continent and the new African world, it is asphyxiation, finally, 
for a Europe drawn into herself and condemned to 
stagnation, that is to say, to decadence...lf, on the other 
hand, Algeria sees itself obliged to play without reserve the
88. In Verite-Uberte. June 1960.
89. Francis Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality. Translated by 
Robert V. Stone (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
c.1980),p.xviii.
90. In a featured letter to Les Temps Modernes. April-May 1960, p.1536.
91. Ibid, p.1536.
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Eastern card, Africa will move entirely and will open, by the 
breach so created, to an imported brand of socialism. [92]
Moreover, he wrote in order to characterize their actions in terms of 
solidarity with the French people:
We firmly believe that our action is just. We hope to convince 
as many as possible of our fellow-citizens of it. But we do 
not feel of another essence than them; and if our reactions 
to them are sometimes brutal, they remain nonetheless 
fraternal, for all together we will surmount the situation or all 
together we will perish...not only have we never envisioned 
cutting ourselves off from France, but we claim insistently the 
possibility to be truly French and that is why we have now 
set to work to reconstitute a national community. [93]
Jeanson’s network gave full support to the FLN, particularly in 
theory: "Our engagement on their side was total". [94] Jeanson went on 
to insist, therefore, that there was a "contradiction" because his people at 
the same time remained French. He emphasized that:
Let us say then that at the same time we had both to 
"betray" the French in making common cause with the 
Algerians and "betray" the Algerians by staying resolutely 
French. This double "betrayal" is our loyalty: to the French 
cause, and to the human cause, which justly should be one 
and the same cause. [95]
Further, Jeanson and his colleagues proposed in their conviction that the 
French Left should form a practical alliance with the FLN. The only Leftist
92. Francis Jeanson, Notre Guerre, pp.43-45.
93. Ibid, pp.12, 14.
94. Ibid, pp. 53-4.
95. Ibid, p.54.
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press that supported Jeanson’s proposal was Les Temps Modernes; the 
rest condemned their suggestion and called for a new resistance against 
Jeanson’s attitude. He declared that his group was putting into practice 
solidarity with the Algerian revolution, and was convinced that aid to the 
FLN must be recognized. In his letter to Les Temps Modernes. Jeanson 
explained that:
Since the Left has lost the sense of action, it was necessary 
to act in order to give it back and thus to act in the direction 
of solidarity. Since the Left could not come to unite, it was 
necessary that each of our undertakings be itself an example 
of unity in action...it is action alone which can act on the 
masses, giving them food for thought and communicating to 
them a line of thought which is more than a reflection of 
impotence. [96]
It should be pointed out that the supporters of Jeanson who aided 
the FLN asserted that the French Left and the FLN were already allies 
because they had the same enemy, colonialism and imperialism. [97] The 
army and the "pied-noir" in Algeria, who were fighting the FLN and the 
innocent people were the same forces as an authoritarian regime in 
France. Certainly, in the form of colonialism, as Jeanson put it, the 
capitalist system exploited the French proletariat, as well as exploiting the 
Algerian people. [98] He went further, arguing that the FLN in Algeria had 
not only the same enemy, but also the same aims as the French Left. 
So, both the FLN and the French Left were struggling for freedom and 
social justice. In his book, Intellectuals and Decolonization in France. Paul 
C. Sorum stated that: "The French Left, with its inveterate paternalism,
96. Francis Jeanson in his letter to Les Temps Modernes. April-May 
1960, pp.1542-3.
97. Paul Clay Sorum, Intellectuals and Decolonization in France. (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977), p.169.
98. Francis Jeanson, Press Conference, "Lettre a Jean-Paul Sartre", 
Verites Pour. No.1 (20 September 1958), pp.18-9.
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doubted for a long time that the Algerian revolt was socially 
progressive". [99] However, the social and political economy of Algeria 
and her destiny would force independent Algeria to adopt Socialism. [100] 
In Verite-Liberte. Sartre said that "At the point where we are, the only way 
to influence opinion is to go beyond it".[101] (We shall see more 
information about the participation of the Jeanson network in the Algerian 
revolution in the last chapter).
The French writer, Georges Arnaud published an article in Paris- 
Press in which he said that: "Les etranges confidences du professeur 
Jeanson"[102] Also, the members of "la Federation de France du FLN" 
wrote in El-Moudiahid:
Heureusement, le soutien n’a pas ete le monopole exclusif 
d’un ou deux chefs de reseau. Cette participation multiforme, 
expression concrete de I’option anticolonialiste 
d’innombrables militants progressistes, ouvrriers, intellectuels, 
Chretiens democrates de France et d’autres pays d’Europe, 
a, tout en contribuant au triomphe d’une cause juste, permis 
I’amorce de relations nouvelles entre les peuples Alg6riens 
et Frangais.[103]
In 1952, Jeanson met Frantz Fanon. Jeanson had already read 
Fanon’s Black Skin. White Masks, before he met him. Later, after Fanon’s 
death, Jeanson described this encounter:
In 1952, we almost broke off our relations, he and I, the very 
day of our first meeting. Having found his manuscript
99. Paul Clay. Sorum, Intellectuals and Decolonization in France, p.169.
100. Francis Jeanson, Notre Guerre, p.75.
101. Sartre in Verite-Liberte. 3 July-August, 1960.
102. Paris-Press. April 19, 1960.
103. El-Moudiahid. November 18, 1979.
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interesting, I committed the error of telling him so, which 
made him suspect me of having thought, "for a Negro, that 
wasn’t so bad". As a result of which, I showed him the door 
and expressed my own reaction in the liveliest terms - which 
he had the good sense to take well. [104]
The unity of goal between Francis Jeanson and Frantz Fanon 
became later more close in the Algerian revolution, especially when 
Jeanson and his Algerian associates arranged for Fanon to join the FLN 
in January, 1957. Both Jeanson and Fanon had taken direct, illegal action 
without examining either "public opinion" or "the impotent French left". 
First, let us take a close look at Frantz Fanon.
At the end of 1956, Doctor Frantz Fanon wrote his resignation to the 
Governor-General of Algiers, leaving his hospital directorship at Blida- 
Joinville (psychiatric clinic). He came over to the FLN, body and soul. 
Born in 1925 in Martinique as a French citizen, he had become an 
Algerian by choice. [105] During the Second World War, Fanon had 
joined the Free French as many French intellectuals did. He had been 
wounded and decorated in the liberation of France. He discovered that a 
black man was not treated as an equal in the French Army. Fanon, the 
dark-skinned Frenchman, discovered that he was a "Negro" in white 
society. He studied medicine in the University of Lyon. As there was no 
equality between two races, black and white, he tried to become a 
European, but he discovered his blackness. As his patients identified him: 
'We have a Negro doctor: his hands are very gentle", and his students 
described him: 'We have a Negro professor, he is very intelligent'. [106]
104. Frantz Fanon, Black Skin. White Masks. Translated by Charles L  
Markmann (New York: Grove Press, Evergreen Books, 1967), p. 213.
105. Alistide R. Zolberg, "Frantz Fanon", Encounter. Vol. 27, November 
1966, p. 56.
106. Irene L. Gendzier, Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study. (London: Wildwood 
house, 1973), p. 57.
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In 1954, Fanon went to Algeria as a doctor. He remained there for two 
years and became an important figure of supporting the FLN, particularly 
when he treated the nationalist warriors. Fanon did not live to see peace 
in Algeria. It was discovered that he was suffering from leukaemia, and he 
was sent by the FLN to Military Hospital in Washington. In December, 
1961, he died aged thirty-six. The government of Algeria now gives full 
respect to Frantz Fanon. There is School, Lycee (secondary school), 
Hospital and Boulevard in his honour; as the Algerians stated in Fanon’s 
book:
En Algerie independante, le message fut saisi directement 
dans les milieux militants dont il exprimart les valeurs et 
l’inquietide...Fanon devint petit a petit une figure symbolique, 
a qui furent dedies une avenue, un lycee, son ancien hopital. 
[107]
When Fanon resigned from Blida Hospital, he went to Tunis, via Paris 
where he met again with Jeanson. In his studies in A Dvina Colonialism. 
Fanon observed his colleagues in the hospital during the War:
We have seen military doctors, called to the bedside of an 
Algerian soldier wounded in combat, refuse to treat him. The 
official pretext was that there was no longer a chance to 
save the wounded man. After the soldier had died, the 
Doctor would admit that this solution had appeared to him 
preferable to a stay in prison where it would have been 
necessary to feed him while awaiting execution. The 
Algerians of the region of Blida know a certain hospital 
director who would kick the bleeding chests of the war 
wounded while lying in the corridor of his establishment. [108]
107. Frantz Fanon, Les damnes de la Terre (Reghara: Editions El-Anis, 
1987), p.17.
108. Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism. Translated by Haakon Chevalier 
(New York: Grove Press, Evergreen, 1967), p. 139.
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In Tunis, Fanon rejoined the Algerian leadership, and worked as an 
editorial writer for Ei-Moudiahid. the official newspaper of the FLN, which 
appeared in French and Arabic editions. Suddenly, El-Moudiahid became 
an important newspaper which began to deal with revolutionary theory, 
and attempted to link the struggle in Algeria with other countries in the 
third world. The great hope of Fanon’s political attitude was to unite 
African countries which could work with Asia and Latin America in a 
campaign in order to be independent from Europe and the United States 
of America. In her book Force of Circumstance. Simone de Beauvoir 
emphasized that, "he had dreamed of a United Africa freed from all 
foreign exploitation".[109] In addition to being editor of El-Moudiahid in 
Tunis, Fanon was treating wounded soldiers of the FLN in refugee camps 
in the Tunisian border and also in the Moroccan border in emergency and 
difficult cases. On behalf of the revolution Fanon wrote:
The revolution in depth, the true revolution because it 
transforms man and renews society, is very advanced. This 
oxygen which invents and organizes a humanity, it is that 
also, the Algerian revolution. [110]
According to Fanon, the striking example of this phenomenon in 
revolutionary Algeria was the veil of a woman, which was as a badge of 
identity and as a basis of solidarity, as he wrote:
In the Arab Maghreb, the veil belongs to the clothing 
traditions of the Tunisian, Algerian, Moroccan and Libyan 
national societies. For the tourist and foreigner, the veil 
demarcates both Algerian society and its feminine that one
109. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p.597.
110. Frantz Fanon, A Dvina Colonialism, p. 140.
119
component...That woman sees in her white veil unifies the perception 
that one has of Algerian feminine society. Obviously what we have 
here is a uniform which tolerates no modification, nor variant. [111]
It should be pointed out that Fanon was aware of Algerian society and 
culture because the French formula toward Algerian woman was "let’s win 
over the women, and the rest will follow". The colonial adminstration was 
convinced of this idea, as Fanon declared:
If we want to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its 
capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the 
women; we must go and find them behind the veil where 
they hide themselves and in the houses where the men keep 
them out of sight. [112]
Fanon argued that the Algerian women participated in their struggle by 
carrying a bomb, or a bag of grenades under the veil and putting them 
in French military targets. However, with the conversion of the veil into a 
military camouflage the enemy gradually became extra alerted as Fanon 
put it:
In the streets one witnessed what became a commonplace 
spectacle of Algerian women glued to the wall, over whose 
bodies the famous magnetic detectors, the "frying pans" 
would be passed. Every veiled woman, every Algerian 
woman became suspect. There was no discrimination. This 
was the period during which men, women, children, the 
whole Algerian people experienced at one and the same time 
their national vocation and the recasting of the new Algerian 
society.[113]
111. Ibid, pp.35-6.
112. Ibid, p.42.
113. Ibid, pp. 61-2.
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Fanon had worked for El-Moudiahid between 1957 and 1961. El- 
Moudiahid was produced to keep the population informed of the progress 
of the revolution and of the position of the FLN and his army ALN. In 
June 1956 El-Moudiahid appeared for the first time in Algeria and came 
out irregularly until the press was transferred to Tunis. Also, Fanon used 
to work for the FLN press organ, Resistance Alaerienne. Apparently, 
Balkacem Krim, Vice-President of the Provisional Government of the 
Republic of Algeria (GPRA) is right when he stated that:
Frantz Fanon!
'Ton exemple restera toujours vivant. Repose en paix! 
L’Algerie ne t’oubliera pas". [114]
In one of his articles in El-Moudiahid. Fanon affirmed that the Algerian 
revolution was the beginning stage of a larger movement toward 
independence. This independence had to be the messenger of a 
democratic and social revolution. For Fanon, Algeria was economically and 
socially part of the "Maghreb" (Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco), "the 
half-moon shaped area of North Africa". As El-Moudiahid wrote in 
December, 1957:
"That a Maghreb exploited for the needs of a colonial 
strategy will give way to a unified and strong Maghreb 
capable of promoting the development of its own natural 
resources in the primary interest of the North African 
people..."[115]
It should be noted that Fanon hoped that North Africa would unite 
with black Africa in order to protect its own independence from Europe. 
As he wrote in El-Moudiahid:
114. Belkacem Krim, "Frantz Fanon!", El-Moudiahid. No. 88, December 21, 
1961. (Extract from speech delivered at Fanon’s funeral by Belkacem 
Krim).
115. El-Moudiahid. December 1957.
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More and more the effects of all the Algerian revolution in 
Black Africa become noticeable. More and more a community 
of interests develops between the people living North and 
South of the Sahara. [116]
Fanon’s dream was to add another Algerian military basis to the Sahara’s 
history; he hoped to make it into an invasion route from South to North, 
and to open a new front against French military bases in the South, which 
was isolated and never had any attacks from the ALN. Indeed, after 1958 
Fanon made several trips to Mali and Niger in order to arrange for African 
Volunteers to aid the Algerian revolution. [117] However, the leaders of the 
FLN were very proud of Fanon’s political activities. In 1960, they had sent 
him to Ghana as the representative (an Ambassador) of the Algerian 
revolutionary provisional government. In her Force of Circumstance. 
Simone de Beauvoir emphasized that:
...later the GPRA sent him as their ambassador to Accra; 
he made many trips through Africa, assuring Algerian 
support to all those who rose in revolt against colonialist 
domination. [118]
When Sartre wrote a preface for Fanon’s book, Les Damnes de la 
Terre (The Wretched of the Earth) (1961) he "asserted his entire solidarity 
with Algerian people - as a Frenchman"[119] said Simone de Beauvoir. It 
should be pointed out that when Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre met 
Fanon the conversations were always about the Algerian revolution and 
the FLN’s political action, as Simone de Beauvoir claims: "Because of the 
friendship we felt for him, and also because of what he could do for the 
future of Algeria and Africa...He was an exceptional man". [120]
116. Ibid
117. Peter Geismar, "Frantz Fanon: Evolution of a Revolutionary - A 
Biographical Sketch", Monthly Review. May 1969, p. 28.
118. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, pp.607-608.
119. Ibid, p.611.
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Moreover, Sartre stated later that:
Fanon, Martiniquais, arriere-pefrt-fils d’esclave, quitte un pays 
qui n’a pas, a I’epoque, pris conscience de la personnalit6 
antillaise et de ses exigences. II epouse la revolte Algerienne 
et combat, Noir, au milieu des musulmans blancs; entraTne 
avec eux dans une guerre atroce et necessaire, il adopt le 
radicalisme de ses nouveaux Freres, se fait le theoricien de 
la violence revolutionnaire et souligne dans ses livres la 
vocation socialiste de L’Afrique: sans reforme agraire et sans 
nationalisation des entreprises coloniales I’independance est 
un vain mot. [121]
It should be noted that the views on the French - Algerian War and 
especially torture of Fanon are from the viewpoint of a third world 
intellectual raised in a francophone colonized situation. He said: The 
European nation that practices torture is a blighted nation, unfaithful to its 
history. [122] According to Fanon, if France behaved "cleanly" and without 
"barbarity" there would be no "blight" to speak of to cause it to be 
considered: "unfaithful to its history". So Fanon’s writings and political 
activities on the Algerian revolution are in favour of the FLN. He 
emphasised that the FLN’s proper conduct did not got "to the lengths to 
which colonialism has gone" [123]
However, as we have seen, the attitude of both intellectuals Francis 
Jeanson and Frantz Fanon toward the Algerian revolution was totally in
121. Sartre, Situations. V. p. 194.
122. Frantz Fanon, A dying colonialism, p.24.
123. Ibid, p.25.
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favour of the struggle of the Algerian people for their freedom. Indeed, 
they committed themselves to the FLN not only by writings and support 
but also by taking action on behalf of the Algerians against their own 
people, on the other hand, Albert Camus’ writings on and political 
activities during the Algerian War, are in favour of "L’Algerie Frangaise".
But there were intellectuals who were pulled both ways like Andre 
Malraux, whose experiences of the First World War were expressed in La 
Condition Humaine (1933), and who later suffered brutal treatment at the 
hands of the Nazis. [124] Later, he became a member of the government 
from 1958 to 1962. Malraux, like all politicians, refused to disclaim publicly 
the government’s use of torture. [125] When asked to join the group of 
intellectuals opposing colonialism, Malraux said in 1958:
At the moment, you know, we are not decolonizing, we’re 
consolidating, we are holding a situation with whatever lies 
to hand, we are at war because nothing was thought out in 
advance...And so for lack of an ideology, we let things take 
their course, even to the point of torture...[126]
It seems that the French Army Captain on duty in Algeria was right when 
he said: 'We do not have much faith in the French Intellectuals. They give 
up too easily". [127]
Now let us discuss Sartre’s attitude towards the Algerian War and 
what was his reaction at the beginning, to the outbreak of the Algerian 
revolution?
124. Jean lacouture, Andre Malraux. Translated by Alan Sheridan, 
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1975) p. 407.
125. Ibid, p. 401.
126. Ibid, p. 390.
127. Jules Roy, La guerre d’Alaerie. p. 87.
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In November 1955, before Fanon joined FLN’s El-Moudiahid. Les 
Temps Modernes came out with a strong editorial declaring that "Algeria 
is not France". It claimed that, if Algeria is France, social security, liberty 
and justice must be revised and unified in order to eliminate 
discrimination. [128] On the contrary, if Algeria is not part of France, then 
one must negotiate with the nationalists (FLN) and recognize the Algerian 
people’s power to administer itself. [129] In the same number of Les 
Temps Modernes. Mohamed Cherif Sahli, pro-FLN, wrote an article entitled 
"De ’L’assimilation’" a ’L’integration’: Une Mystification Politique", he stated 
that:
[Algerians] do not ignore the fact their [the left’s] task is 
difficult, given the prejudices that arise out of the old myth 
of "L’Algerie Frangaise". But they believe that in order to 
enlighten and win over a worried and troubled [public] 
opinion, it is not enough to denounce the abuses and the 
violence of the system. If one wishes to work for a positive 
solution, one must free the Algerian problem from the 
spider’s web of official lies and directly attack the system 
itself. [130]
Before discussing how Sartre reacted initially to the Algerian 
revolution, it will useful to know first Sartre’s activities in 1954, when the 
Algerian War started. Sartre was invited to many international conferences 
in Belgium, Berlin and Moscow. Both Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir were 
busy on their own writings and travelling. The Mandarins (1954) by 
Simone de Beauvoir, was published, winning her the prestigious "Goncourt 
Prize". In addition to his writings and travelling, Sartre was made Vice- 
president of the France-USSR Association in December 1954. Further, he
128. "L’Algerie n’est pas La France", Les Temps Modernes. Vol. II. No.119, 
November 1955, p. 577.
129. Ibid, p.579.
130. Mohamed Cherif Sahli, "De ’L’Assimilation’ a ’L’lntegration’": Une 
Mystification Politique", Les Temps Modernes. Vol.ll. No. 119, 1955 
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wrote several articles on this subject for the review France. USSR, and he 
gave a long and enthusiastic interview about the relation between France 
and Soviet Union to Liberation. In 1955, Sartre published his play in eight 
acts, Nekrassov. in Les Temps Modernes. and he maintained his 
friendship with the Soviet Union and, later in the year, with China. In their 
book The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka 
emphasized that:
Only one attitude is possible - gratitude and friendship 
toward a people who have shed their blood to save their 
future - and the future of the universe - and who have 
proved their sacrifices that they meant to make history, not 
submit to it; towards a people who were for half a century, 
each time Germany threatened the peace, always there at 
our side. [131]
On the 6 September 1955, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir went to China 
for two months, in order to get their own writings known there. They 
were received at the highest official levels: by the Vice-Minister, Chen-Yi 
and Mao Tse-Tung. But before they went to China, they had attended in 
June the Congress of the Peace Movement in Helsinki, where Sartre 
called in his speech for a new kind of peace, which would be "an 
indissoluble whole, an indestructable bond between a certain kind of 
international relations and a certain kind of political and social relations 
within nations..."[132] In the Peace Congress, Sartre met the Algerian 
delegation and he discussed the situation in Algeria with them. In Adieux: 
A Farewell to Sartre. Simone de Beauvoir asserted that "yes...we met 
some Algerians who told us about the situation in Algeria". [133]
131. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre.
Vol. II, p.314.
132. Quoted in Liberation (20 June, 1955).
133. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p.366.
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At first Sartre seemed to ignore the outbreak of the Algerian 
revolution in November 1954, much as any Frenchman. He was occupied 
by writings and travelling, as we have seen, as a result of his friendship 
link with the Eastern Bloc. Gradually, Sartre realized that France was 
facing a new situation in Algeria. In 1950, he had gone to Algeria, and he 
had travelled from the North to the South, then to Mali and Senegal, and 
he had seen the political, social and economic structures of "L’Algerie 
Frangaise". As Simone de Beauvoir reported later:
We were opposed to the colonial system, but we had no a 
priori prejudices against the men who administered native 
affairs or supervised the construction of the roads. [134]
However, Sartre became involved in the Algerian War on January 27, 
1956 when Andri Mandouze,[135] Professor of Literature at the University 
of Algiers, who formed around him an important sector of pro-FLN 
sympathizers in the University, returned to Paris and called for a meeting 
of the "Comite d’Action" at the "Salle Wagram". The protesters present 
stated that: "For the respect of people’s right to govern themselves. For 
a peaceful solution to the Algerian problem, etc... [136] Professor 
Mandouze told the meeting: "This morning I was in Algiers...! bring you 
the greeting of the Algerian revolution".[137] Although, Les Temps 
Modernes had been critical of French colonialism in North Africa before
134. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p.205.
135. Andre Mandouze had close contacts with the FLN’s leaders like 
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the Algerian revolution started, and in October, 1955 the editorial had 
sided with the struggle of the Algerian people, Sartre warned his assistant 
Marcel Peju not to go too far in supporting the FLN, as Peju said later in 
one of his interviews:
The Algerians associated French rule with repression, racism 
and torture. Sartre warned Peju not to go too far in 
supporting the FLN. [138]
According to Peju, Sartre did not support the FLN when the Algerian
revolution started in November 1954. But the November uprising came
out explicitly in favour of the FLN, and by then a group of French
intellectuals had begun to support and to publish the evidence that ALN
were being tortured, thousands of innocent people had been interned in
camps. But at the meeting of the "Comit6 d’Action" Sartre dealt with the
Algerian problem directly for the first-time - when it seemed to him, it was
first of all, economic and it was a matter of giving bread to nine million
people. In one of his strongest assessments of the problem, Sartre:
La seule chose que nous puissions et devrions tenter - mais 
c’est aujourd’hui I’essentiel - c’est de lutter a ses cotes pour 
delivrer a la fois les Algeriens et les Frangais de la tyrannie 
coloniale.[139]
It should be noted that when Sartre wrote "Le Colonialisme est un 
Systeme", (colonialism is a system), in 1956, Les Temps Modernes called 
for the recognition of Algeria and for negotiation with the FLN. Thus, 
Sartre made his most detailed effort to establish the "totality" of the French 
occupation of Algeria, that complex of political, social and economic 
structures in place when the Algerian War started. He affirmed that:
138. Marcel Peju interview with Ronald Hayman, 28.04.1985. Quoted in
Ronald Hayman’s Writings Against A Biography of Sartre (London:
Weidenfeld, 1986). p.295.
139. Sartre, "Le colonialisme est un Systeme", Les Temps Modernes. No.
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C’est que la colonisation n’est ni un ensemble de hasards 
ni le resultat statistique de milliers d’entreprises individuelles. 
C’est un systeme qui put mis en place vers le milieu du XIX 
siecle.[140]
However, the Algerian question was the first political issue to which Sartre
devoted himself, as he affirmed later:
I have always looked upon colonialism as an action of pure 
theft, the brutal conquest of a country and the absolutely 
intolerable exploitation of one country by another; I thought 
that all the colonial states would have to get rid of their 
colonies sooner or later. [141]
Sartre supported the cause of self-determination for the Algerian people. 
It was exactly what Sahli, and particularly Fanon, called for as the 
indispensable statement of the matter. Let us first quote Sartre’s main 
arguments which attack colonialism:
Je voudrais vous mettre en garde ce qu’on peut appeler la 
"mystification neo-colonialiste..."
La mystification consiste en ceci: On vous promene en 
Algerie, on vous montre complaisamment la misere du 
peuple, qui est affreuse, on vous raconte les humiliations que 
les mechants colons font subir aux musulmans. Et puis, 
quand vous etes bien indignes, on ajoute: "Voila pourquoi 
les meilleurs Algeriens ont pris les armes: ils n’en pouvaient 
plus." Si I’on s’y est bien pris, nous reviendrons convaincus:
1. Que le probleme Algerien est d’abord economique. II 
s’agit, par de judicieuses reformes, de donner du pain 
a 9 millions de personnes...
2. qu’il est ensuite social: il faut multiplier les medecins 
et les ecoles.
3. Qu’il est enfin, psychologique: vous vous rapellez De 
Man
140. Ibid. p.1372.
141. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p.367.
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avec son "complexe d’inferiorite" de la classe ouvriere. II avait 
trouv£ du meme coup la cl& du "caract&re indigene": mal 
tra'rte, mal nourri, illetre, I’Algerien a un complexe d’inferiorit6 
vis-a-vis de ses maitres.[142]
Sartre realised that what was missing in the heart of the matter was the 
political dimension and this political and social economy was planned by 
French administration. He went on to argue that:
Nous, Frangais de la metropole, nous n’avons qu’une legon 
a tirer de ces faits: le colonialisme est en train de ce detruire 
lui - meme...Notre role, c’est de I’aider a mourir. Non 
seulement en Algerie, mai partout ou il existe. Les gens qui 
parlent d’abandon sont des imbeciles: il n’y a pas a 
abandonner, ce que nous n’avons jamais possede. II s’agit 
tout au contraire de construire avec les Algeriens des 
relations nouvelles entre une France libre et une Alg€rie 
liberee.[143]
In the meantime he attacked the "neo-colonizing nation" proposed by 
the partisans of an intermediary solution. He went further by asserting 
that: "Car il n’est pas vrai qu’il y ait de bons colons (settlers or pied-noir) 
et d’autres qui soient mechants"[144] and he insisted that: "il y a des 
colons, c’est tout".[145] Also, Sartre pointed out that during the nineteenth 
century, the French administration and the "pied-noir" had used a variety 
of legal deceptions in order to rob the Algerians of all the best land, 
mainly in the North (Metidja region). French industry found it difficult to 
complete in World markets, making it all the more important to develop 
and exploit the best land in the North.
142. Sartre, "Le Colonialisme est un systeme", Les Temps Modernes. No 
123, 1956, p.1371.
143. Ibid, p.1386.
144. Ibid, p.1372.
145. Ibid, p.1372.
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Le systeme colonial est en place: L’Etat Frangais livre la terre 
arabe (Algerians) au colons pour leur cre6 r un pouvoir 
d’achat qui permette aux industriels metropolitans de leur 
vendre leurs produitsf[146] and where:
"Les colons (pied-noir) vendent au marches de la m&ropole 
les fruits de cette terre volee".[147]
It seemed that Sartre could no longer believe in his earlier illusion 
in which he assumed that the First World War was the last War; as he 
declared:
We had lived since the end of World War I with the illusion 
that it was the last. That is, we thought of the social 
problems that arose in the twenties and thirties as so many 
minor upheavals of no real consequence, since indeed we 
were moving toward peace, and peace was assumed as part 
of the total picture...We envisaged a Germany that in the not 
too distant future would be democratic. And...firmly believed 
that other forces would come into play which would 
overwhelm the forces of reaction, and thereby we would 
come to a political understanding. [148]
Perhaps Sartre took the view that colonialism must be defeated, not as
Simone de Beauvoir thought, because of "humanitarianism or any other
such moral abstraction"[149], but for more concrete reasons and because:
We ourselves were in peril, and if Hitler was not crushed, 
France would suffer more or less the same fate as 
Austria..."SureIy France at war would be worse than France 
under the Nazis?"[150]
146. Ibid, p.1376.
147. Ibid, p.1376.
148. Sartre by himself, p.48.
149. Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, p.358.
150. Ibid, p.358.
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Later, in his Critique of Dialectical Reason. Sartre explained how the 
primary violence of the nineteenth century was given to the contemporary 
oppressors a "hell of the practico-inerte"[151] which must be ceaselessly 
maintained by their individual and group praxes, as he affirmed that:
...it is also true that these sons of violence (that is of the 
pied-noir-settlers) are produced by the violent praxis of their 
fathers - which sends us back to history which we wanted 
to flee.Jn new conditions where exploitation must depend on 
oppression, this violence renews itself...it must re-express 
itself in order to maintain itself...it becomes its own idea 
under the form of racism. Or, in other words, the settlers 
actualize at each instant, the practices of extermination, of 
robbery and of exploitation inaugurated by the preceding 
generations...the victory of arms does not suffice; it must be 
renewed each day. [152]
I shall discuss in the next chapter how Sartre’s position gradually 
evolved on the Algerian revolution, mainly on the issue of torture. This 
work proposes to recall the circumstances of Sartre’s personal 
involvement and discuss the reflections of the conflict in his political 
writings.
151. It should be pointed out that Sartre felt it is necessary to reinterpret 
the meaning of "No Exit," which he had discussed earlier in his play 
Huis-Clos (1943), in Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), "Hell is the 
practico-inerte". He claimed that hell is the situation which others 
have set up for the individual. Hell is the world into which the 
individual was born, and also it is where the individuals must live.
152. Sartre, Critique de la Raison Dialectiaue. pp.675-679.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POWER OF THE FRENCH ARMY AND THE ATTITUDE OF 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE TOWARDS THE TORTURE INFLICTED
IN ALGERIA.
(a) The Power of the French Army in Algeria.
(b) Sartre and the Tortured Algerians.
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We had attacked, we the slaves, we the dung underfoot, we the animals 
with patient hooves. We were running like madmen; shots rang out...we 
were striking where the shouting came from, and the shouts became 
more strident and a great clamour rose from the east; it was the 
outhouses burning and the flames flickered sweetly on our cheeks. 
Then the assaults made on the master’s house. They were firing from 
the windows. We broke in the doors. The master’s room was wide 
open. The master’s room was brilliantly lighted, and the master was 
there, very ca!m...And our people stopped dead...it was the master...l 
went in. "It is you", he said, very calm. It was I, even I, and I told him 
so, the good slave, the faithful slave, the slave of slaves, and suddenly his 
eyes were like two cockroaches, frightened in the rainy season...l struck, 
and the blood spurted; that is the only baptism I remember today.
Aime Cesaire, Les Armes Miraculeuses.
(Paris: N.R.F., Gallimard, 1970)
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I shall attempt to discuss the atrocities of the French 
Army in Algeria and how France waged her war in her colonized country. 
With the transfer of power to the French military forces in Algeria, 
torturing, killing indiscriminately, and shooting for "fun" became normal to 
the French soldiers in Algeria; this point will be discussed at length in 
both sections.
In the next section of this chapter I shall examine the development 
of Sartre’s writings towards the torture inflicted in Algeria, and I will 
consolidate his position with the eye witnesses on torture, such as Henri 
Alleg, Sergeant Pierre Leulliete, Djamila Boupacha, and other Algerians.
(a) THE POWER OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN ALGERIA
Besides the "pied-noir" and the Algerian Moslems there was a third 
political entity in Algeria; the French Army which gave the country one 
appearance: that of war. There was a huge number of soldiers occupying 
Algeria: "Regiment Etranger Parachutistes" (REP), "Regiment Parachutistes 
Colonial" (RPC), "Regiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes" (RCP), etc... In 
each "Mechta", "Douar", and "willaya" there were more soldiers than 
civilians in the streets, especially during their operations. Both the 
Algerian Moslems and the "pied-noir" remained in their homes most of the 
time, frightened of death. The Algerians feared the French Army which 
killed indiscriminately and the "pied-noir" were frightened of the FLN’s 
vengeance. In the streets the French soldiers could be seen pointing 
their weapons at every Algerian they met. Because the executions of the 
ALN were held in public and the French Army forced the people into the
135
streets to attend, the Algerians preferred to remain indoors. [1]
Although Guy Mollet, the secretary-general of the Socialist Party 
(SFIO)* won a vote of confidence in the National Assembly, and became 
Prime Minister in February 1956, he was having trouble within the Socialist 
Party at its congress which was held in Lille. Its members demanded a 
ceasefire and negotiation in Algeria.[2] It should be pointed out that when 
Mollet took office, one of his first moves was to announce Soustelle’s 
replacement by the seventy-nine year old General Georges Catroux, the 
wartime High Commissioner in Algiers, who was later replaced by Robert 
Lacoste. Lacoste was ideally suited for the post of Governor-General of 
Algeria. He had joined the French resistance during the Second World 
War when his father was shot as a hostage by the Nazis, and had dealt 
with industrial and economic affairs in the former government. His favourite 
expression was "je ne me laisse pas emmerder" as he said later in Algiers 
to the American journalist Edward Behr:
"Je ne vous demande qu’une seule chose, a vous autres 
journalistes etrangers: C’est de bien vouloir ne pas venir 
nous emmerder". [3]
Neither Soustelle nor Lacoste could stop the horror of war, as Ferhat 
Abbas put it:
*  SFIO: Section Frangaise de L’lnternationale Ouvriere.
1. John E. Talbott, "The Myth and Reality of the Paratrooper in the 
Algerian War", Armed Forces and Society. 1976, Vol. 3, No. 1, p.77.
2. Le Monde. May 18, 1956, p.4.
3. Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem, p.101.
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Le del Algerien restart plein d’orages. Ni Soustelle, ni 
Lacoste n’avaient pu desamorcer la situation et rapprocher 
les deux communautes. En faisant le jeu des "ultras" contre 
les liberaux Frangais et contre le FLN, les representants du 
pouvoir central avaient eloigne I’heure de la reconciliation et 
de la paix.[4]
All thoughts of negotiation and ceasefire were soon forgotten, and the 
tempo of the war increased, as Mendes France had promised before the 
election of the National Assembly 1956. Above all else:
The first duty of the government that will be formed after the 
election will be to reestablish peace in North Africa. What we 
must do before anything else is to stop lying, to stop falling 
into the same old errors of Indo-China, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Of course, we must protect the Algerian populations, but we 
must stop all this blind and insane repression. [5]
The Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet’s aim was to commit France more 
completely to the suppression of the Algerian revolution than either of his 
predecessors, and to establish a course of action that was not to be 
changed before de Gaulle came to power. The total number of the 
French Army fighting in Algeria exceeded 500,000 men, with many of the 
crack military units coming from NATO, while 150,000 others waited in 
Morocco, and 20,000 in Tunisia. The French military forces were now 
using conscripts in Algeria, which they had never done in Indo-China. 
In addition to the strength of the French Army there were the NATO bases 
in North Africa, particularly in Algeria, France being a member, with the 
use of NATO’s equipment. There were many NATO military bases in the
4. Ferhat Abbas, Autopsie d’une Guerre, p.223.
5. Cited in A. Werth, The Strange History of Mendes France. (London: 
Barrie, 1957), p.395.
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Sahara and on the Algerian coast. Thus, the French Army in Algeria 
scented victory in the war which they could not lose, because of the huge 
numbers of their men and arms, and because of the many battles they 
had won during their operations, by shooting indiscriminately, burning 
villages, torturing people, and killing for "fun". As the eye witness account 
reported:
Arabs (Algerians) shot down "for the fun of it", prisoners
brutally murdered, villages burned, mass executions etc...[6]
Now let us discuss the most important events which seemed to give 
the hope of victory to the French Army in Algeria. First, the Battle of 
Algiers in 1956, won by the French paratroops, but which gave an 
international hope to the FLN, as we shall see later. For the Algerian 
people, it was comprehensible and logical to react by making "attentats" 
and exploding bombs at the French military targets: that was the only way 
to defend themselves against the colonial regime, but the French 
considered it as terrorist action against innocent people. However, when 
the Battle of Algiers took place, Robert Lacoste gave orders to close 
down the FLN’s network by using all the military forces in the city to 
Colonel Yves Godard, Chief of Staff of the Tenth Parachutist Division, 
General Raoul Salan, Commander-in-Chief of the elite of the division, and 
General Jacques Massu, the Tenth Division commander, who in effect 
took over as police chief of Algiers. He had experience in West Africa 
and with the Free French forces, and later in Indo-China and Suez. In 
1955, he had been promoted General, at the age of 47. Massu, whp had 
a reputation as a warrior, reminded observers of one of Napoleon’s 
Imperial guards.
6. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Lieutenant in Algeria. Translated by
Ronald Mathews (New York: Knopf, 1957), p.30.
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Robert Lacoste informed those generals that there were more than
1500 police in Algiers under pressure from the FLN terrorists since the
outbreak of the revolution. Therefore, the defeat of the FLN’s
underground was one of the positive moves towards the victory of the
French in Algeria. The army tried to fill the increasing administrative void
in Algiers in accordance with the decisions of Lacoste, and the military
shouldered ever-increasing responsibilities. Immediately, the army created
a new "Section Administrative Specialisee" (SAS) (Special Administrative
Section) and "Detachements Operationnels de Protection" (DOP) (the
Secret Police Detachments) within the army in order to control the area
of Algiers. Later this practice was followed not only in Algiers but all over
Algeria. Thus, the result of this increasingly political administrative
emphasis was that:
...on the verge of the crisis of May 1958, the army had not 
only supplanted civil administration in districts where the latter 
were incapable of handling the job, but the precepts of 
revolutionary war had also taken over from old colonial 
traditions, extending and developing them. [7]
When the FLN organized a strike against French colonization in 
Algiers for eight days, which lasted from January 28, to February 4, 1957, 
General Massu replied by declaring his intention to act as a strikebreaker. 
By threats, invitations, and coercion the French military forced or induced 
Algerian workers to return to their jobs and Moslem children to their 
schools, and the paratroops forcibly reopened Algerian shops. The army 
claimed that they had succeeded in breaking the strike, and the Algerians
7. Raoul Girardet, Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962), p.139.
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agreed in order to gain international support, and to organize themselves 
to counter the new colonization.
After the strike the French paratroops organized their intelligence 
network in the whole city, with checkpoints in the streets, barbed-wire 
barriers and armed patrols. The French soldiers searched night and day 
in order to find out the structure of the clandestine organization, patrols 
moving from door to door. Torture was the army’s response to the 
people of Algiers, as we shall see in the next section. Let us look at one 
of the FLN heroes of the Casba area (the poorest area in Algiers where 
most of the Algerians lived), Ali La Pointe, who became something of a 
folk hero for the Algerian masses. Before the outbreak of the revolution, 
Ali La Pointe had been a sometime pimp and foot soldier in the organized 
clandestine crime of the city. In his book Le Temps des Leopards. Yves 
Courriere observed:
The knowledge that Ali had of the underworld of the Casbah 
was of considerable value to Yacef (Yacef Saadi, head of the 
autonomous FLN network in Algiers, 1955-1957). He knows 
everyone, the bistros, the informers, the gamblers, the pimps, 
the whores. He had worked for all the important gangs, 
including that of "Vincent the Scorpion Fish" (Vincent La 
Rascass) and that of Joe Menella. He knows them all, and 
they know him. But Ali La Pointe doesn’t want to be in 
anyone’s service. He works as an "independent". But for 
the first time, he has found a leader: Yacif Saadi. He is 
ready to follow him to the ends of the earth. This uncouth 
being who believed in neither God nor the Devil had found 
a cause, to which he devoted himself with exaltation. 
Whatever Yacef asked of him, Ali would do, faithfully and 
coldly. The team of Ali La Pointe and Yacef was thus 
constituted. It would be heard from. [8 ]
8 . Yves Courriere, Le Temps des Leopards (Paris: Fayard, 1969), p.238.
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It will be very interesting for Yves Courri&re to add to his 
observation that the reason why Ali La Pointe was faithful to the FLN 
leader in Algiers, though he was an illiterate person, was that he started 
hating the French people in Algeria when he witnessed the scene of the 
decapitation of Moslems in the prison called "El-Finga" by a machine 
which the Algerians feared during the war. [9]
In Algiers the leadership of the FLN was forced to change hands, 
names, and forms in the ensuing years. The CCE had to flee Algiers 
and to establish itself in Tunis. Between October 1957 and February 
1961, Algiers was nearly free of political violence. It should be pointed 
out that the Battle of Algiers was the most important step in the French 
Army’s identification with the cause of "L’Algerie Frangaise". Later, Massu 
became a special hero, and regimental officers socialized with the 
"pied-noir" elite in Algiers. [10]
The war was not only in Algiers, as might be expected, but also all 
over Algeria. Indeed, the war outside Algiers was going very much in 
favour of the ALN, as they had considerably extended the areas under 
their control in the east and west, and they dominated most of the 
"djebels" (mountainous regions) of the country, particularly the Aures and 
Kabylia between November 1954 and 1958, perhaps because funds and 
arms could be supplied regularly to these areas from Tunisia and 
Morocco.
With the arms and funds supplied by both countries, the number of
9. Film, La Bataille d’Alqer. 1966 (Film-maker, Gillo Pontecorvo [Italian]).
10. L’Echo d’Alqer. January 2, 1957, p.3.
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"El-Moudjahidine"* had increased since the outbreak of the revolution. 
The French government decided to build an electrified fence, which was 
called the "Morice line" (named after miner of Defence) after General 
Morice Challe who had drawn its plan along the Tunisian-Algerian border 
and which threatened to cut off Tunisia as the main source of supply. In 
September 1957, the French completed an imposing "Cordon Sanitaire" 
the length of the Tunisian border. The Morice line was a barrier of 
modern military technology which was built from the sea to the empty 
Sahara along the Tunisian frontier for more than two hundred miles. The 
nucleus of the line was a ten-foot electric fence charged with five 
thousand volts; on both sides was barbed-wire similar to the style of the 
First World War as described by one French conscript: "An immense 
serpent in the style of Bernard Buffet." Defending the line was most 
important to the French military forces; there were more than 85,000 
soldiers on the Algerian-Tunisian frontier, the most powerful concentration 
of French combat troops in Algeria. [11]
By the beginning of 1958, the French had completed another barbed- 
wire barrier, this time along the Moroccan-Algerian border - with the same 
equipment as the first. The French Army posts were now, strengthened; 
being electrified and equipped with radar and alarm systems. Further, 
they were made more secure by reserves in the rear. In Tunisia there
*  "El-Moudjahidine", singular of "El-Moudjahid". In Arabic this term 
means rebel fighting in a holy war in the Islam religion. But in the 
Algerian dialect there is no difference between the terms rebels and 
"El-Moudjahidine", both of them mean soldiers of ALN. In this thesis 
I used these words to mean the same thing. But I have started with 
the use of rebel in the second chapter because the Algerians used 
it in the first year of the war, then "El-Moudjahide" and later 
"El-Djcffch".
11. Alistair Horne. A Savage War of Peace, p.230.
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were approximately 15,000 Algerian men and 10,000 in Morocco who 
were receiving military training and carrying out raids, though the 
transport of supplies to Algeria had been cut off, and major breakthroughs 
were effectively stopped. In spite of the Morice line, the sinister triumph 
of military technology and of the strength of the French paratroops on 
the frontier, the ALN troops, tried out new techniques and they had 
ordered high-tension wire-cutters from Germany. Many diversionary 
tactics were tried in an attempt to pass under the line. They created 
breakthrough units in Tunisia, which were trained in the execution of 
forced marches at astonishing speeds. They even had the notion of 
transporting arms and funds by camels across the Sahara. But it was 
impossible for them to break down the line, and the cost in deaths grew 
higher and higher. According to the 9th RCP, there were more than 
6,000 men killed in seven months in 1958.
In Algeria itself the French Army had regrouped. Electrified barbed 
wire fences and land-mines encircled each barracks and village, as well 
as blocking the main streets of the cities and villages. The 
"El-Moudjahidine" had to retaliate and attack French military targets; they 
had to continue their hit-and-run tactics with which they had harried the 
French Army so often during the last two years. The country was 
covered with fortified posts and French troops were permanently assigned 
to the region with the tasks of policing and patrolling. Furthermore, there 
were mobile units for fighting the political-military FLN organization, 
regrouping the civilian population, and organizing it for self-defence. In 
addition, there was the general reserve of the French Army besides the 
soldiers who were fighting permanently, mainly paratroops and 
"Legionnaires" (the parachute regiment of the foreign legion (REP) most 
of those soldiers were Europeans and French African troops), well
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equipped with helicopters, aircraft and artillery, etc...[1 2 ]
It should be noted that militarily the new concept of the French 
Army in Algeria was immensely successful. As each area was divided 
between the paratroops and "legionnaires", the operation became limited, 
and they operated in small units, as the Germans had often done in 
Russia during the Second World War (even their name - "commandos de 
chasse" - was a translation of the German "Jagdkommandos"). They 
broke up the battalions which they had only recently enlarged to a 
strength of 600 soldiers and replaced them by units of 100 men. Thus, 
the French Army and the military advisors of NATO in Algeria, had made 
sure that the ALN would not succeed in building up regular forces and 
confront them with a Dien Bien Phu situation which was regarded as a 
military disaster not only for France but also for Western countries. As the 
frontier barriers stopped the flow of weapons and supplies to the 
"El-Moudjahidine", the French Army in Algeria became stronger and 
stronger. Besides, barracks and military enclosures, there were soldiers 
tents everywhere surrounded by tanks and under observation by 
helicopters and aircraft. [13]
When the FLN lost more soldiers in breaking through the Morice 
line, they decided to build many base-camps for the ALN on the 
Tunisia-Algeria frontier. Among these camps was Sakiet Sidi Youcef, a 
small village in Tunisia, from where the "El-Moudjahidine" had attacked 
the French paratroops inside Algeria, and had shot down an investigating 
French plane. It should be noted that it was not the first time that the 
ALN had launched attacks on the French troops from Tunisia. On several 
occasions between 1957 and 1958, French troops had pursued 
"El-Moudjahidine" into Tunisian territory, with casualties recorded on both
12. Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indo-China to Algeria 
(London, Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1964), p.35.
13. Ibid, p.36. 1 4 4
sides. The Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, warned the French 
troops to stay out of his country, while the French government repeatedly 
warned Tunisia that further border violations would incite retaliation. The 
French government in Paris was aware of the role Tunisia was playing in 
the FLN’s military success. [14] When retaliation did come, however, in 
the form of a surprise attack on a small Tunisian village, it served only to 
enlarge the crisis and also internationalize it.
In the early morning of 8 th February 1958, another investigating 
French plane was hit by ALN from Sakiet base and had to make a forced 
landing behind the Morice line. Three hours later the French military, 
taking matters into its own hands, and according to the authorities in 
Paris not securing permission from them, [15] dispatched 25 Air Force 
planes (American-built B-26 bombers) to bomb the Tunisian village of 
Sakiet-Sidi Youcef on the Algerian-Tunisian border, as they had several 
times to the Algerian villages. It was Saturday morning - a market day 
and most of the people were out on the streets. Many people were killed, 
most of them women and children. The Algerian refugee camp, hospital, 
schools, mosques, houses, were all destroyed according to the Red 
Cross, visiting the area that day and witness to the event. [16]
14. Jacques Soustelle, Voici Pourquoi. (A fortnightly review critical of 
the government and strong in its defence of "L’Algerie Frangaise". 
It had begun publication in November 1957. Soustelle was its 
political editor and chief inspiration).
15. According to Jean Ferniot, De Gaulle et le 13 Mai. (Paris: Plon, 
1965), pp.15-3. Minister of Defence Chaban-Delmas, Resident 
Minister of Algeria Robert Lacoste, and Foreign Minister Pineau were 
not informed of the raid beforehand.
16. Yves Courriere, La Guerre d’Alaerie. 4 Volumes:
(1) Les Fils de la Toussaint (Paris: Fayard, 1968), p.584.
(2) Le Temps des Leopards (Paris: Fayard, 1969).
(3) L’Heure des Colonels (Paris: Fayard, 1970).
(4) Les Feux du Desespoir. La Fin d’un Empire (Paris: Fayard, 
1971).
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It should be pointed out that after the Sakiet Sidi-Youcef bombing, 
Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba withdrew his ambassador to France 
and began preparations to take the matter to the United Nations. He 
also demanded an immediate evacuation of the 20,000 French troops still 
stationed in Tunisia. Undoubtedly, the French government 
countercharged, claiming that Tunisia was to blame since it had been 
warned many times that further aid to the Algerian FLN would result in 
retaliation from France.
The French military forces were strong in Algeria compared with the 
ALN, but the government in France was politically weak. Contrarily, the 
FLN was militarily weak in Algeria but politically strong in the exterior. 
Earlier, on October 22, 1956, the external delegation of the FLN, Ahmed 
Ben-Bella and three other organizers of the All Saints rising, Mohamed 
Boudiaf, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Khider, and Mustapha Lacheraf, 
an Algerian professor who wrote a few articles about Algerian nationalism 
in Les Temps Modernes. left Rabat for Tunis in a DC-3 belonging to 
Air-Maroc, with a French crew. On approaching Algerian territory, the 
French pilot received radio orders from Oran in the name of the French 
high command; the Moroccan plane was diverted from its course and 
forced to land in Algiers. With no chance to resist, the FLN leaders were 
arrested and transported to France, where they remained imprisoned for 
five and a half years. It was said that they were given the status of 
political prisoners, but they were never brought to trial. [17] The four 
leaders were imprisoned in a French fortress on the fie d’Aix, off the 
Atlantic coast of France. In defending this pirate act, Robert Lacoste said
17. John Talbott, The War Without A Name: France in Algeria. 1954- 
1962 (London: Faber & Faber, 1980), p.72.
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that: "C’est formidable! Quelle histoire! C’est une affaire du tonnerre de 
Dieu."[18] But Ren6  Coty was against Lacoste’s decision and he 
emphasized that: "Celui qui & ordonne cette connerie nous fera perdre 
la guerre d’Alg6rie."[19] (Indeed they lost it because of their terrorist 
activities).
In Algeria the "pied-noir" still had their slogan of "L’Algerie Frangaise" 
and the French Army came up with the idea of "integration" by any 
means - including torture, brainwashing, oppressive propaganda, and 
destroying human dignity. They claimed that they were responsible for 
these actions in order to reorganize the population from top to bottom as 
Colonel Roger Trinquier, one of the leading Indo-China hands, said in one 
of his interviews with an associated Press correspondent in September 
1958. He declared that:
...you can call me a fascist if you like, but our aim is to make 
the population docile and everyone’s actions must be 
controlled. [2 0 ]
The French government in Paris seemed to encourage the aim of the 
"pied-noir" and the army in Algeria. Robert Lacoste himself delegated full 
administrative and police powers to General Massu by administrative 
decree. Jean-Marie Domenach, the editor of the left-wing Catholic review, 
Esprit, described the situation as follows:
Their "war of ideas" required a single idea, fixed and clear. 
From this position the army arrived somewhat experimentally 
at political action. Its chiefs sensed that the old principles 
of patriotism and discipline were not enough to set up
18. Quoted from J. R. Tournoux, "Secrets d’Etat" in F. Abbas Autopsie 
d’une Guerre, p.187.
19. Ibid, p.187.
20. Quoted in Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem, p. 138.
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against "subversive warfare"; and in order to fulfil their 
mission they demanded that the state define a policy and 
hold to it. As the state was weak and divided, the army 
naturally substituted itself for the state; in its ten years of 
continuous combat it had worked out a coherent conception 
of permanent interests and of the objectives of guerilla 
war. [21]
According to Resident Minister Robert Lacoste, the figure of 
Algerians dead given to the National Assembly from November 1954 to 
December 31st 1956 was officially totalled at 23,189, of whom 3,876 had 
"disappeared". Losses inflicted by the French military forces were put at 
17,784 killed. Further, General Salan made a statement to a press 
conference that 700 rebels were killed during military operations in the 
period from January 28 to February 5. In one day (February 8 ) 130 
civilians were killed; 216 died between the 9th and 10th February. On 
March 2-3, 1957, Reuter reported that French security forces killed 267 
insurgents and captured 478 during the weekend. On March 5, the 
correspondent of the Manchester Guardian reported that there had been 
10 killed and 13 wounded in a terrorist attack and 137 rebels killed in 
military operations. [22] It should be pointed out that the French soldiers 
were fully equipped with the most modern weapons of warfare, and in 
1957 the government had spent more than £400,000,000 on military 
operations in Algeria in order to reduce the number of the ALN. 
Moreover, in the budget of the French government in 1958, there were 
600m allocated to Algeria.
The French paratroops were killing not only "El-Moudjahidine" as
21. Jean-Marie Domenach, "The French Army in Politics", Foreign Affairs.
Vol. 39, 1960-61, p.189.
22. "The Algerian Bloodbath", Selected Articles - Freedom. Vol. 4-10,
1954-60 (March, 1957), pp.55-7.
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might be expected, they were also killing people indiscriminately, women, 
children, and old men. They were burning villages, palms, fields, and 
forests, thinking that the ALN were camping there. As the eye witness, 
Pierre Leulliette, Sergeant in the French military forces during the Algerian 
War, reported in his book St. Michael and the Dragon:
We went back. The village below seemed perfectly calm. 
The population rushed over to help us, bringing us food and 
water...We searched a few "Mechtas" mechanically, though 
we were tired of repeating the same actions again and again. 
In the back of a small miserable hut, we found a vast 
white-and-green FLN flag...A quarter of an hour later, all the 
"Mechtas" around the one where we found the flag were in 
ashes. [23]
According to Sergeant Leulliette, killing, torturing, burning villages and 
forests, and searching everywhere became normal to the French Army 
in Algeria. They even shot Algerian civilians for "fun" in the street, and 
capturing "El-Moudjahidine" became an amusement for the French 
paratroops. He witnessed that:
In a hut, wedged between two large slabs of rock, we prised 
out two women...Both wore a kind of sand-coloured pilot’s 
uniform and on their chests the green and white badge of 
the FLN..."they say that they are prisoners of war, that they 
won’t talk, and that they’ll complain (Perhaps they said that 
according to the Geneva Convention)...The little lieutenant, 
bright red with anger, went on yelling: "Kill her! Go on, kill 
her!"...He fired five bullets in succession into the woman’s 
crumpled body...First, two bullets in the middle of her chest; 
then three in her belly. She died without a sound. [24]
23. Pierre Leulliette, St. Michael and the Dragon: A Paratrooper in the 
Algerian War. Translated by Tony White (London: Heinemann, 1964),
p.262.
24. Ibid, pp.251-3
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In addition to this savagery and barbarism, Ferhat Abbas also in his part 
reported that:
"A nouveau c’est le massacre. Plus de 100 cadavres restent 
sur la chauss§e. II faudrait aussi parler des morts de Medea 
ecrases par les chars ou devores par les chiens 
poIiciers".[25]
and he added that:
"L’Algerie Musulmane dechiree, blessSe, humiliee, 
definitivement engage dans la guerre..."[26]
It should be noted that among those burned villages, the author’s 
"Dechera",* Ouled Amrane, "Douar" Tamza in the North-East of Algeria, 
was completely destroyed by the French Air Force in 1957. Most of the 
people escaped to other "Mechtas" when aircraft started bombing our 
"Dechera", more than 17 people were killed and most of them were old 
men and women. The number of wounded people was higher. Among 
those who were killed were seven from my family, "Ouled Amrane", four 
men and three women. The attack was designed to exterminate the 
"Ouled Amrane" family because most of them were "Moudjahidine"; there 
were 42 of them in the ALN. The author’s father El-Hadi was a leader of 
the "cellule" of the ALN in Tamza and Aures mountains. He conducted 
many military operations with his soldiers and was promoted and had 
been given the third part of the Aures area to control. In 1957, he was 
killed on a military operation with most of his soldiers in the forests called
* Dechera: smaller than a "Mechta" in the countryside, usually most of 
the people who lived there were "Fellah" - peasants.
25. Ferhat Abbas, Autoosie d’une guerre, p. 196.
26. Ibid, p.197.
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"Ghabet El-Beradja" in the South-East of Aures area. [27] As might be
expected, all 42 "Moudjahidine" were killed during the Algerian War. Today 
streets, roads, and institutions have been named in honour of Amrani’s 
"chouhada" (martyrs) killed in the Algerian revolution.
Now let us take a bird’s-eye view of the FLN’s political movements
and how they had started the War in France. The FLN realized that the
revolution would have to continue in order to free Algeria from French
colonization. For the first time since November 1954, the FLN’s internal
leaders of "Willayate" met in Soummam, in the North of Algeria in order
to create party institutions and to settle the important outstanding
questions. The form and structure of leadership was essential to the FLN’s
wartime development in the Soummam Valley Congress which was held
on August 20, 1956:
The Soummam Congress...constituted the most important 
event in the history of the FLN. It was from this congress that 
the relations of the front were defined with the trade unionists 
of the UGTA and the students of the UGEMA. It was there 
also that the ALN could draw lessons from twenty months 
of war and finally establish the political objectives of the 
revolution. [28]
The Soummam Congress had been planned by Ramdane Abane, the new 
chief of "Willaya" IV, and the interior leaders while all the exterior 
delegations were still outside the country. The FLN created the first 
political institution the "Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne" 
(CNRA), the wartime parliamentary legislative body of the party. Besides
27. Belkacem Drardja, in Achaab. November 14,1974. (The daily Arabic 
newspaper of the FLN party in Algeria). See also more information 
about the "Douai4' Tamza tragedy during the Algerian War in Djamila 
Amrane’s research in Le Retentissement De la Revolution Algerienne 
(Colloque international d’Alger: 24-28 Novembre 1984) [Centre 
National d’Etudes Historiques] Edited by Mohamed Touili (Algiers 
and Brussels: Enal, Gam 1985), pp.90-108.
28. Jacques Duchemin, Histoire du FLN (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1962), 
p.179.
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this organization, they had created another one in France called "La 
Federation de France du FLN" (FFFLN), which was named later "La 7E 
Willaya". The aim of this congress was as follows:
The doctrine is clear. National independence is the goal, and 
the means to its attainment is revolution destroying the 
colonial regime. [29]
The components of the FLN after the Soummam Congress are shown in 
the figure below.
ORGANIZATION OF THE FLN AS FORMED AT THE 
SOUMMAM VALLEY CONGRESS 
AUGUST 2 0 , 1956.
C.C.E.
F.F.F.L.N.Exterior Delegation
National Organization
1. UGTA
2. UGEMA
C.N.R.A.
\ /
A.L.N.
29. Le Front de Liberation Nationale. La Platforme de la Revolution 
Algerienne. (Resolutions of the Soummam Valley Congress, August
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As we have seen, the French military forces were too strong in 
Algeria for the ALN to counter them. The results of the French military 
victory from November 1954 to 1958 can be listed as follows: (1) the 
hastening of the FLN’s disintegration by the building of the Morice line on 
the Algerian-Moroccan-Tunisian frontiers; (2) the winning of the Battle of 
Algiers by torturing and killing people; (3) the success of military 
operations, bombing and burning villages and forests throughout Algeria;
(4) the hijack of the leaders of the exterior delegation; (5) shooting in the 
streets for "fun" and killing people indiscriminately became normal to the 
French paratroops in Algeria. At this point, the FLN decided to carry out 
actions in France. Indeed, this was its strategy of physically extending the 
war to the mother country. In his book Veritas sur la Revolution 
Algerienne. Mohamed Lebjaoui stated that:
"...to carry the war to France, so that the French should 
discover just how painful the war was."[30]
In August 1958, the FLN moved their place of operations from 
Algeria to metropolitan France. Fires broke out, many policemen were 
attacked in the streets by Algerians; on August 24 alone, four policemen 
in Paris were killed by the FLN. Lebjaoui led the organization of the 
"attentat" in France, which was "spectacularly successful", in collecting 
funds and recruiting volunteers, particularly deserters from the French 
Army. They also tried to avenge, by burning down the forest of the "Bois 
de Boulogne" in Paris, the burning of many forests in Algeria. To this 
extent, the FLN committed a spectacular series of acts of violence; gas 
storage tanks set alight in Marseille, and policemen killed in Paris. The
30. Mohamed Lebjaoui, Ver'rtes sur la Revolution Algerienne (Paris: 
N.R.F., Gallimard, 1970), p.81.
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FLN’s activities reached their highest on September 15, when there was 
an attempt on Jacques Soustelle’s life; Soustelle, who supported "L’Alg6 rie 
Frangaise" and gave the order to the French paratroops in Algiers to 
torture people in order to attain his goals, and who asserted when he was 
in Algeria as Governor-General:
"L’abandon de PAIgerie serait un crime, et un crime qui ne 
paierait pas". [31]
At about 9.45 am as his chauffeur-driven car approached his office on the 
Avenue Friedland, near the Etoile, two armed Algerians attacked the 
car. [32] Soustelle escaped with a small cut on his face, and two bullet 
holes in his jacket. Undaunted by the attack, Soustelle appeared later that 
day for a press conference. He stated:
"This attempt demonstrates once more that the FLN, 
despairing of winning the game, has resorted to the most 
criminal measures". [33]
In France itself, "L’Algerie Frangaise" propaganda had always insisted 
that Algeria would be lost only because the French government was too 
ineffective in opposing the rebellion. When, because of the weakness of 
the government, the military insurrection occurred in May, 1958, the 
Socialists refused to work with Communists and with De Gaulle. As 
former Prime Minister Guy Mollet put it:
31. Jacques Soustelle, Le Drame Alaerien et la Decadence Francaise: 
Reponse a Raymond Aron. (Paris: Plon, 1957), p.26.
32. Ali Haroun, La 7E Wilava: La Guerre du FLN en France 1954-1962 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), p.210.
33. Le Monde. September 20, 1958, p.3.
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The police, army, and administration were en route. 
Organize the vast and intense popular reaction? Of course, 
this is what we wanted to do. Throughout an entire night, 
representatives of the free labour unions came through my 
office. The result of our consultations was clear: the working 
class, not because of softness, but because of 
incomprehension, would stay quiet; they were not ready to 
fight for this disqualified form of government, this impotent 
republic. [34]
It should be pointed out here that Mollet seemed to agree with the 
diagnosis of the problem made by the supporters of "L’AlgSrie Frangaise" 
in dividing the government; the hope of "La plus grande France de 
Dunkerque a Tamanrasset" lost him supporters.
(b) SARTRE AND THE TORTURED ALGERIANS
Now let us see the torture in Algeria. First, let me briefly explain what
the term torture means. Torture as explained in the Longman Dictionary
of Contemporary English: is "the act of causing someone to feel severe
pain, done out of cruelty, as a punishment, etc..."[35] but torture seems
to have been known to all societies of the ancient world with the possible
exception of the Hebrews. In ancient Greece, for instance, prisoners of
war were liable to be tortured. But in the eighteenth century, Voltaire
pointed out concerning torture that:
...There is a natural comparison in the human heart, which 
makes all men detest the cruelty of torturing the accused in 
order to extort confession...Possibly Thou mayst be innocent; 
but I will torture Thee that I may be satisfied: not that I intend 
to make Thee recompense for the thousands deaths which 
I have made Thee suffer, in lieu of that which is preparing for 
Thee. [36]
34. Guy Mollet, 13 Mai 1958 - 13 Mai 1962 (Paris: Plon, 1962), p.97.
35. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Essex, 1982), p.1170.
36. Quoted in Malise Ruthven, Torture, the Great Conspiracy (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), p. 13.
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But Edward Peters said that torture was the: "torment and suffering of the 
body in order to elicit the truth"[37] At the time of the French-Algerian war, 
prohibitions against torture had been condified but the act was still not 
defined. However, the universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 set 
out an early prohibition: "no-one shall be subjected to torture or to 
degrading treatment or punishment"[38] Later, torture was defined in the 
Geneva Conventions in force during the Algerian war:
Persons...shall in all circumstances be treated humanely...To 
this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited 
at any time and in any place whatsoever...Violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment, and torture... [39]
But for Sartre, torture during the Algerian War "...n’est ni civile, ni militaire, 
ni specifiquement Frangaise: C’est une verole qui ravage Pepoque 
entiere.[40] Before discussing Sartre’s attitude towards the torture inflicted 
in Algeria it will be useful to know first how Sartre gradually became 
involved with the tortured Algerians.
Earlier in the first issue of Les Temps Modernes which appeared 
shortly after the liberation of France, Sartre recalled his own comment as 
follows:
37. Edward Peters, Torture. (New York, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985) 
p.i.
38. General Assembly Resolution 217A (111), December 10, 1948, U.N. 
Doc. A/810 at 7/1948.
39. Basic rules of the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols, 
Edited by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva, 
1983, pp.52-3.
40. Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. p.80.
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Aujourd’hui, les choses en sont venues a ce point que Ton 
a vu des ecrivains, blames ou punis parce qu’ils ont lou& 
leur plume aux Allemands, faire montre d’un 6 tonnement 
douloureux. "Eh quoi? disent-ils, ga engage done, ce qu’on 
ecrit?"[41]
Furthermore, Sartre attempted to define the theoretical orientation of the 
review and consequently the social responsibility of the intellectuals, as he 
stated:
En resume, notre intention est de concourir a produire 
certains changements dans la societe....nous nous rangeons 
du cote de ceux qui veulent changer a la fois la condition 
sociale de I’homme et la conception qu’il a de lui-meme.[42]
In order to attain this goal, intellectuals needed a different conception of 
their own role than the commonly accepted ones. Sartre argued that 
intellectuals are not "above" the affairs of society, or members of a "quasi­
monastic" order divorced from "temporal" consideration:
"pour nous, en effet, I’ecrivain n’est ni Vestale, ni Ariel: il est 
"dans le coup", quoi qu’il fasse, marque, comprimis, jusque 
dans sa plus lointaine retraite".[43]
For Sartre, the intellectual must accept this social responsibility not just as 
any other private citizen, but as one with higher opportunity to affect 
public opinion, as he affirmed:
41. Sartre, "Presentation" Les Temps Modernes. No.1, Vol. 1 (October, 
1945), p.3.
42. Ibid, pp.7-8.
43. Ibid, p.3.
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L’ecrivain est en situation dans son epoque: chaque parole 
a des retentissements. Chaque silence aussi..., en une 
circonstance particuliere de sa vie, a mesur6  sa 
responsabilite d’6 crivain. L’occupation nous a appris la 
notre.[44]
Therefore, the intellectual must be "engage", committed to defend a certain 
conception of man. This conception, with which the existentialists 
necessarily agree, is that: c’est ce que nous nommons la liberty et la 
personne n’est rien d’autre que sa liberte.[45] Perhaps this is the reason 
why Sartre committed himself to the Algerian War later in the 1950s. First, 
he condemned France for using the nineteenth-century economic 
machinery of colonial exploitation as we have seen in the second chapter. 
Second, he attacked the French Army for using the method of torture, as 
we are going to see later. Thus, Sartre became "engag§" and committed 
himself to defend the freedom of the Algerian people. But how and when 
did Sartre start to condemn France for using torture in Algeria?
In his article, "Vous etes Formidables" (1957) (You’re Terrific), Sartre
condemned both sides for using torture. Torture was probably the basest
part and most important effect of the Algerian revolution. Since the torture
existed on both sides, a number of questions had arisen at this stage:
Sur la solution du probleme Algerien, des amis pouvaient 
differer d’avis sans cesser de s’estimer. Mais les executions 
sommaires? Mai la torture? Peut-on garder de I’amitie pour 
celui qui les approuvera'rt? Chacun se tait, chacun regarde 
son voisin qui se tait, chacun se demande: "Que sait-il? Que 
croit-il? Qu’a-t-il decide d’oublier? Sauf entre gens "du meme 
bord" on craint de parler. Si j’allais decouvrir une 
complaisance criminelle en I’homme qui vient de me serrer 
la main: il ne dit rien, cet homme; qui ne dit rien consent.
44. Ibid, p.5.
45. Ibid, p.17.
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Mai je ne dis rien non plus, moi. Si c’etait lui, au contraire, 
qui me reprochait ma veulerie? La m§fiance nous enseigne 
une solitude nouvelle: nous sommes s£par£s de nos 
compatriotes par la crainte d’avoir & m6 priser ou d’etre 
meprises. C’est une meme chose, d’ailleurs, puisque nous 
sommes tous pareils et I’on a peur d’interroger les gens 
parce que leur reponse risque de reveler notre 
degradation. [46]
But later, Sartre seemed to condemn only France, because fifteen years
ago France was condemning Germans who used different kinds of torture,
as he asserted:
Plonges dans la stupeur, les Frangais decouvrent cette 
evidence terrible: si rien ne protege une nation contre elle- 
meme, ni son passe, ni ses fidelites, ni ses propres lois, s’il 
suffrt de quinze ans pour changer en bourreaux les victimes, 
c’est que I’occasion decide seule: selon I’occasion, n’importe 
qui, n’importe quand, deviendra victime ou bourreau.[47]
But in France itself the responsibility toward torture in Algeria was 
collective. Although Sartre did not see the tortured Algerians, he 
condemned its use. It appeared in Sartre’s earlier writing when he said: 
'We must militate in our writings in favour of the freedom of the 
person..."[48]
In February, 1958 there was a huge demand in bookshops in France 
for a first-hand account of torture in Algeria - La Question by Henri Alleg, 
member of the Algerian Communist Party, and editor of the newspaper 
Alger- Republican, from 1950 to 1955. He was arrested by the French 
paratroops of General Massu’s Tenth Division (Parachutists) in June 1957 
and he had been imprisoned for a month in EL-Biar (Algiers). Alleg, a
46. Sartre "Vous etes Formidables", Situations. V. p.64.
47. Sartre "Une Victoire", Situations. V. p.73.
48. Sartre, What is Literature? Translated by Bernard Frechtman. 
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), p.29.
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European Jew whose family had settled in Algeria during the Second 
World War, was put to torture as were other Algerians.
In his introduction to Henri Alleg’s account of torture "Une Victoire" 
(A Victory), Sartre realized that the victim who successfully resisted his 
tortures, like Alleg must show "will" and "courage" beyond what we can 
call human. Sartre affirmed that:
Mais, dans la torture, cet etrange match, I’enjeu semble 
radical: c’est pour le titre d’homme que le tortionnaire se 
mesure avec le torture et tout ce passe comme s’ils ne 
pouvaient appartenir ensemble a I’espece humaine...lt faut 
que sa trahison la brise et debarrasse a jamais d’elle. Celui 
qui cede a la question, on n’a pas seulement voulu le 
contraindre a parler; on lui a pour toujours impose un statut: 
celui de sous-homme.[49]
It should be noted that Sartre had written a play called The Victors 
(1949), which had no hero, although the theme of the play was heroism. 
There were five resistance fighters in Sartre’s play, who had no power. 
Things happened to them but they could not make things happen. In The 
Victors, the intellectual Henri is the most Sartrean character of the play, 
particularly when Sartre wrote:
You are too concerned with yourself, Henri; you want to 
redeem your life...Hell, what you need to do is work, and 
you’ll be saving your life into the bargain. [50]
Later Simone de Beauvoir described the circumstances in which Sartre 
had written The Victors: she explained:
49. Sartre "Une Victoire", Situations V. p.84.
50. Sartre, The Victors. Translated by Lionel Abel (New York: Knopf, 
1949), p.78.
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He had thought a great deal about torture for four whole 
years; alone, and among friends, we asked ourselves: Am 
I sure I would not talk? How do you manage to hold on? 
All these thoughts that haunted him he threw into his 
play. [51]
However, after nine years, Sartre seemed to find himself in the same 
situation but with a real hero (Henri Alleg) who resisted torture.
At first, Sartre seemed to ignore the tortured Algerians, who had 
been resisting and suffering since November 1954. Gradually, he became 
aware of the circumstances of torture in Algeria, when Henri Alleg was 
tortured. One can say either Sartre did not pay any attention to the 
tortured Algerians or refused to condemn the French side. From this point 
of view, it is very difficult to criticize Sartre’s attitude towards the torture 
in Algeria, because he had not seen the victims. But as the intellectual 
must be "engage" and accept this social responsibility, Sartre committed 
himself and he stressed:
Et puis Ton arrete au hasard; tout Musulman est 
"questionnable" a merci: la plupart des tortures ne disent rien 
parce qu’ils n’ont rien a dire, a moins qu’ils ne consentent, 
pour ne plus souffrir, a faire un faux temoignage ou h 
s’accuser gratuitement d’un crime impuni dont il parart 
opportun de les charger. Quand a ceux qui pourraient 
parler, on sait bien qu’ils se taisent. Tous ou presque tous. 
Ni Audin*, ni Alleg, ni Guerroudj** n’ont desserre les dents. 
Sur ce point, les tortionnaires d’EI Biar sont mieux renseignes 
que nous. [52]
*  Maurice Audin, Professor in Algiers University, had been tortured 
before Alleg, as we are going to see later.
* *  Mrs. Jacqueline Guerraudj, one of the best students of Simone de 
Beauvoir in Rouen. She had gone as a teacher to Algeria and she 
got married to a member of the FLN.
51. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p.112.
52. Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. pp.81-82.
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It is with the particular case of Alleg that Sartre became aware of the 
torture inflicted in Algeria, as he pointed out:
La torture s’est imposee d’elle - m§me, elle 6 tait devenue 
routine avant meme qu’on s’en fut avise. Mai la haine de 
I’homme qui s’y manifeste, c’est le racisme qu’elle exprime. 
Car c’est bien I’homme qu’on veut detruire, avec toutes ses 
qualites d’homme, le courage, la volonte, I’intelligence, la 
fidelite - celles meme que le colon revendique. Mai si 
I’Europeen s’emporte jusqu’a detester sa propre image, c’est 
qu’elle est reflectee par un Arabe.[53]
First let us see how Henri Alleg had been tortured. Apparently, 
Sartre was right when he said that:
Alleg, en quelques traits, nous decrit ceux qu’il a connus et 
cela suffit a marquer les etapes de la metamorphose...Tout 
cela, c’est la calme lucidite d’Alleg qui permet de le 
comprendre. Quand il n’apporterait rien d’autre, il faudrait 
lui garder une reconnaissance profonde. Mai il a fait bien 
plus: en intimidant ses bourreaux, il a fait triompher 
I’humanisme des victimes et des colonises contre les 
violences dereglees de certains militaires, contre le racisme 
des colons (pied-noir).[54]
Indeed, it was Alleg, the first tortured Frenchman who discovered and 
described the method of torture in Algeria in order to show to public 
opinion how people were regularly and systematically tortured.
In The Question. Alleg explained how he had been tortured by the 
French paratroopers in Algiers. He realized that the French soldiers were
53. Ibid, p.8 6 .
54. Ibid, pp.78-87.
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proud of torturing people and characterized themselves as Gestapo, as 
they claimed:
'Well, A Frenchman! He’s sided with the rats against us?..." 
"Lie down!..."
'We fought the war in Indo-china that was enough to know 
your type. This is the Gestapo here! You know the Gestapo? 
Then, with irony: "So you wrote articles about torture did you 
bastard! Very well! Now it’s the Tenth Paratroop Division who 
are doing it to you". [55]
Alleg perhaps thought that it was only the behaviour of the army toward 
the prisoners, but soon he experienced his first subjection to the field 
"gegene" which many Algerians came to know, when they were 
interrogated, and he said:
A flash of lightning exploded next to my ear and I felt my 
heart racing in my breast. I struggled, screaming, and 
stiffened myself until the straps cut into my flesh. [56]
Here, I believe, their own object was not only to torture a man for a while 
with pain but to drive him mad. In the second step for Alleg, a large 
magneto was used:
Instead of the sharp and rapid spasms that seemed to tear 
my body in two, it was now a greater pain that took 
possession of all my muscles and tightened them in longer 
spasms. [57]
Electric torture was eventually regarded as a matter of course, the 
electrodes were placed in Alleg’s mouth; he said that:
55. Henri Alleg, The Question, pp.41-7.
56. Ibid, p.44.
57. Ibid, p.48.
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My jaws were soldered to the electrode by the current, and 
it was impossible for me to unlock my teeth, no matter what 
effort I made. My eyes, under their spasmed lids, were 
crossed with images of fire, and geometric luminous patterns 
flashed in front of them. [58]
At the end of this horrible scene, which one would not advise weak 
stomachs to hear about, Alleg was left in the room with an intolerable 
thirst. The torturers seemed to "look after" him as they had promised; 
torture by electricity, by drowning, by fire, by thirst, with all the perfected 
techniques of our times.
As the torturers described themselves as supermen, Gestapo, strong 
and severe, they wanted to convince themselves and their victims of their 
invincible power. Certainly, the most important thing was to make the 
prisoner feel that he did not belong to the same world. But in reality as 
Sartre put it:
L’essentiel est de faire sentir au prisonnier qu’il n’est pas de 
leur race: on le deshabille, on le ligote, on le moque; des 
soldats vont et viennent, proferant des insultes et des 
menaces avec une monchalance qui se veut terrible. [59]
However, the torturers were using different kinds of water torture, they 
repeatedly put their victims’ heads into water until the victim was half 
drowned, then they would take the victim out, not with their hands as one 
might expect, but with a rope attached to his body. The torturers were not 
satisfied with torturing Alleg, they put him into water like other Algerians. 
He reported that:
58. Ibid, pp.56-7.
59. Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. p.77.
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I had the impression of drowning, and a terrible agony, that 
of death itself, took possession of me...'That’s it! He’s going 
to talk", said a voice. [60]
Further, he stated that:
I don’t believe that there was a single prisoner who did not, 
like myself, cry from hatred and humiliation on hearing the 
screams of the tortured for the first time. [61]
However, at the EL-Biar centre in Algiers, Alleg, certainly, heard different 
yells of tortured people and their hoarse laments which seemed to him 
like those of animals being slowly put to death. Suddenly, all these people 
disappeared. Among these horrible cries, was the horror of an old 
Algerian Moslem who wanted to escape torture and to release his life from 
torturers, as Alleg reported:
Between the terrible cries which the torture forced out of him, 
he said, exhausted: "Vive la France! Vive la France!" Without 
doubt, he was hoping in this way to appease his tormentors. 
But the others continued to torture him and their laughter 
rang through the whole building. [62]
Also, one of the tortured Algerians said later:
Ou je suis torture:
On passe a la torture comme les voitures passerrt dans une 
chaTne de montage. Mai la, c’est pour le demontage! La 
Casse! L’aneantissement physique et moral. Sous la torture 
et devant Pimpossibilite d’obtenir la mort, certains peres 
finissent par accuser leurs enfants; certains enfants leur pere 
ou leur mere ou leur freres et soeurs. Comment la "mere des 
Arts, des armes et des lois" en est-elle arrivee la?[63]
60. Henri Alleg, The Question, p.49.
61. Ibid, p.6 8 .
62. Ibid, p.91.
63. Belkacem Ouled Moussa, Les Chemins de L’independance. (Paris: 
Sindbad, 1980), p.262.
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However, as one can imagine, Alleg was not the first Frenchman to 
be tortured in the Algerian revolution. There were many people who 
disappeared without any information given from the official sources like 
Gabrielle Griminez, Blanche Moire, Elytte Loup, and other young women, 
and all these people sided with Algerian nationalism.
Probably, the first tortured Frenchman was Maurice Audin. Twenty- 
five year old Audin, brilliant mathematician in the Science Faculty of Algiers 
University, was a member of the Algerian Communist Party. Arrested a few 
days before Alleg by the French parachutists on suspicion of aiding the 
FLN in June 1957, Audin was tortured by electricity, by drowning, by fire, 
by thirst, etc...According to General Salan, Audin had escaped and made 
his way to Tunisia. As there was misleading information about Professor 
Audin, I believe that the Gestapo of the fifties tortured him to death. In his 
book Torture. Cancer of Democracy. France and Algeria: 1954-1962. 
(1963), Vidal-Naquet said that: "It was at Fort Emperor that Maurice Audin 
was secretly buried after he had been murdered..."[64]
For months, members of the National Assembly had been inquiring 
about Audin’s fate. French intellectual leaders, including one hundred 
professors, had set up the "Maurice Audin Committee" to find out what 
had happened to Audin. [65] Alleg asserted that Audin had been too badly 
hurt to have escaped his captors, he was murdered. By bringing to light 
these two incidents, Alleg’s The Question again rallied world opinion 
against France, as there was wide discussion of French Army atrocities 
and of how France was waging her "war" in Algeria.
64. Vidal-Naquet, P. Torture: Cancer of Democracy. France and Algeria: 
1954-1962. Translated by Barry Richard, (London: Penguin Books, 
1963), p.53.
65. Le Monde. January 25, 1958, p.5.
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Up to this point, it seemed that Sartre himself was concerned about
the torturer and the victim, as he stated:
Aujourd’hui, nous savons qu’il n’y a rien a comprendre: tout 
s’est fait insensiblement par d’imperceptibles abandons, et 
puis, quand nous avons leve la tete, nous avons vu dans la 
glace un visage etranger, haissable: le notre.[6 6 ]
Earlier, in his preface to Aden-Arabie. concerning the post war period, 
Sartre wrote: "Nous autres, les vieux, nous y laissames quelques plumes 
et toutes nos vertus".[67] Moreover, he said later, on Fanon and the 
Algerians "it is to his own brothers that he proclaims our old tricks, for he 
is sure that we have no spare ones".[6 8 ] Here, someone could say that 
Alleg was the victim of torture and Fanon was the colonial victim, but how 
about Sartre? Is he the victim and the executioner of the work he offered 
to us? Perhaps it is too early to judge him now, as this aspect will be 
developed later in the chapter.
Now let us examine the tortured Algerians and how the French Army 
institutionalized torture and constituted in each single area an institution 
of torture with all the perfected equipment and technique.
Indeed, before Alleg and Audin were tortured in June 1957, there
were many Algerians who had been tortured by different methods since
the outbreak of the revolution. People of different ages, including young 
girls, were tortured throughout the country mainly in big cities like Algiers, 
Constantine, Annaba, Oran, Tizi-Ouzou (Kabylia), and Khenchela (Aur&s). 
The main goal of the French Army in torturing innocent people in Algeria
6 6 . Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. p.73.
67. Sartre, preface to Paul Nizan’s Aden-Arabie p.12.
6 8 . Sartre’s preface to Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth.
Translated by Constance Farrington, (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 
p.19.
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was to put down the number of the ALN and to destroy the FLN’s aims. 
The most preferred method of torture which was used by both the police 
and the army was the "gegene". This technique consisted of an army 
signate magnito from which electrodes were fastened to different parts of 
the human body, particularly to the sexual organs (penis and breast). 
They were moved about the entire body, left for a long time on the chest, 
where the thoracic cage protects the heart, so the tortured went mad, 
jumping here and there, like a scalded cat. As the torturers were not 
satisfied, they also used other methods, as the eye witness reported:
These experts made the recalcitrant open their mouths by 
pinching their noses. They thrust the antennae deep down 
into their throats. But it sometimes happened that, in his 
agony, the prisoner would clamp his jaws together so 
violently that he sliced through the wires, in one go. So they 
had to be thickened. [69]
According to Sergeant Leulliette who published his documented 
collection during the Algerian revolution (1954-1957), as "Documents: 
Algerie", as the torture had become the official method of investigation, 
each company had its own little torture chamber and each room was well 
equipped. He described the torture chamber of number one company of 
the Second RPC, his own company in Hussein-Dey (Algiers) which 
seemed to the Algerians a small institution of torture compared with EL- 
Biar and Bouzarea. Sergeant Leulliette said that they used to sleep during 
the day and, almost every night, there were secret expeditions into the 
endless Casba, or the suburbs of the city. The paratroopers used to go 
and drag the men from their beds. No public or private building could bar 
its doors to them and no one was ever safe from their investigation. 
Further, the evidence of torture gathered in Algeria seemed to be
69. Pierre Leulliette, St. Michael and the Dragon, p. 233.
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consolidated by the eye-witness account of their sergeant, as he reported 
from his company that nearly all parachutists who were camped in 
Hussein-Dey adapted the old Gestapo methods to their own uses. Some 
of them claimed that they were French Alsatians, but for Sergeant 
Leulliette, were in fact, "genuine SS men", including the captain in charge 
of the torture chamber. He asserted that:
These special teams worked in relays under the benevolent 
eye of the Captain, an intellectual, one of those for whom 
suffering does not exist - especially the suffering of others. 
They worked in groups of three, smoking cigarettes. Their 
task consisted mainly of torturing the bound and naked 
prisoners, one after another, from morning till night, under 
the guise of interrogation. [70]
It should be noted that Algiers had only one face, that of war. There
were an incredible number of French soldiers and policemen occupying
it; there may have been more soldiers than civilians (you could not go a
hundred yards without meeting one). The other side (the Alg6 rois)
seemed as if they did not exist, because they had no hope any more in
confronting the huge army with modern technique of weapons. Even if
death was ugly, stupid and filthy, for "the Algerois" it was still better than
living a life just because there was no alternative. People were tortured
indiscriminately without any evidence, as Sergeant Leulliette reported:
That was how, one day, a rather witty Sergeant amused 
himself by scouring the district in a lorry and collecting all the 
Arabs (Algerians) he met dressed at all smartly in European 
clothes, without even asking them for their papers. He came 
back with a lorry-Ioad. Parading his victims in the glutinously 
muddy ward, he first had the idea of making them do a few 
"press-ups" and a few stretches by way of punishment. 
Then...hunting down the best-dressed Moslems.[71]
70. Ibid, p.232.
71. Ibid, p.234.
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In France itself, it seemed that the issue on which leftist public 
opinion came to rest was the question of torture. Certainly, the campaign 
against the methods of pacification in Algeria had been principally the 
report of leftist intellectuals, Catholic and non-Catholic, and their journals 
like Temoianaqe Chretien. France-Observateurj and L’Express. The 
campaign subsequently spread to Les Temps Modernes and Esprit. 
Therefore, the deficiencies of the campaign against the atrocities of the 
French Army were discovered most clearly in the controversy over torture, 
as Bourdet, a left-wing journalist and politician, affirmed:
If military slaughterers take more lives and create a greater 
suffering, they do not dishonour their authors to the same 
degree, they do not create the same irremediable chasm, 
they do not engage the same quality of evil freely chosen, 
calmly accepted, savoured...There are degrees in horror, and 
the bloody attacks of terrorists, like the bloody violence of 
repression, are still crimes of men, moved by human 
passions. Cold-blooded torture of a defenceless prisoner, 
sadistic torment in order to make him talk, which destroys 
the body slowly and seeks to empty the soul - this is the 
bestial crime above all others. BestiaL.I insult the beasts.[72]
But Sartre may have been more accurate when he asserted that the 
French people actually knew the truth although they made an effort to 
hide it from themselves, but they had chosen to accept their complicity 
with the torturers. Sartre did not blame the individual soldier for his 
atrocity. In "Une Victoire" he started to condemn both the French 
government and the atrocities of the army:
72. Claud Bourdet, 'Tortures en Oranie?", France-Observateur. 
September 27, 1956, p.4.
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En 1943, rue Lauriston, des Frangais criaient d’angoisse et 
de douleur; la France entiere les entendait. L’issue de la 
guerre n’etait pas certaine et nous ne voulions pas penser 
a I’avenir; une seule chose nous paraissait en tout cas 
impossible: qu’on put faire crier un jour des hommes en 
notre nom.
Impossible n’est pas frangais: en 1958, k Alger, on torture 
regulierement, systematiquement, tout le monde le sait, de 
M. Lacoste aux cultivateurs de L’Aveyron, personne n’en 
parle. Ou presque: des filets de voix s’effilochent dans le 
silence. La France n’etait guere plus muette sous 
I’Occupation: encore avait-elle I’excuse de porter un 
baillon.[73]
Accordingly, Sartre asserted that the aim of the torturers was not just 
to obtain information, as it appears to us, but to force the victim to "...se 
designe elle-meme, par ses cris et par sa soumission, comme une bete 
humaine, (human beast)". [74] Torture therefore became what the anti­
colonialist left called a "system", that is, "little by little it became an 
institution with its organization, its instructors, its workers, one could 
almost say its laws".[75] However, at the end of his "Une Victoire", Sartre 
seemed to dismiss the moralists who reacted against the act without 
examining how its logic was marked in the nature of the situation, as he 
stressed in concluding his preface to Alleg:
A quoi bon, d’ailleurs, troubler la conscience des bourreaux? 
Si quelqu’un d’eux bronchait ses chefs le remplaceraient: un 
de perdu, dix de trouves...non, il ne suffit pas de punir ou
73. Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. p.72.
74. Ibid, p. 84.
75. Comite Maurice Audin, Sans Commentaire (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 
1960), p.105.
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de reeduquer quelques individus; non, on n’humanisera pas 
le guerre d’Algerie. La torture s’y est Stablie d’elle-meme: 
elle etait proposee par les circonstances et requise par les 
haines racistes; d’une certaine maniere, nous I’avons vu, 
elle est au coeur du conflit et c’est elle, peut-etre, qui en 
exprime la vSrite la plus profonde. Si nous voulons mettre un 
terme a ces immondes et mornes cruautes, sauver la France 
de la honte et les Algeriens de Tenter, nous n’avons qu’un 
moyen, toujours le meme, le seul que nous ayons jamais eu, 
le seul que nous aurons jamais: ouvrir les negotiations, faire 
la paix.[76]
It should be noted that the years 1956-1957 were a period of 
important transfers of power from Paris to the military authorities in Algeria 
in order to consolidate their position and to maintain "L’Alg6rie Frangaise", 
not by political^  protection or by defence and exploitation of the main 
production of the country, as the West used to do to the colonized, but 
by bombing villages and killing people, as we have seen in the previous 
section, particularly when the FLN carried out actions against their forces. 
Certainly the atrocities of the French Army had to avenge and to slaughter 
innocent people, as Sergeant Leulliette reported.
An "Adjutant" (French Officer) made his way on his own...He 
was killed by Arabs (Algerians) with knives in the 
street...Getting killed in the battle was all right...Vengeance! 
Vengeance!...Sixty-Four people (innocent)...were slaughtered 
by automatic rifle or bayonet in less than an hour. Fire did 
the rest. [77]
Moreover, torture was one of these new privileges, the transfers of military 
power in Algeria. It appeared that Simone de Beauvoir was right when 
she said that:
76. Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. p.8 8 .
77. Pierre Leulliette, St. Michael and the Dragon, pp.160-1.
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"And then of course there’s the usual torture ration". It was 
monotonous, certainly: electric goads, immersions, hangings, 
rapes, funnels, stakes, nails torn out, bones broken; always 
the same programme. But we saw no reason to change our 
tune until the army and the police changed theirs. [78]
But General Massu, "a pious and scrupulous man", had insisted on
sampling the electrodes himself and his verdict was: "Very rough, but a
brave man could take it'. [79] It means that the French government was
aware of the matter and approved the system of torture. They claimed
that there was no link between the army and the politicians. But later, at
the trial of one officer in "L’Organisation de L’Armee Secrete" (OAS)* (I
shall discuss this organization in the last chapter), Godard, a defence
witness asserted that:
I declare under oath that Godard, like a hundred other 
officers, received an order to torture in order to obtain 
information. I do not know who the highest placed authority 
to give the order was. You will never find a written trace of 
it. [80]
Certainly, the army was not satisfied with this arrangement, as it appeared 
that it might tend to create insubordination within the ranks. Probably, 
several reports by lower-rank soldiers to their officers were ignored.
It should be noted that when public opinion became aware of the 
torture in Algeria and blamed the French Army for their action toward 
torture, the military turned against the politicians, the politicians seemed 
to let the army take the blame. In his book Lieutenant in Algeria. Jean- 
Jacques Servan-Schreiber, founder and editor of L’Exoress. who spent six 
months as an officer in Algeria, reported one officer’s reaction to this:
*  OAS: L’Organisation de L’Armee Secrete. A clandestine force 
organized in 1961 by die-hard French Generals, residents of Algeria - 
pied-noir, who sought to prevent Algerian independence.
78. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, pp.391-2.
79. Ibid, p.396.
80. Cited in J.M. Theolleyre, Ces proces qui ebranlerent La France. 
(Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1966), p.338.
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In this region we are rather well informecL.lf I do not stop 
(the FLN agents) they continue their work...which is very 
effective.Jf I stop them? Since there is no precise 
crime...One day or another they are released. They come 
back here with a reputation ten times greater...lf I stop them 
and kill (supprimer) them? That is the only reasonable 
operation. Only...l won’t do that without an order. At Algiers 
they tell me that they do not want to know and that they will 
close their eyes...Great! the soldiers get to do the dirty 
work...and then...they turn against the army...These 
gentlemen will have their hands clean...No, I will not do 
it...This makes ten times that I have asked the administration 
for instructions: no answer...They don’t want to know.[81]
Earlier, in February 1955, Robert Wuillaume, Inspector General of the 
Administration, had been given the task of instituting an inquiry on torture 
in Algeria, and the report was not published until March. The report was 
intended as a single, isolated study to supply information on only three 
points:
1 . les sevices. (the forms of violence used).
2 . les responsabilites (the authority under which maltreatment 
occurred).
3. I’utilite, dans certaines conditions, des sevices (the efficacy, in 
certain conditions of the maltreatment).[82]
Wuillaume’s inquiry was a much more serious affair when he 
submitted his report to Jacques Soustelle. Although Wuillaume had 
restricted his inquiry only to the Kabylia and to the area of Constantine, 
he rightly considered that he had sufficient information and he seemed to 
the French authorities to have worked scientifically and objectively.
81. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Lieutenant in Algeria, p. 54.
82. Vidal-Naquet, La Raison d’Etat. (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1962),
p.60.
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Wuillaume had interrogated police officers and no more than sixty-one 
prisoners who had been carefully chosen from the prisoners. His 
conclusions were clear; that physical violence of every kind had been 
inflicted on suspects throughout Algeria. Wuillaume recommended:
...the water and electricity methods, provided they are 
carefully used, produce a shock which is more psychological 
than physical and do not therefore constitute excessive 
cruelty...This conclusion, which takes us back to a recent and 
painful past (a reference to the Gestapo) may appear 
repugnant. But since the problem is with us, we must face 
it. [83]
As it seemed to Wuillaume, "interrogation by water" was the torture of the 
Middle Ages. It was necessary to make use of electricity as a modern 
method (Wuillaume’s report had given birth to a doctrine of torture). He 
concluded his researches:
...Now either of these attitudes is admissible, the first 
because the veil has been lifted and public opinion alerted, 
the second because Algeria, particularly in the present 
circumstances, has need of an especially effective police 
force. To restore its confidence to the police force and set 
it back on its feet there is only one remedy: to recognize and 
condone certain procedures. [84]
The role of the director of police Jean-Mairey was the highest 
ranking officer of the French police, with authority over nearly all of 
France’s police services. This senior civil servant with an honourable 
history in the French resistance of the Second World War, he found it: 
"...intolerable to think that French police officers could by their behaviour 
evoke the methods of the Gestapo". [85]
83. Quoted in Vidal-Naquet, P. Torture: Cancer of Democracy, p.35.
84. Quoted in Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p.340.
85. Vidal-Naquet, P. La Raison d’Etat. p.89.
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Although Wuillaume did not mention any medical supply for prisoners 
in his report, Soustelle "categorically refused" to accept Wuillaume’s 
conclusions: "The attempt to establish the limits of personal responsibility 
is one of the extremest difficulty. Furthermore, it is to my mind 
inopportune". [8 6 ]
It should be noted that during the "Battle of Algiers" the interrogation 
techniques of French intelligence were vicious. For instance, the co­
operation between the army and the police was totally successful, as 
General Massu’s system of "quadrillage" and the rifling of the police was 
increased by the work of the new organization called the "Dispositif de 
Protection Urbaine" (DPU). This new organization had been created by 
order of Resident Minister Robert Lacoste, and placed under the control 
of Colonel Roger Trinquier who had been in Indo-China as an expert on 
subversive warfare. The DPU divided Algiers into sectors, sub-sectors, 
blocks, buildings and houses.
According to General Massu, when the DPU handed over the 
suspects from the city, mainly from the Casba area, they would interrogate 
first in what he called the "Detachment Operationnel de Protection" (DOP) 
which he described as being "specialists in the interrogation of suspects 
who wanted to say nothing". Then, the suspects would be passed on to 
a "centre d’hebergement" for torture. Most of these people disappeared 
under the torture of the French paratroops. Thus, all those who died 
under torture were thrown everywhere. Among these people who were 
tortured to death was Larbi Ben-M’hidi, the FLN political leader in Algiers, 
who had been tortured until he died. But General Massu claimed that 
Ben-M’hidi hanged himself with an electric flex, while Colonel Yves 
Godard, Chief-of-Staff to the Tenth Parachutist Division in Algiers, later
86. Ibid, p.341.
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said in his memoirs that Massu made no comment when they had 
discussed the death of Ben’M’hidi together. However, the exact truth 
about Ben-M’hidi’s death remains a mystery to European historians to this 
day. But to the Algerians Ben’M’hidi had been tortured until he 
disappeared, like many other Algerians. Yves CourriSre, generally well- 
informed on French undercover activities, wrote of bodies dropped out in 
the sea by helicopter, which might prove that Ben-M’hidi’s body dropped 
out with other Algerians. [87] Further, there were a great number of mass 
graves in the Algiers area and Mitidja region, as Sergeant Leulliette 
reported:
He [body] was buried, or, rather, hidden discreetely in the 
ground. His body was laid next to his comrade’s in the 
bottom of the big ditch.[8 8 ]
Sergeant Leulliette asked himself that: 'Was I wrong not to show any
sympathy for these new methods?"[89]
Seemingly, the torture which had been inflicted in Algiers since the 
outbreak of the Algerian revolution, helped the French military forces to 
win the "Battle of Algiers". Certainly without the use of torture, the FLN’s 
network would never have been overcome and the "Battle of Algiers" 
could not have been won by General Massu. Later in his book La Vraie 
Bataille d’Alqer. Massu acknowledged the use of torture but disavowed its 
routinization. He said that in the face of the necessity to obtain from 
terrorists: "urgent operational information on which the lives of innocent 
beings depended,...it was a consequent necessity to knock them about 
a b'rt...to make them ’spit it out’".[90] However, Algiers between 1957 and 
1960 seemed to the FLN’s leaders in Tunis as the Capitulation of Dien- 
Bien-Phu.
87. Yves Courriere, La Guerre d’Alqerie: Le Temps des Leopards. Vol.lll, 
p.525. f
8 8 . Pierre Leulliette, St. Michael and the Dragon, p.243.,
89. Ibid, p.24. \
90. Jacques Massu, La Vraie Bataille d’Alaer. (Paris: Plon, 1972) p.165.
177
But the torture was not only in Algiers, as one might expect it was 
practised all over Algeria by the French Army in order to obtain 
information and to destroy the FLN’s underground. The prisons were full 
throughout the country as the French government built more detention 
camps than schools or hospitals. The Algerian people were suffering 
torture and they had to resist in order to have their own freedom. They 
had learned by experience that they had one enemy and they had to 
organize themselves and to fight with confidence. As Sartre put it:
En Algerie, notre armee s’est deployee sur tout le territoire: 
nous avons le nombre, I’argent, les armes; les insurges n’ont 
rien, sauf la confiance et le soutien d’une grande partie de 
la population. [91]
Thus, the French Army learned from the "Battle of Algiers" that torture was 
the most important means of putting down the number of the ALN. In 
Palistro (Kabylia) for instance an eye witness reported:
They were bodies: the bodies of hanged men...l saw that 
they were all, apparently, still alive. Yes, everyone of them. 
But for how much longer?...they had been strung up by their 
feet and their heads had slowly filled with blood...A night and 
a day spent in that position...most of them died that night. 
Many "talked" to avoid the horror of that slow death. [92]
I have mentioned earlier that there was no distinction between men 
and women in torture. The French military forces destroyed everything in 
Algeria, even the hope and the future of the younger girls by raping and
91. Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. p.82.
92. Pierre Leulliette, St Michael and the Dragon, p.263.
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torturing them. Among these girls Djamila Boupacha, twenty-three years 
old, an FLN liaison agent, illegally imprisoned by French paratroops, who 
subjected her to torture and deflowered her with a bottle. Let me explain. 
When Djamila was arrested by the French paratroops, she was tortured 
like other young girls (Hassiba Ben-Boualli, Djamila Bouhired, Zohra Drif, 
etc..., who were tortured before her). The torturers put Djamila through the 
third degree, they affixed electrodes to her nipples with scotch tape, then 
applying them to her hands, legs, face, anus and vagina and this electrical 
procedure used for Djamila was interspersed with blows and cigarette- 
burns. The next step for her, she was hung over a bath on a pole and 
immersed many times. A week later the French soldiers interrogating her 
said, "you won’t be raped, you might enjoy it". In their book, Diamila 
Boupacha. Simone de Beauvoir and Gisele Halimi reported that:
Djamila Boupacha herself states what in fact took place: "I 
was given the most appalling torture of all, the so-called 
"bottle treatment". First they tied me up in a special posture, 
and then they rammed the neck of a bottle into my belly. I 
screamed and fainted. I was unconscious, to the best of my 
knowledge for two days". A witness whose name and 
whereabouts are known actually saw her at Hussein-Dey, 
bleeding and unconscious, being dragged along by her 
gaolers. (She was a virgin).[93]
Djamila spent thirty three days in one of those torture centres known as 
"centre de tri" (classification centre), before they charged her. Throughout 
the whole of this period there was nothing to rely on, no control to check, 
no higher authority to protect her from torturers from using her as a 
mistress. At the end what Djamila had to say to her lawyer was: "I am 
only one among thousands of other detainees". According to Simone de 
Beauvoir and Gisele Halimi, probably Djamila was right in her statement
93. Simone de Beauvoir and Gisele Halimi, Diamila Boupacha. Translated 
by Peter Green. (London: Andre Deutsch, 1962). p.195.
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because there was approximately in 1959, fourteen thousand Algerians 
confined in French camps and prisons, seventeen thousand in jail in 
Algeria itself, and hundreds of thousands filling the Algerian camps.[94]
In 1958 General De Gaulle claimed that the use of torture was an 
integral element of the old "system" and would be abolished with the fall 
of the Fourth Republic. Certainly, the Fifth Republic proclaimed later that 
torture had been abolished. But torture was still regularly and 
systematically practised in prisons, barracks, and the so-called "transit 
camps" under De Gaulle’s Minister of War. According to the army and 
the politicians, there was a difference between them in their public 
attitudes towards the use of torture. On the contrary I believe that there 
was a total agreement.
It should be noted that the torture of the Algerians was not only
inflicted in Algeria as might be expected but also in France itself. The
Algerian authors of The Gangrene (Abdel-Kader Belhadj, Bechir Boumaza,
Moussa Khebaili and Ben-Aissa Souami), were arrested in Paris and
tortured by the French "Departement de Security du Territoire" (DST), [95]
that was before the book had been published by the "Editions de Minuit"
and suppressed. This book produced the statements of five Algerian
students who asserted that they had been abominably tortured in Paris
between the 2 nd and 12th December 1958. They had been tortured by
different methods of torture. At the end one of them said:
My torture is nothing beside that of my brothers and sisters 
in Algeria who have been burned alive, mutilated, humiliated, 
raped, impaled and cut in pieces. But my brothers’ voices
94. "1,000,000 d’Algeriens parques dans les camps de regroupement" 
El-Moudiahid. No. 40, April 24, 1959 and also see "Les Camps de 
regroupement", El-Moudiahid. No. 41, May 10, 1959.
95. It should be noted that this organization (DST) used electrical torture 
in certain instances in 1949. (See Vidal-Naquet, P. Torture: Cancer 
of Democracy, p.121).
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no longer reach France, and the only reason I bear witness 
is that I hope my voice, which is doubtless weaker, but which 
is nearer, will perhaps have more chance of reaching it. [96]
Another one affirmed that:
In the midst of the worst tortures I thought hard of my 
brothers and sisters, of Ben’M’hidi, of Djamila, and I repeated 
ceaselessly to myself that one can be covered with filth and 
yet remain clean. [97]
And when one of them attempted to explain to the police officer how he 
had been tortured, the officer ignored him and he said: 'We know this 
music, you’re all the same". [98] As the torture had been increased in 
France, three French officers who had admitted torturing a young Algerian 
to death had just been acquitted by the Paris military tribunal. [99] But 
what was the development of Sartre’s political writings toward the tortured 
Algerians?
Before discussing the development of Sartre’s political attitude 
towards the tortured Algerians, it will be useful to give a bird’s-eye view 
of justice in both France and Algeria towards torture. First, there were 
special tribunals for particular cases in both countries. But the decree of 
7th October, 1958 gave full support and responsibility to military tribunals 
for dealing with members of the FLN and the French who supported 
them. In Algeria, the French Army were not satisfied with this system of 
justice and they had created a "superior military tribunal" and a "special 
military tribunal". In reality there was no justice in Algeria either under
96. Abdel-Kader Belhadj, Bechir Boumaza and others. The Gangrene. 
Translated by Robert Silvers (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1960), p. 54.
97. Ibid, p. 63.
98. Ibid, p. 80.
99. Ibid, p. 80.
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Premier Guy Mollet or under General De Gaulle, as torture was never 
mentioned in the courts when the torturers were in the dock. But later in 
France when it was decided with the agreement of the Minister of the 
Interior to open an inquiry into the cases of sixty Algerians who had been 
found drowned or dead in the Paris area, the official inquiries about these 
victims were withdrawn from the local courts "for reasons of public 
security". [1 0 0 ]
It should be pointed out that during the Algerian War the cases of 
a few tortured people were brought to justice, but nothing was done to 
stop such crimes against humanity, either in Algeria or in France. As the 
Western world is still bringing to justice Germans who committed crimes 
against humanity during the Second World War, supported by the 
"Geneva Convention", the Algerian government must also open an official 
inquiry on torture during the Algerian War, 1954-1962. In this case it would 
be better to make reference to the torturers who brought Klaus Barbie, 
a former torturer in the Second World War to trial (the longer you live, the 
more you see).
The French barrister, MaTtre Jacques Verges, the defence lawyer of 
Klaus Barbie, is a radical left-winger, and passionate anti-colonialist. 
Barbie aged 73, a former wartime Gestapo chief of Lyon in France, was 
brought to trial in June 1987, for the crimes he committed against 
humanity. MaTtre Verges based his defence on the atrocities of the French 
Army in the Algerian War. He attempted to put France herself on trial over 
wartime collaboration with the Germans and alleged French atrocities in 
Algeria. [101] It seems that Claude Bourdet was right when he asserted 
in 1955:
100. Ibid, p. 127.
101. The Times. 15 June, 1987, p.9.
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...but it is M.M. Mendes France and Mitterrand who are 
responsible before public opinion and before history. [1 0 2 ]
Anyway, the evidence which was given to the court of Lyon revealed not 
only Germany’s conduct in France but also French conduct in Algeria. 
The defence lawyer of Barbie argued that what the French did in their 
Algerian colonial war in the way of torture, deportation, and killing was 
similar to Germans in France. He proved these "crimes against humanity" 
with several witnesses: Algerians, Algerian refugees in Tunisia, and a 
former French soldier who gave evidence about torture he witnessed 
during the Algerian War in order to consolidate his position. However, it 
seems that the whole trial was a "hypocritical charade". [103]
As French justice denounces "crimes against humanity", it will be 
worthwhile to refer to Jean-Marie le Pen, leader of the French National 
Front and member of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, when he 
accused French statesmen of not only torturing people during the Algerian 
War but also of exposing them to nuclear weapons in the Sahara and the 
Pacific. Indeed, for these crimes which France committed against 
humanity in the past, who is responsible today? The French government! 
French justice! I am not going to discuss this point in detail, but I would 
like to suggest that the Algerian government reopens an inquiry on the 
French who tortured Algerians and puts them on trial, as they did Klaus 
Barbie. Generals and officers who were involved in torture must be
102. Claude Bourdet, "Votre Gestapo Algerien", France-Observateur. 
January 1955, p.21.
103. The Times. 17 June 1987, p.8 .
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brought to justice.*
Now let us examine how Sartre’s political attitude had developed 
towards the tortured Algerians. Indeed, Sartre was totally concerned 
about the Algerians; he testified in favour of Ben-Saddok, who had shot 
Ali Chehkal, a "collaborationist" Algerian moslem political figure and the 
former Vice-President of the Algerian Assembly and one of the supporters 
of "L’Algerie Frangaise". At an exit of the Colombes Stadium in Paris, he 
had been shot by pro-FLN Ben-Saddok. Immediately the FLN took 
responsibility and asserted that:
'We’re the ones they’re putting on trial. They’re saying that 
whatever happens to us in Algeria is just a fair 
exchange!"[104]
The argument for the defence was that Saddok’s action was caused by 
the conditions of life imposed on his Algerian friends. According to 
Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre was agitated when he had heard different 
views about Ben-Saddok’s action as a murderer. He thought that Ben- 
Saddok’s act was not a terrorist murder but a political one. [105]
*  It should be noted that Western countries attempted many times to 
accuse Dr. Kurt Waldheim, President of Austria, of committing "crimes 
against humanity" during the Second World War, particularly against 
the Jewish people. However, today tortured Jews have become 
torturers in Palestine. They are killing people indiscriminately, 
torturing and deporting the native population in exactly the same way 
as they were themselves treated during the Second World War. But 
the Western world which was on the side of the Jewish people 
during the War, keeps quiet about the "crimes against humanity" 
which were being committed today by Israel. Indeed, history repeats 
itself.
104. Quoted in Simone de Beauvoir’s Force of Circumstance, p. 393.
105. Ibid, p. 394.
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Speaking of the dead man in court, Sartre referred to him as Ali "Jackal". 
Simone de Beauvoir reported that Sartre:
...went on to emphasize the fact that Saddok’s action was a 
political murder and must not be treated as a terrorist 
attack. [106]
In the event, it was with relief that Sartre learned of the verdict; life 
imprisonment, not the death penalty for Saddok:
We were happy for Saddok first of all, but it was also a 
comfort to find that there were still men in France capable 
of judging an Algerian according to their conscience. [107]
But the next day every newspaper was violently against Ben-Saddok. 
'What a nice-looking boy he is, Chehkal’s murderer! read one of the 
headlines."[108] While the FLN’s newspaper El-Moudjahid wrote: "Le 
proces de Ben-Saddok: un Monde qui s’ecroule".[109] It should be noted 
that later the FLN member in France Ali Haroun wrote about this event 
in his book La 7E Wilava: La Guerre du FLN en France 1954-1962:
Le FLN ne I’a jamais entrepris. II eut ete, en effet, bien moins 
dangereux pour les militants de commettre, dans I’anonymat 
de la foule, un tel forfait, que de s’introduire a decouvert 
dans les tribunes d’honneur du Stade de Colombes 
particulierement surveillees pour la protection du President 
de la Republique et de tirer precisement sur Chehkal k ses 
cotes. [1 1 0 ]
106. Ibid, p. 394.
107. Ibid, p. 395.
108. Ibid, p. 395.
109. EhMoudiahid. No 14, December 15, 1957. See also, "La justice 
Frangaise plus raciste que j’amais", El-Moudiahid. No 56, November 
26, 1959.
110. Ali Haroun, La 7EWilava: La Guerre du FLN en France 1954-1962. 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), p. 108.
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Sartre’s attitude as a witness for political murder could be considered 
a positive one towards the struggle of the Algerian people for their 
liberation and independence. Further, he became more aware of the 
suppressed Algerians under the French authorities, and he gave a press 
conference about the violation of human rights in Algeria. And later he 
affirmed in his interview with Playboy:
You can take action against what people have made of you 
and transform yourself. The Algerian child, though 
predestined to torture or to death, is living out his revolt 
today; it’s he who makes that revolution. [1 1 1 ]
Toward the end of 1959, the mounting evidence about the existence 
of prison camps in Algeria became inescapable for the Algerian people. 
The number of the ALN and the refugees had increased behind the 
barbed wire "Morice Line" in redistribution centres in Tunisia, where they 
lived in appalling conditions. According to one report published and 
addressed directly to the French government, there were at least a million 
of such people:
On an average, 550 out of every thousand inmates were 
children, and one of those 550 was dying every two days; 
since many of the women and old men were also unable to 
withstand the conditions, it may be estimated that these 
camps killed more than a million people in three years. [1 1 2 ]
Here, Sartre decided that he could no longer stand on the sidelines and 
responded with alacrity to Francis Jeanson’s request for help in his 
clandestine network that supported the FLN. Sartre granted Jeanson an
111. Jean-Paul Sartre interview with Playboy. May 1965, p.72.
112. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p. 468-9.
186
interview that appeared under his own name in order to protect him from 
any searching.
In 1959, Sartre presented his play, The Condemned of Altona. in 
Paris. The first performance of this play was designed to call attention to 
the torture then being perpetrated by the French Army in Algeria. Sartre 
wrote:
My subject is a young man returning from Algeria who has 
seen certain things out there, has perhaps had a share in 
them, and keeps his mouth shut. [113]
He went on to identify the purpose of the play:
The political situation in France makes it imperative to 
recover such people for society and despite the filthy 
brutalities they may have perpetrated. [114]
By "recover" Sartre meant, very precisely, to make active in the 
struggle against the war. In this play the soldier hero, Frantz has been 
imprisoned in windowless rooms since the Second World War in the 
family of a wealthy industrialist in Altona, suburb of Hamburg (Germany). 
The entire action of the play turns on the experience of Nazism and the 
war. The whole aristocratic family was imprisoned and paralysed by its 
contradictions, failures and solitude. At the beginning of Sartre’s play the 
audience was led to the understanding that Frantz had been killed fifteen 
years before, as a criminal at the Nuremburg trials. Then the secret of the 
house was discovered, that Frantz was alive. Frantz had tortured on the
113. Paul Caruso interview: Jean-Paul Sartre, March 4, 1964, Sartre on 
Theatre. Edited by Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka. Translated by 
Frank Jellinek. (London: Quartet Books, 1976), pp. 259-60.
114. Ibid, p. 260.
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Russian Front; then he decided to assume his own and his country’s 
destiny, and the main concern of the play was to explore the individual as 
a historical agent. Frantz’s guilt revealed how far he had advanced in his 
understanding of the relationship of individuals to history. Frantz was 
neither a Nazi nor a mass murderer. He had tortured and murdered. All 
these were certainly his acts but he showed the whole responsibility with 
Hitler, the military command structure, or Germany as a nation. Thus, his 
guilt is translated into a madness as the only alternative to confronting 
what he himself had done. Commenting on the theme of the play, Sartre 
said later in an interview with Kenneth Tynan:
I believe that the tribunal of history always judges men 
according to standards and values which they themselves 
could never imagine. We can never know what the future 
will say of us...The point is that we know we shall be judged, 
and not by the rules we use to judge ourselves. And in that 
thought there is something horrific. [115]
Frantz’s madness began to disintegrate, and when he was asked to 
define the meaning of crabs, he said that crabs are men, they are real 
men, good, and handsome (I have heard them saying "What’s that, 
brother?"). After being tortured, Frantz ceased to be human, he was 
metamorphosed into an animal - in Sartre’s imagination a crab and also 
the horror of watching a human being transformed into a beast.
But when Frantz absorbed Nazism into his character he became an
enthusiastic collaborator of Hitler as he claimed:
I was Hitler’s wife...l have supreme power. Hitler has changed 
me, made me implacable and sacred, made me himself. I
115. "An interview with Jean-Paul Sartre", in Tvnan Right and Left, by 
Kenneth Tynan (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1967), p. 124.
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am Hitler, and I shall surpass myself...Germans will crush me 
to the earth, and my own men will bleed the prisoners to 
death...l alone will deal with the prisoners. I’ll debase them 
into abject wretches. They’ll talk. Power is an abyss, and I 
see its depths. I shall decide life or death with a penknife 
and a cigarette lighter.[116]
It should be noted that Frantz was only a symbol to the critics and 
the audience in Sartre’s play. Sartre was talking to them not only about 
a former SS lieutenant but also about French torture in Algeria[117]. In 
transforming the Frenchman who had tortured Algerians into a German 
who had tortured partisans during the Second World War, Frantz evoked 
both the French soldier returned from Algeria and the French nation 
characterized by its experience of the occupation and the Algerian War.
It seemed that the experiences of unbearable powerlessness made 
Frantz become a torturer after the failure of his attempt to resist the Nazis. 
Since power was on the side of the Nazis, Frantz supported that power 
in order to make it his own, although he did not believe in Nazi doctrine. 
But with the Algerian War, the nation’s horror of torture turned from "them" 
(Germans) to "us" (French). Here, Sartre perhaps made a positive attitude 
towards the freedom of human beings in Algeria when he emphasized 
that the French in 1959 found themselves in the same situation to the 
Algerians as that of the Germans to the French in the Second World War:
116. Sartre, The Condemned of Altona. Translated by Silvia and George 
Leeson (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp. 163-4.
117. It should be noted that Sartre had insisted on this point. "None of 
the spectators took literally the Germany that I presented. No one 
believed that I really wanted to talk about what happened to a 
German ex-soldier in 1959. Behind that Germany, they all read 
Algeria - everyone, even the critics". Jean-Paul Sartre, an interview 
with Bernard Dort, Theatre Populaire. xxxvi (1959).
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Pendant la guerre, quand la radio anglaise ou la presse 
clandestine nous avaient parl6  d’Oradour, nous regardions 
les soldats allemands qui se promenaient dans les rues d’un 
air inoffensif et nous nous disions parfois: "Ce sont pourtant 
des hommes qui nous ressemblent. Comment peuvent-ils 
faire ce qu’ils font?" Et nous etions tiers de nous parce que 
nous ne comprenions pas.[118]
The central fact of Sartre’s The Condemned of Altona was torture. 
Frantz existed in this play as the man who had been tortured and the one 
who had tortured. He was recognized as well as condemned. Therefore, 
all Frantz’s life had been possessed; first by his father, then by Hitler, now 
by his memories. For Sartre, it was impossible for Frantz to accept himself 
in this situation. So, Sartre developed his proclamation on "Une Victoire" 
in which he said: "L’inhumain n’existe nulle part, sauf dans les cauchemars 
qu’engendre la peur".[119] Later in his play, The Condemned of Altona. 
he wrote this notion which gave a full life to these nightmares of the 
inhuman:
One and one makes one - there’s our mystery. The beast 
was hiding, and suddenly we surprised his look deep in the 
eyes of our neighbours. So we struck. Legitimate self- 
defence. I surprised the beast, I struck. A man fell, and in his 
dying eyes I saw the beast still living - myself. [1 2 0 ]
It should be noted that Sartre’s attention in his last play was 
focussed on the enemy - capitalists, collaborators, and European 
colonialists. The audience in Sartre’s play would identify the enemy as 
itself. Frantz characterized as France. Was it France whose crimes were 
so great and Sartre must uncover them through the images of Nazi 
Germany? This was exactly the main point which Sartre was writing about
118. Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. pp. 72-3.
119. Ibid, p. 76-77.
120. Sartre, The Condemned of Altona. p. 169.
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the war in Algeria from the European view. In identifying Frantz as France, 
Sartre was affirming that "them" were the enemy. By his adaptation of 
"Euripides", Sartre made this explicit:
Man of Europe,
You despise Africa and Asia,
And you call us barbarians, I believe,
But when vainglory and greed,
Throw you and our land,
You pillage, you torture, you massacre.
Where are the barbarians then?[121]
In fact, The Condemned of Altona (1959) invariably provokes 
comparison with Sartre’s play Huis Clos (1943). Fifteen years after the 
latter play, Sartre seems to take us again into the closed world of five 
characters imprisoned in what they have done, tending to judge and 
destroy each other. Sartre himself thinks that The Condemned of Altona 
is a kind of historical variation in which "characters are dominated, gripped 
by the past throughout just as they are by each other"[122]. Whereas in 
Huis Clos. Sartre describes these characters (Estelle, Inez, and Garcin) in 
one room, the triangle of the relationship in this play is set in a circle. 
Each of the three characters needs the other, because their past 
completely defines their present and they have no future. In Huis Clos. 
Sartre affirms the interference of the other people. Even the room was 
prepared for the characters by others. While in The Condemned of Altona. 
Sartre portrays five characters (Frantz, Johanna, Leni, Von Gerlach and 
Werner). These characters exist primarily in relation to Frantz, whose 
sequestration has sequestered them as well. Here, the past of the 
characters defines entirely their present and they have no future, as in 
Huis Clos.
121. Sartre, The Troian Women (Euripides, adaptation by Sartre). 
Translated by Ronald Duncan (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 130.
122. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, Sartre on Theatre, p. 268.
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Later, after Algerian independence, in one of his interviews, Sartre 
explained the meaning of "Hell is other people" as follows:
Other people are hell insofar as you are plunged from birth 
into a situation to which you are obliged to submit. You are 
born the son of a rich man, or an Algerian, or a doctor, or 
an American. Then you have a cut-and-dried future mapped 
out, a future made for you by others. They haven’t created 
it directly, but they are part of a social order that makes you 
what you are. If you’re a peasant’s son, the social order 
obliges you to move to the city where machines await you, 
machines that need fellows like you to keep them going. So 
it’s your fate to be a certain type of worker, a country kid 
who has been driven away from the country by a certain 
type of capitalist pressure. Now the factory is a function of 
your being. What exactly is your "being"? It is the job you’re 
doing, a job that masters you completely because it wears 
you down - along with your pay, which classifies you exactly 
by your standard of living. All this has been thrust on you by 
other people. Hell is the proper description for that kind of 
existence. Or take a child who was born in Algeria in 1930 
or 1935. He was doomed to an explosion into death and the 
tortures that were his destiny. That, too, is hell[123]*.
*  See further information about "hell is other people" in author’s M.Litt. 
Thesis, Jean-Paul Sartre’s Conception of Bad Faith (University of 
Glasgow, 1985).
123. Jean-Paul Sartre interview with Playboy. May 1965, p. 72.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SARTRE’S POSITION ON THE ALGERIAN WAR.
(a) De Gaulle, the OAS and Self-Determination for 
the Algerian People.
(b) Sartre’s Writings on and Political Activities during 
the Algerian Revolution.
(c) An Assessment of Sartre’s Writings on the 
Algerian War.
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Come theny comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must 
find something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do 
not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to 
catch up with Europe. Europe now lives at such a mad, reckless pace 
that she has shaken off all guidance and all reason...
Nationalism, that magnificent song that made the people rise 
against their oppressors, stops short, falters and dies away 
on the day that independence is proclaimed. Nationalism is 
not a political doctrine, nor a program. If you really wish 
your country to avoid regression, or at best halts and 
uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national 
consciousness to political and social consciousness.
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth
Translated by Constance Ferrington, 
(London: Penguin Books, 1961).
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INTRODUCTION
The first concern in this chapter is to discuss the conflict of the 
Algerian War in the period of General De Gaulle’s government and to see 
how the development of Sartre’s attitude towards the Algerian revolution 
in the 1960s is revealed. The present chapter also discusses Sartre’s 
writings and political activities between 1960 and 1962 in broad outline. 
This chapter constitutes a continuation of the discussion of the political 
development on the Algerian revolution in Sartre’s writings between 1956 
and 1962 stated in the previous chapters.
Finally, I shall draw up a list of Sartre’s views on the Algerian 
revolution, which I may call his positive attitude on the Algerians. 
However, the main questions to be asked are first, how did the French 
Army become against De Gaulle’s proposal of self-determination for the 
Algerian people? And second, are Sartre’s writings and political activities 
in favour of the Algerian struggle?
(a) DE GAULLE, THE OAS AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE
ALGERIAN PEOPLE.
Before discussing De Gaulle, the OAS, and self-determination for 
the Algerian people it will be useful to give a bird’s-eye view of De 
Gaulle’s political life. Charles Andre Marie Joseph De Gaulle was born 
on November 22, 1890. He graduated as a second lieutenant from St. 
Cyr Military Academy in 1912. In the First World War, he was promoted 
to Captain and wounded twice and also captured by the Germans and 
released at the end of the war. At the beginning of the Second World
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War he was a colonel in command of an armoured division, and he was 
promoted to the rank of brigadier-general after the success in turning 
back a German tank offensive at Laon in May 1940. After the fall of 
France, De Gaulle made an historic radio appeal to France on June 18, 
1940 in order to continue the fight, thereby launching the Free French 
movement. In November 1945, De Gaulle was named as head of the 
French government. He resigned in January 20, 1946. In June, 1958, 
De Gaulle returned to power and became the last Premier of the Fourth 
Republic. De Gaulle’s return to power and the creation of the Fifth 
Republic were both precipitated by the four years old Algerian revolution 
which had caused growing unrest and repeated political crises in France 
itself. De Gaulle had the full power to choose his cabinet and he kept 
for himself the Algerian ministry, which Soustelle desired for himself in 
order to consolidate his slogan of "L’Algerie Frangaise", and did not offer 
Soustelle a position in the cabinet at first. But later he was named as 
Minister of Information when the former Minister resigned. Also, De Gaulle 
chose Max Lejeune (Socialist) as Minister for the Sahara.
In the first week of June 1958, De Gaulle made a quick tour of 
Algeria and his every word was being scrutinized. When he arrived at 
Algiers, General Salan told him that:
"Integration is the key to Algeria. It is necessary that you 
announce it upon your arrival". De Gaulle answered 'We 
shall see if they want it."[1]
It was surprising to see the new Premier who was greeted by a 
tremendous, enthusiastic crowd in Algiers and declared that "Je vous ai
1. Claude Paillat, Dossier Secret de L’Ala6 rie. Vol. II (Paris: Le Livre 
Contemporain, 1962). p. 57
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compris - I have understood you." I know what you want. He hailed 
Algeria’s Europeans and the French Army for opening "in Algeria...the 
road of renewal and brotherhood." He announced that all Frenchmen 
including 10 million Algerians would, within three months, take part in 
elections to choose their representatives to the public assembly. De 
Gaulle urged participation in the proposed voting even by "El- 
Moudjahidine". 'To those" he said, "I De Gaulle open the door to 
reconciliation". Moreover, he claimed that he would offer to the Algerian 
people equality and justice and France will consider that there were only 
Frenchmen of the same sort, with the same rights and the same duties.
It seemed that De Gaulle wanted to compromise between the 
"pied-noir" minority and the Algerian Moslem majority in his new policy. 
He also made speeches in Algerian cities like Oran, Constantine, and 
Annaba, but he never mentioned the word "integration" or "L’Algerie 
Frangaise". However, another young man who had played an important 
part in returning De Gaulle to power could not control his emotions, and 
his words became among the most quoted of the summer in Radio 
Algiers. Leon Delbecque, speaking on Radio Algiers, June 5, 1958, stated 
that he and his friends supported De Gaulle, but not at any price: "We 
have not crossed the Rubicon just to go fishing on the other side."[2] 
Just two days after Delbecque’s rash utterance, De Gaulle was speaking 
in Mostaganem to a crowd of people. He concluded his speech "Long 
live Mostaganem! Long live L’Algerie Frangaise! Long live France!"[3] 
As might be expected, one can say that whether De Gaulle was trying 
to placate Delbecque and other supporters of "L’Alg6 rie Frangaise", or the 
words were just a slip of the tongue was not known, but De Gaulle’s
2. Le Monde. June 7, 1958, p.2.
3. Le Monde. June 10, 1958, p.2.
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popularity with the "ultras" shot up immediately. However, De Gaulle’s 
appeal for reconciliation was rejected by the FLN in Cairo. The FLN 
leaders stated that Algeria’s Moslems were not French and would never 
be French.
It should be noted that after De Gaulle’s speech in Algeria the 
situation was too complicated as there were the "pied-noir" people who 
wanted to preserve "their" country and their privileges to keep "L’Algerie 
de Papa" (Algeria of Papa). They were willing to cooperate with the army 
and with the Gaullists if it served their purposes. The French Army was 
ashamed of their defeat in Indo-China, embarrassed at Suez, and further 
frustrated by the lack of the government support for them in Algeria. The 
French military leaders were eager - even desperate - for victory. They 
were not really as sympathetic to the "pied-noir" as it appeared, for them 
it was a matter of pride. Then there were the Gaullists. Both the army 
officers and the Gaullists believed in what they called "Franco-Moslem 
Fraternization" and thought that a policy of integration of Algeria into 
metropolitan France would lead to higher standards of living and a better 
life for the Algerian Moslems. It should be pointed out that most of the 
Gaullists were prudent, patient, intelligent strategists, who planned their 
activities carefully and they were willing to wait for change, although De 
Gaulle himself was fully aware of the whole operation and publicly kept 
aloof from it in order that he might have power come to him without 
seeming to have seized it. But how and why did De Gaulle offer 
self-determination to the Algerian people?
On October 23,1958, De Gaulle announced publicly what he called 
a "cease-fire" in Paris and agreed to meet with the FLN’s leaders and 
negotiate an "end of hostilities" in Algeria. This was the first press 
conference of De Gaulle since he became Premier. He also declared that
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the FLN had "fought courageously", but slowly they were losing ground 
to superior French forces. He offered ALN troops a "Brave Men’s peace" 
and he promised that they would be treated honourably under truce flags. 
But the GPRA rejected De Gaulle’s negotiation as "a request for 
unconditional surrender". The FLN’s leaders in Cairo made clear their 
issue that negotiation would have to centre on Algerian independence 
demands and could be held only on neutral territory. [4]
First, let us start with the condition of vote for the new constitution 
on September 28, 1958, referendum. Propaganda for the constitution 
varied according to where it was being used. And a "yes" vote meant 
different things to different people. For many, a "yes" vote was a vote for 
De Gaulle; they assumed that he would do whatever was best for the 
nation. To the members of the Algerian Committee of Public Safety on 
the other hand, a "yes" vote meant specifically a vote for integration. 
Soustelle as Minister of Information, who supported "L’Algerie Frangaise" 
since the outbreak of the Algerian revolution and his supporters 
deliberately avoided being precise on what a "yes" vote meant. As the 
Socialist Edward Depreux complained in Le Monde:
One wants in the country and in the party to count the "yes" 
and "no" votes, but the word "yes" does not have the same 
meaning in Paris, in Abdjan and in Algiers. How does one 
say "no" to certain aspects of the constitution if one is for 
association between the metropole and the overseas 
territories?...the government should say what it thinks instead 
of being quiet. [5]
4. Speeches and Press Conferences. No. 119 (held in Paris on 
October, 1958), p.4. (Taken from Documents on Algeria)
5. Le Monde. September 14, 1958, p.2.
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Although General De Gaulle had said that he did not want his name used 
in the campaign for the "yes" vote, Soustelle did not hesitate to use it, 
because he was aiming to use his slogan "L’Algerie Frangaise" extensively 
and implied in his speeches if the people of Algeria voted "yes" in the 
referendum, they would be voting for integration. [6 ]
On September 28, 1958, the Fifth Republic’s constitution was 
approved in a referendum by a 4-1 margin in France and overwhelmingly 
in Algeria. Thus, the results of the referendum were more favourable to 
the constitution than anyone had predicted. The French of the metropole 
voted 79% "yes" for the new constitution and Premier De Gaulle had won 
by 17,666,828 to 4,624,478. In Algeria also the constitution was approved 
by a 3,356,169 to 118,615 vote. This vote was massive and favourable 
to the new constitution according to the French government, despite the 
FLN decree of boycotting the referendum.
After the referendum General De Gaulle made his fourth visit to 
Algeria since he came to power, and he focused his attention on the 
Algerian people. He spent the next few days there and on October 3, 
1958, he delivered a speech in Constantine detailing his hopes and plans 
for Algeria. At Constantine, De Gaulle spoke to a crowd of nearly forty 
thousand people about what he called a five-year plan for the creation of 
a prosperous, peaceful Algeria linked closely with France. He asserted 
that:
Stop this absurd fighting and you will at once see a new 
blossoming of hope all over the land of Algeria. You will see 
the prisons emptying; you will see the opening up of a 
future big enough for everybody, and for yourselves in
6. Le Monde. September 20, 1958, p.3.
200
particular...Only two paths lie open to the human race today, 
war or brotherhood. In Algeria as everywhere, France, for 
her part, has chosen brotherhood. [7]
It should be noted that in De Gaulle’s assertion there was no mention of 
the phrase "L’Algerie Frangaise" in the speech and at the end De Gaulle 
shouted "Long live France and long live AIgeria."[8 ]
Meanwhile, on September 19, 1958 in Cairo FLN’s leaders set up 
an Algerian Provisional Government-in-exile in order to replace the CCE 
and to represent the FLN in any eventual government included Ferhat 
Abbas, Vice Premier and Krim Belkacem, Minister of Defence and Deputy 
Premier, while Ahmed Ben-Bella, still in prison, was designated Deputy 
Prime Minister. The new government was promptly recognized by Peking 
and eight Arab states.. The announcement of the GPRA symbolized 
Algeria’s final separation from France. It was also the last political
institution to grow out of FLN decision-making in wartime. At a press
conference in late October De Gaulle mentioned that these leaders had 
been making peace overtures to him. He argued to stop fighting 
immediately so that negotiations could begin. In a speech, De Gaulle 
declared that:
...the political destiny of Algeria is Algeria itself. Opening fire 
does not give a man the right to determine that destiny.
When the democratic way is open, when citizens have an
opportunity to express their will, then there is no other way 
that is acceptable. Now this way is open to Algeria. [9]
7. Charles De Gaulle, Major Address. Statement and press
Conferences. May 19, 1958 - January 31, 1964. (New York, ND),
p.2 1 .
8 . Ibid, p.21.
9. Ibid, p.26.
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It should be pointed out that at the press conference in March 
1959, when De Gaulle ruled out "slogans" that would somehow quickly 
solve the problem of Algeria, he was keeping his statement vague, and 
indicated that in the future there would be a "new Algeria" - one with a
unique Algerian personality and that the Algerians themselves would
determine the direction that their country would take:
As this new Algeria takes shape in body and spirit its political 
destiny will appear in the minds and in the votes of its 
children. I am sure that this is what the Algerians want... 
yes, blood and tears will flow; yet Algeria and France are
marching toward the future - a future which, I assert, will
belong to everyone and in which no door will be closed. [1 0 ]
Although De Gaulle talked of a close relationship between Algeria 
and France, he also seemed to be saying that Algeria would be a 
separate country. Certainly, the "pied-noir" and the supporters of 
"L’Alg6 rie Frangaise" were angered by these words. In May, 1959 during 
a trip to Algeria De Gaulle angered them further with the warning. He 
said that:
There are those who want to return to the "L’Algerie de 
Papa", but "L’Algerie de Papa" is dead, and those who are 
not able to understand that will die with it. [1 1 ]
Noting that Algeria would soon be pacified, he spoke of the 'total 
evolution" of Algerian society and the history of the culture of North Africa. 
But General De Gaulle still advocated and predicted a French military 
victory in Algeria.
10. Ibid, p.47.
11. Le Monde. May 2, 1959, p.1.
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In July 1959 former Premier Guy Mollet, who had increased the 
number of the French military forces and defended integration in 1956 and 
1957, he asserted that he no longer believed in it, as he declared:
The hour has passed...We are not able to say what will take 
place in Algeria tomorrow, but we must make clear the 
criteria that we wish to be respected: total equality of rights, 
majority rule, respect guaranteed to all minorities, declaration 
that there exists an Algerian personality, acknowledgement 
that there are links with France that must not be broken.[12]
In Algeria itself, the ALN were still fighting under control of the FLN 
organization for their twin goals: independence and liberation of Algeria. 
The GPRA-in-exile refused to negotiate with De Gaulle’s government until 
withdrawal of all the French troops from Algeria and recognition of self- 
determination and independence to the Algerian people. Elsewhere in the 
world the tide was still moving in the direction of decolonization. In 
Monrovia in early August 1959 nine independent countries of Africa 
unanimously adopted a motion that France:
recognize the rights of the Algerian people to self- 
determination and to independence, to put an end to the 
hostilities, withdraw all its troops from Algeria, and enter into 
negotiations with the Provisional Government of the Algerian 
Republic. [13]
They also discussed a program of aid for the ALN if France did not 
recognize the independence of Algeria.
12. Le Monde. July 12-13, 1959, p.2.
13. Le Monde. August 1959, p.5.
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It should be pointed out that since the outbreak of the Algerian 
revolution in November 1954, the Western countries supported France to 
keep "L’Alg6 rie Frangaise", although, as early as February 1956, Senator 
John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts in the USA had demanded the 
liquidation of both the French and the British colonies in Africa. [14] This 
was before the independence of Tunisia and Morocco, and also before 
the British had removed their last troops from Egypt.
However, in July 1957, Kennedy made another move regarding the 
Algerian people. In a speech to the United States Congress, he 
condemned French policies in Algeria and demanded that the American 
government place its influences:
...behind the efforts, either through the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization or the good offices of the Prime Minister of 
Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco, to achieve a solution 
which will recognize the independent personality of Algeria 
and establish the basis for a settlement interdependent with 
France and the neighbouring nations. [15]
Now let us discuss how De Gaulle’s proposal for the Algerian 
people’s self-determination and how the army officers turned against him. 
On September 16, 1959, President De Gaulle offered the Algerian people 
freedom to choose their political future - including independence from 
France. He stated that after the pacification, the people of Algeria would 
be allowed to choose one of three arrangements to determine their future
14 Le Monde. February 28, 1956, p.3.
15. United States. Congressional Record. Vol. 103, Part 81 st Congress, 
First Session, July 2, 1957. p.10788.
204
to determine their future political status. General De Gaulle presented 
three choices as:
1. "La Secession" (Secession) - independence.
2. "La Francisation Complete" (integration) - total 
integration of France and Algeria;
or
3. Le Gouvernement des Algeriens par les Algeriens, appuye 
sur I’aide de la France (Internal Autonomy) - autonomy in 
union with France. [16]
But how and why did De Gaulle present these alternatives to the Algerian 
people?
Certainly, there were, however, a number of important reservations 
and conditions as might be expected. First, the Algerian people would 
not have an opportunity to make a choice until after the restoration of 
peace. Second, the French people would have the right to approve or 
disapprove the Algerian people’s choice. Third, it appeared that France 
intended to retain control of the Sahara. Fourth, De Gaulle implied that 
secession might mean a partition of Algeria; those "pied-noir" who 
supported "L’Algerie Frangaise" and wanted to remain French citizens 
would be grouped in the coastal area, with an independent Algeria 
confined to the hinterland. But how did the GPRA react to De Gaulle’s 
proposal of self-determination for the people of Algeria?
On September 28, 1959, after reportedly consulting with the Arab 
countries and receiving the encouragement of the Eastern bloc, the FLN
16. Ala6rie Documentation. "Discours du General De Gaulle" prononce 
& la Radiodiffusion - Television Frangaise, le 16 Septembre 1959 
(Paris, July 1960), p.1.
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leaders accepted the principle of self-determination. But they took issue 
with four specific points of De Gaulle’s proposal. They stated that their 
government would, first, oppose any plan which would provide for the 
partition of Algeria in any way. Second, they maintained that France did 
not have the right of ownership of the Sahara oil. Third, they strongly 
denied that the French people had the right to approve or disapprove 
the result of the referendum on Algeria’s status. Fourth, from experience, 
the FLN did not believe that the referendum would be fair if the French 
administered it. [17]
It should be pointed out that an effort was made by De Gaulle in 
order to bring the Algerian nationalists to the conference table and to gain 
more support for his Algerian program in France and in the international 
world. In November 1959, he declared that all Algerians would be able 
with respect to the proposed referendum:
to take part not only in the voting, but also in the discussions 
that will precede it, so as to determine the voting procedures, 
when the time comes, and the regulations governing the 
campaign that will precede the vote. [18]
Although General De Gaulle had responded and attempted to 
eliminate one of the four specific objections of the GPRA to his proposals 
concerning the resolution of the Algerian problem - the GPRA’s concern
17. Time. September 29, 1959, p.8.
18. Speech and Press Conferences of De Gaulle. No. 142, November 
10, 1959, p.3. (Taken from Documents on Algeria III).
206
that a strongly French administration of the proposed referendum on 
Algeria’s political future would prejudice its outcome - there was no 
immediate progress in regard to negotiations. But how can General De 
Gaulle decide to offer self-determination to the Algerian people without 
asking his army who were fighting for the honour and victory of France 
since November 1954?
When General De Gaulle changed his Algerian policy, one of his 
first concerns was to reassure the army. In October 1959, he told the 
French troops that before self-determination could be carried out, Algeria 
had to be pacified "completely and humanely". [19] Paul Delouvrier, De 
Gaulle’s new Delegate-General (a less imposing title than Governor- 
General), the government’s highest civilian official in Algeria, also 
attempted to dispel military doubts and he affirmed that: "The route has 
been marked clearly", he explained "...the army is here and will remain 
here. France is here and will remain here."[20] General Massu, hero of 
the torturers and one of the greatest supporters of "L’Alg6 rie Frangaise", 
returned from government briefing and said to his soldiers, "I have come 
to tell you that pacification continues and will continue with the same 
means."[2 1 ]
It should be noted that when the French Army was fighting to 
pacify Algeria, De Gaulle was struggling to pacify the army. But it was 
extremely difficult for President De Gaulle to convince the military forces 
of the necessity for self-determination. The French Army had been at war 
for six years and they had lost money, arms, and soldiers in order to
19. L’Express. January 28, 1960.
20. Le Monde. October 31, 1959, p.3.
21. L’Ann6 e Politique. 1959, p.284.
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ensure the future of "L’Algerie Frangaise". They considered the September 
16th offer as a sign of weakness and a partial surrender. The notion of 
self-determination generated increasing discontent within the officer corps 
until General Massu vented his anger at a press interview. On January 
18,1960, the Munich newspaper Suddeutsche Zeituna carried an interview 
that General Massu had granted Hans Ulrich Kempski, an ex-paratrooper 
turned journalist. Massu complained that De Gaulle had not given the 
army a clear view of his aims, and he did not understand the goal of the 
Moslem people. If the army and the government continue like this, they 
will think it is a weakness. [2 2 ]
In L’Echo d’Alqer. Alain de Serigny, the right-wing journalist and 
fanatical "pied-noir", wrote that General Massu who represented military 
honour, an honour which is part of France, was absent with his soldiers 
from us. [23] On January 24, 1960, a huge demonstration of the 
"pied-noir" against De Gaulle began in Algiers centre for the first time. 
As the anti-Gaullists were angered, there was a sharp crack of a shot 
between the army and the demonstrators, eight "pied-noir" were dead and 
24 wounded in one hour. An army officer was seriously hurt and was 
heard to say:
I die in despair. After two years of fighting the rebels to 
keep Algeria French I’ve been brought down by French 
bullets fired by those yelling "L’Algerie Frangaise". [24]
22. The interview for the SOddeutsche Zeituna was reprinted in Le 
Monde. January 23, 1960, p.4.
23. L’Echo d’Alaer. January 23, 1960, p.4.
24. Alain de Serigny, Un Proces (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1961), p.193.
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The French military forces failed to carry out their orders to suppress what 
had turned into revolution against De Gaulle’s Algerian policies. The 
President was finally able to begin restoring order with the aid of the 
French troops brought from the Algerian interior, but he did not make a 
retreat in his Algerian policies in deference to the "pied-noir". On January 
29, 1960, General De Gaulle declared that he would seek the most French 
solution to the Algerian problem and that the French Army would control 
the referendum on self-determination. [25] It should be noted that it was 
definitely a retreat; President De Gaulle had, in his September 16, 1959, 
"self-determination declaration" on Algeria, stated that he preferred Algerian 
autonomy in union with France to either secession or, the most French 
solution, which was integration. Furthermore, De Gaulle had also 
expressed his resolve to allow the FLN to participate in setting up the 
referendum on self-determination.
But the Europeans of Algeria were still desperate. Many of the 
"pied-noir" came from families that had lived in Algeria for generations 
and their future was ambiguous. In this atmosphere of terror and 
apprehension many of them were recruited to a new secret terrorist 
organization named "L’Organisation de L’Arm6 e Secrete" (OAS) (Secret 
Army Organization) whose leaders vowed to use the methods of the FLN 
to retaliate against Algerian people and against De Gaulle’s pro-Algerian 
policies, and also French policemen who carried out his orders. For the 
OAS, if De Gaulle would listen to the FLN terrorists, they reasoned, maybe 
he would listen to the "pied-noir" terrorists. Army officers, likewise, were 
incensed with the turn of events. The French Army knew that they could
25. Speeches and Press Conferences. No. 142, January, 1960 "Address 
Broadcast on January 29, 1960", p.3. (Taken from Documents on 
Algeria III).
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win the war militarily, but now, it seemed that they would be obliged to 
lose it.
Before discussing how OAS terrorists became anti-Gaullists and 
anti-Algerians it will be useful to see how they had first started. When 
General De Gaulle offered self-determination for the Algerian people, a 
small group of "pied-noir" based in Madrid had used the name of the 
OAS*. During the demonstration in Algiers these groups returned to 
Algeria in order to steal a huge supply of arms and ammunition from the 
French arsenals there, and after the military revolt of April 1961, these 
groups of "pied-noir" acquired a new military leadership. It should be 
pointed out that when OAS terrorism was beginning to make a name for 
itself on both sides of the Mediterranean, Sartre wrote:
You can see it’s the end; Europe is springing leaks 
everywhere. What then has happened? It simply is that in 
the past we made history and now it is being made of 
us...The old "mother countries" have still to go the whole 
hog; they still have to engage their entire forces in a battle 
which is lost before it has begun. At the end of the 
adventure we again find that colonial brutality which was 
Bugeaud’s** doubtful glory;...The national service units are 
sent to Algeria, and they remain there seven years with no 
result...today violence, blocked everywhere, comes back on 
us through our soldiers, comes inside and takes possession 
of us. [26]
*  The OAS was based the successor to a long line of right-wing,
neo-fascist "pied-noir" parties. It carried on the work of Joseph 
Ortiz’s Front National Frangais, it replaced the Front pour L’Algerie 
Frangaise, and it attracted the members of the league for the 
self-protection Mitidja farmers.
* *  Thomas-Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie (1784-1849), Duke of
Isly, Marshal of France. Famous for military exploits in the 
conquest of Algeria, he was appointed Governor of Algeria in 1840.
26. Sartre in his preface to Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. 
p.23.
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It seemed that Sartre knew that the OAS terror marked the end of 
a grim epoch in history, the close of a disastrous twenty years in the 
nation’s life. According to Sartre, the violence of the OAS was one more 
indication of the high cost of resisting decolonization, as we shall see in 
the next section.
In June 1960, General Raoul Salan had retired from military service, 
and asserting that he said "No" to "L’AlgSrie Alg§rienne" (Algerian Algeria). 
In his retirement General Salan went into hiding in the area of Mitidja farm 
countryside south of Algiers where most of the wealthy "pied-noir" 
extremists lived. From there he was able to gain support and control of 
the European movements against Algerian independence. Salan thought 
that he had betrayed the Europeans by helping to bring De Gaulle to 
power in 1958. The ex-general later explained "I had to return to the 
people and take the leadership of the OAS". [27] However, before the 
spring of 1961, the OAS had to be completely rebuilt so that it could 
absorb the new wealth of talent that was available. In his communications 
with his followers, he emphasized that:
...to build a French Algeria in a community of ideas and 
actions with the Moslems without any spirit of racism. [28]
In Algeria, both the army officers and the "pied-noir" became more 
and more angered by De Gaulle’s Algerian policies. On April 22, 1961, 
a military "coup d’etat1 was launched in Algeria by four retired French 
Generals opposed to De Gaulle’s self-determination for the Algerian
27. Le Proces du General Salan. p.81.
28. Communications from Salan to Goddard, OAS Parle (Documents
i).
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people. The revolt was led by General Raoul Salan, a former commander 
in Algeria, General Andre-Marie Zeller, former inspector of the ground 
forces in Algeria, General Maurice Challe, former commander of French 
forces in Algeria, and General Edmond Jouhaud, former French Air Force, 
in co-operation with several officers. These Generals were acting under the 
name of the OAS. However, although the insurgents had the support of 
many officers and the anti-Gaullists, they did not have enough support 
among the troops in order to assure the operation’s success. General De 
Gaulle was able to crush the revolt against his order by April 25, when the 
majority of the soldiers responded to his radio appeal and remained loyal 
to the government. Generals Challe and Zeller gave up after only a few 
days, whereas Generals Jouhaud and Salan escaped and went 
underground. A few days later they emerged as leaders of the OAS.
In Algeria, especially in Algiers, Oran and Constantine there were 
bomb explosions everywhere and anti-government demonstrations by 
Europeans opposed to French withdrawal from Algeria. Many Europeans 
and Algerian Moslems were killed by the demonstrators and the French 
troops. Also, in France, the OAS carried out its action against the 
supporters of "L’Algerie Algerienne". On both sides of the Mediterranean, 
the OAS carried out an impressive campaign of terror. The OAS 
trademark was an easily-handled, malleable, powerful dynamite derivative 
called plastique. At the end of 1961, "plastique" exploded in the plants of 
all the pro-Gaullist and Left-wing newspapers. Bombs went off everywhere, 
from the offices of George Pompidou, Minister of State and close personal 
associate of President De Gaulle, in the Rothschild Bank, to the central 
headquarters of the Communist Party in Paris. Many well-known 
personalities, writers and leaders of the Left-wing were attacked in Algeria 
and France. Among these writers was Sartre who was threatened by the
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OAS, as we shall see in the next section. In Algeria, all Moslem doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, teachers and writers were attacked and were killed by 
OAS terrorists. Among these personalities were Dr. Cherif Zehar, one of 
the closest friends of Henri Alleg, and who was tortured in 1957 in front 
of his wife, and also Mouloud Feraoun, the Algerian poetry writer, who 
was knifed in the back by the OAS in his house. Even the Moslem 
postmen in Algiers were killed by OAS terrorists on the same day.
The original OAS headquarters in Madrid complained about the 
independence of Algeria and accused the Spanish group of "total 
ignorance of the situation in Algeria". According to ex-General Jouhaud, 
within Algeria itself there were also difficulties in maintaining discipline and 
he admitted that the OAS was never the monolithic organization some 
thought it to be. OAS terrorism "was often the work of small groups of 
French "pied-noir" not under the control of ex-General Salan or his 
subordinates".[29] It should be pointed out that there were two main 
terrorist organizations of the "pied-noir" and the army, which worked under 
the name of OAS in both Algeria and France.
In this difficult situation, the relatively "moderate" Algerian 
government of Ferhat Abbas was ousted on August 27, 1961, and 
replaced by Youcef Ben-Khedda, former Secretary General of Messali’s 
MTLD and Minister of Social Affairs in the first GPRA. The announcement 
came at the end of three weeks of secret meetings in Tripoli, Libya, of the 
Second FLN National Congress. In his first public speech at the
29. Le Proces d’Edmond Jouhaud. p.90. It should be pointed out that 
Lieutenant Roger Degueldre of the First REP had his own gang of 
daredevil commandos whom he had recruited from the Foreign 
Legion. Degueldre was always careful to preserve his own freedom 
of action while carrying out raids in the name of the OAS terrorists.
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conference of non-aligned nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September, 
President Ben-Khedda declared that the ALN would continue the fight for 
freedom and independence of Algeria. He asserted that he was ready to 
negotiate with the French government, but the Algerian people and the 
GPRA would never give up their claim to the Sahara. Many anti­
colonialist intellectuals who were actively involved in the Algerian revolution 
welcomed the nomination of the new President of GPRA, among them, 
Frantz Fanon. Thus, Fanon speaking through Simone de Beauvoir:
He was satisfied with the decisions taken by the CNRA 
(Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne) at Tripoli and 
by the nomination of Ben-Khedda; he believed victory to be 
at hand, but at what a price!...[30]
During December 1961 and January 1962 informal discussions 
between French government and GPRA officials took place in secret in 
order to avoid OAS terrorism. On February 5, 1962, General De Gaulle 
declared that his policy of self-determination for the Algerian people would 
eventually lead to an independent Algerian state. In a radio-television 
address broadcast both in France and Algeria, President De Gaulle 
reasserted his determination to settle the Algerian nation and to suppress 
the OAS terror campaign against his Algerian policies. In Tunis, the 
spokesmen of the GPRA welcomed De Gaulle on February 5, for his 
reassertion of Algerian independence in the face of violent rightist 
opposition. Then, formal discussions were begun and reconvened at 
Evian-les-Bains, France.
30. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, pp. 608-9.
214
On June 7, 1962, the GPRA sent her delegation to the final Evian 
talks with French government, with Belkacem Krim speaking for the GPRA 
and De Gaulle’s Minister for Algeria, Louis Joxe representing the French 
government. The seven-and-half-year old Algerian revolution against 
French colonialism in Algeria was ended earlier after a strong position of 
negotiation of the GPRA on March 18, 1962 by a truce agreement signed 
by both representatives, the negotiators in Evian. A series of common 
agreements provided for a cease-fire and ensuring an Algerian self- 
determination referendum and full sovereignty for an independent country. 
On March 19, a cease-fire between French military forces and ALN forces 
had been imposed effectively on all fronts. Moreover, a cease-fire 
commission was organized to handle any infringements of the agreement 
and all prisoners taken during combat were to be returned within 2 0  
days. [31] However, immediately, the OAS terrorists declared war against 
De Gaulle’s government, and the French-Algerian peace agreement in the 
Evian Accords.
In spite of the uneasiness within their ranks, the OAS terrorists were 
able to prolong a spectacular campaign of violence. On 21 -26 March, the
31. ft should be pointed out that the Ex-President of GPRA, Ferhat 
Abbas (1958-61) stated after this agreement that:
Cependant, cette premiere rencontre d’Evian - meme sans 
resuitat - etait pour nous, une preuve de la bonne volonte 
du Gouvernement Frangais. Par ailleurs le General avait fait 
liberer 6,000 prisonniers, deplacS les "chefs historiques" de 
L’lle d’Aix au Chateau de Turquant, et ameliore leur regime 
de detention. Ferhat Abbas, Autopsie d’une Guerre, p.310. 
See also texts of declarations drawn up in common 
agreement at Evian, March 18, 1962, by the Declaration of 
the French Government and the FLN, El-Moudiahid. No. 91, 
March 19, 1962. Further information see Youcef 
Benkhedda’s Les Accords D’Evian (Algiers: OPU, 1986).
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OAS fought French troops in Algiers, Oran and Constantine, the terrorists 
armed with guns and bombs attacked gendarmes and other security 
forces at three main cities. Many Moslem and European civilians were 
killed and wounded by the OAS. Also, OAS gunmen invaded a private 
clinic in Algiers and shot the patients in their beds. Forty persons were 
killed, most of them Moslems, and the hospital was destroyed. (For the 
Algerians, this act of French atrocities was a new savage barbarism, but 
for the French it was only a new method for keeping their slogan 
"L’Algerie Frangaise". The "pied-noir" terrorists wanted to provoke the 
Algerian people into carrying out reprisals which would shatter the peace 
and cancel the Evian Accords, and the OAS invented new forms of racial 
warfare; their targets were designated for "Arab hunts". During one "Arab 
hunt", a car filled with explosives was left in the midst of Moslem workers 
on Algiers docks. Sixty-two of the labourers were killed and 110 
wounded, all of them Algerian Moslems. Furthermore, OAS terrorists had 
burned the University in Algiers library in order to destroy the future and 
the will of the Algerian people. It appears that tons of explosives were set 
off in these strategic centres and used against factories and stores until 
the country was totally paralysed by terrorists of the OAS, and the "pied- 
noir" fanatics.
In France itself, the OAS terrorists had killed the Mayor of Evian. 
There was also an attempt to destroy the fifth Republic by the OAS, and 
the fanatical warriors took aim at President De Gaulle himself. In 
September 1961, after he had admitted that the Algerian Sahara belonged 
to Algeria, a bomb failed to explode under De Gaulle’s car on its way to 
Colombey - Les-Deux-Eglises. In August 1962, about 150 bullets were 
fired at the President’s procession as it passed through Petit-Clamart; 10 
slugs went into De Gaulle’s limousine, some passing within inches of his 
head. De Gaulle’s wife and Colonel Alain De Boissieu, De Gaulle’s son­
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in-law, were in the car but were not injured. [32]
It should be noted that when the leader of the OAS, Salan, was 
captured on April 20, 1962 in Algiers and was flown to Paris in order to 
face trial for insurrection against the French government, anti-OAS 
campaigns began in both countries. Oran police arrested 500 men on 
charges of being pro-OAS. At the same time, the French police made 
some damaging thrusts against the terrorists’ organization.
In this difficult situation, the FLN faced the French-Algerian 
negotiation on one hand and OAS terrorism on the other hand, the 
Algerian nationalists were forced to negotiate with OAS for a peace 
settlement in Algeria. Thus, the remaining OAS members began to work 
for a face-saving negotiated peace with the FLN’s leaders in order to 
secure recognition of the OAS terrorism as the representative organization 
of Algeria’s "pied-noir" community. A "pirate" broadcast in the middle of 
June announced that:
...during the last few days, since the arrival of Belkacem Krim 
in Algeria, negotiations have taken place at Rocher-Noir 
(Alger) and elsewhere (Oran) involving the OAS, and the 
FLN, and the provisional executive. [33]
On the 17 June, the FLN and OAS leaders announced the truce 
agreement on cease-fire. The truce had been signed by two executives 
in Algiers and later in Oran and Constantine. Then the FLN organization
32. France Under De Gaulle, edited by Robert A. Diamond (New York: 
Facts on File, Inc., 1970), p.54.
33. Marie-Therese Lancelot, (.’Organisation Armee Secrete. Vol. I, 
Chronologie, Vol. II documents, p. 51.
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worked for the Algerian self-determination referendum which was going to 
be held on July 1, 1962, in order to achieve their own goal; independence 
and liberation of Algeria.
Now let us see how the Algerian people became independent from 
French colonialism after seven and a half years of fighting and struggling 
for their rights and freedom. The Algerian self-determination referendum 
pledged by President De Gaulle in the Evian- Accords, and the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, was carried out on July 1, 1962 after the 
"pied-noir" extremists and the OAS fanatics had ended their terrorist 
campaign against "L’Algerie Algerienne". On July 1, the referendum was 
carried by the expected overwhelming majority of the Algerian population, 
with only a few "pied-noir" and Algerian pro-French who supported 
"L’AlgSrie Frangaise" registering "no" votes. The final results of the 
referendum were announced by the Electoral Control Commission: 
5,975,581 "yes" votes; 16,534 "no" votes. Two days later, on July 3, De 
Gaulle declared that France recognized the independence of Algeria and 
French-Algerian relations would in the future be governed by the Evian- 
Accords.[34] After the proclamation of the new state, the French 
government declared that Jean-Marcel Jeanneney had been named as 
France’s first ambassador to the new Algerian republic.
On July 5,1962, the GPRA announced the independence of Algeria 
and celebrated their victory for the first time in Algerian history. Men, 
women and children of the new-born state were celebrating peacefully 
with the Algerian flag in the streets, yelling "Tahya El-Dja Zair" (long life to 
Algeria), "Hacha Hizeb Jebja Tehrir" (long life to the FLN), etc...After a
34. French Affairs. No. 140, July 3, 1962, pp.1-2. (Texts of the 
declaration of De Gaulle proclaiming Algerian independence), taken 
from Documents on Algeria III.
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week, the GPRA - which was to hold power in Algeria until a time when 
elections for a new government could be organized and held - published 
a statement outlining Algeria’s position in the international community. 
Moreover, the GPRA thanked the Great Meghreb Arabs (Tunisia, Libya 
and Morocco), Arab and Moslem countries and the communist nations 
including China for their material aid and moral support for Algeria’s 
struggle for independence and criticized the Western countries for their 
"hostile policies", but made clear its intention to follow a policy of unity 
with North Africa and the Arab world, and a policy of non-alignment and 
non-involvement in foreign affairs.
The GPRA reported not only to the Algerian people but also to all 
humanity in the world that the price of liberation and independence of 
Algeria was much higher in seven-and-a-half years that one and a half 
million "chouhada" (martyrs) killed during the Algerian revolution. After 132 
years of colonial domination, Algeria emerged from a dark era of its 
history. Some would say that July 1962 was a month of happiness in 
Algeria, but for the Algerian people it was a bleak month as there were 
not enough doctors for the mutilated victims of the last bombs. The 
departing French officials had left nothing but emptiness behind them, 
they had destroyed and burned everything like hospitals, schools, houses, 
cars, libraries, telephone exchanges, power plants, government buildings; 
even the furniture had been burned. In Ben-Bella’s speech to youth 
leaders at EL-Biar (Algiers), the country was a "desert" and there was an 
immense "vacuum" at the dawn of the Algerian independence; he said that
Everyone remembers the situation we inherited. Everything 
was deserted - communication centres, "prefectures", and 
even the administration so vital to the country. When I 
entered the "prefecture" in Oran, I personally found just seven
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employees instead of the five hundred who had previously 
worked there. The departure of the French attained a 
proportion of 80 per cent, even 90 to 98 per cent in some 
technical services such as the highway department. And to 
that you must add the loss of all statistical records burned 
or stolen...[35]
Also, Sartre for his part blamed France for her crime, not only 
against humanity in Algeria but also against French history which repeated 
itself, and he asserted that:
II faut dire que le joie n’est pas de mise: depuis sept ans, la 
France est un chien fou qui traine une casserole a sa queue 
et s’epouvante chaque jour un peu plus de son propre 
tintamarre. Personne n’ignore aujourd’hui que nous avons 
ruine, affame, massacre un peuple de pauvres pour qu’il 
tombe a genoux. II est reste debout. Mais a quel prix!,... il 
restart: deux millions quatre cent mille Algeriens dans les 
camps de la mort lente; nous en avons tu6  plus d’un million. 
La terre est a I’abandon, les douars sont aneantis par les 
bombardements, le cheptel, maigre richesse des paysans, 
a disparu. Apres sept ans, il faudra que, I’AIgerie parte a 
zero: d’abord conquerir la paix, ensuite s’accrocher par 
I’effort le plus dur a cette misere provoquee qui sera notre 
cadeau de rupture. Nous n’ignorons plus rien, nous savons 
ce que nous avons fait: en 1945, les Parisiens criaient de joie 
parce qu’on les delivrait de leurs souffrances; aujourd’hui ils 
ont ce soulagement taciturne parce qu’on les debarrasse de 
leurs crimes. [36]
(b) SARTRE’S WRITINGS ON AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES DURING 
THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION.
Before discussing Sartre’s position on the Algerian revolution
35. Ben-Bella’s speech to youth leaders at El-Riath in El-Biar, (Algiers), 
April 4, 1963. (Ben-Bella’s Speeches published by Ministry of 
Information, March 29, 1964).
36. Sartre, Situations. V. p.161.
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between 1960 and 1962, it will be useful to know about his writings and 
political activities. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Sartre wrote 
The Condemned of Altona in 1959 in order to show how the French Army 
were practising torture in Algeria, although his health was not good, 
according to Simone de Beauvoir. For Sartre, the year of 1960 began 
badly with the death on January 4 of his opponent Albert Camus. 
According to Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre spend the evening with her 
reminiscing about Camus, particularly in terms of their early comradeship 
before the arguments and estrangement. On January 7, Sartre wrote an 
article about the historical and philosophical writings of Camus in France- 
Observateur. It was also the year notable for the publication of Sartre’s 
second major philosophical work, Critique of Dialectical Reason after his 
main book Being and Nothingness, in 1943. Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical 
Reason emerged from the reconsideration of Marxism that he had begun 
early in the 1950s. By 1956 he had been converted to the dialectical 
method and was attempting to reconcile it with his basic existentialism, as 
I have discussed in Chapter One. However, two contemporary 
intellectuals of high standing, Claude Levi-Strauss and Raymond Aron, 
subsequently devoted a series of lectures to discussions of Sartre’s work. 
Sartre had promised to write a second volume of the Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, but it never appeared, as he said at the end of Being 
and Nothingness. He also claimed that he was going to write a book on 
"Ethics" and did not. In his preface to the new edition of Paul Nizan’s 
book Aden-Arabie (1960), Sartre addressed himself to the younger 
generation, incorporating such phrases as "In a society which reserves its 
women for the old and the rich...",[37] and attacked the left’s resignation 
and acquiescence in 1958. In this preface, Sartre wrote his
37. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre. 
p.728.
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self-criticism concerning the emergence of the new movement, as he 
stressed later in one of his interviews:
La jeunesse est la seul qui a repondu a la mystification 
comme il le fallait, c’est - h - dire par la violence...Pour moi, 
les seuls vrais hommes de gauche en France aujourd’hui se 
trouvent parmi ceux qui ont vingt ans. [38]
As might be expected after this declaration, it was natural for Sartre to join 
forces with the signatories who pledged themselves to civil disobedience 
in the "Manifesto of the 121". (As will be seen later in this section).
Between February and March 1960, Sartre visited Cuba with 
Simone de Beauvoir. He was much impressed with the spontaneity and 
undogmatic nature of the Cuban revolution and in his discussion with 
students at the University of Havana, he compared the Cuban revolution, 
which was in its honeymoon period, favourably with the French and 
Russian revolutions. Further, in Havana, he and Simone de Beauvoir were 
received by President Fidel Castro who introduced a talk by Sartre on 
Cuban television. Castro told viewers that he was their friend. On the way 
back to France there was a controversial press conference in New York. 
When Sartre returned to Paris, a series of sixteen articles appeared in 
France-Soir (June 28-July 15) entitled "Ouragan sur le sucre: un grand 
reportage a cuba de Jean-Paul Sartre sur Fidel Castro", (Storm over 
Sugar: A Report on Fidel Castro from Cuba by Jean-Paul Sartre), and 
later on September, Le Monde wrote "M. Jean-Paul Sartre dresse un 
parallele entre cuba et rAlgerie" (M. Jean-Paul Sartre draws a parallel 
between Cuba and Algeria).
As Sartre became a political thinker, he attended a reception given 
by Khrushchev at the Soviet Embassy in Paris. In May 1960, Sartre went 
to Yugoslavia, accepting an invitation from the writers’ union where he was
38. Sartre interview with Verit6-Libert6. August 7, 1960.
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received by Marshal Tito and gave a talk at Belgrade University. But 
Algeria still continued to dominate his political life and on June 17, Sartre 
appeared as a defence witness at the trial of Georges Arnaud, a left-wing 
journalist, who had written a report of an illegal meeting about the Algerian 
revolution arranged by the Francis Jeanson network. Sartre denounced 
the Algerian War and the repression in France: "Nous n’avons plus 
d’autres tribunes que les tribunaux".[39]
When Sartre went to Cuba he met Brazilian friends who said that 
if he paid a visit to Brazil, he could combat the French government 
propaganda about Algeria and render a service to the left. [40] In 
November 1960, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir visited Brazil, where they 
spent two months. Sartre made numerous speeches on the Algerian and 
Cuban revolutions. The students of the University of Sao Paolo had 
formed a "Sartre society" in honour of his name and in Rio de Janeiro 
both Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir were given the rank of honorary 
citizens.
In France itself, Francis Jeanson was due to be tried by a military 
tribunal. Sartre had promised to make a surprise appearance from Brazil 
and he sent back a statement of support for the Jeanson network. 
Sartre’s statement, confirming his 'total solidarity" with Jeanson’s actions, 
and defying the authorities to bring proceedings against himself was read 
in the Court. Sartre declared that:
39. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, Les Ecrits des Sartre, p. 359.
40. Indeed when the President of GPRA, Ben Khedda visited Brazil in 
the autumn of 1961, he was struck by the services Sartre had 
rendered to the Algerian problem. See Simone de Beauvoir, Force 
of Circumstance, p. 552.
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Je ne pense pas qu’il y ait dans ce domaine des taches 
nobles et des taches vulgaires, des activit6s r6serv6es au 
intellectuels et d’autres indignes d’eux. Les professeurs de 
la Sorbonne, pendans la Resistance, n’h€sitaient pas h 
transmettre des plis et a faire des liaisons. Si Jeansons 
m’avait demande de porter des valises ou d’heberger des 
militants Algeriens, et que j’aie pu le faire sans risque pour 
eux, je I’aurais fait sans hesitation. II faut, je crois, que ces 
choses soient dites: car le moment approche ou chacun 
devra prendre ses responsabilites.[41]
The year 1961 began with violence and terrorism by the OAS in 
both Algeria and France. Sartre himself was threatened twice by French 
terrorist organizations. Also, there were the deaths of Sartre’s two friends 
with whom he felt great intellectual sympathy - Merleau-Ponty and Frantz 
Fanon. In July, Sartre went to Rome and wrote an article "Merleau-Ponty 
Alive" which appeared in Les Temps Modernes in October. During his 
stay in Rome, Sartre met Fanon, who discussed his book The Wretched 
of the Earth with Sartre for the last time. The preface, which was written 
for Fanon was the most violent text Sartre ever wrote. In his preface 
Sartre proclaimed his solidarity with the Algerian people and also with the 
struggle of all colonial people in the Third World. Ironically, later in Algiers, 
Fanon’s widow had Sartre’s preface deleted from the 1968 edition 
because she disagreed with his stand on the 1967 Arab-lsraeli War. In 
November Sartre took part in a silent protest against the violent repression 
of the demonstration by Algerian workers in Paris on October 17, and 
attended a large meeting on the Algerian issue in Rome on December 13 
organized by the FLN representatives and the Italian Left-wing. For his 
political writings on the Algerian revolution, Sartre received "The Omega 
Prize" in Milan, which had been awarded in recognition of this work and 
his struggle against the Algerian War.
41. Francis Jeanson, Sartre dans sa Vie, p. 217.
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For Sartre, the year 1962 opened with a second bomb attack on 
his flat by OAS terrorists (as will be seen later). Also, in January, he gave 
evidence for the defence in the trial of the Abb6  Robert Davezies, who 
was prosecuted for helping FLN members. Sartre’s political activities 
continued to revolve around anti-Fascist meetings and support for Algerian 
resistance movements. On February 13, he participated in a demonstration 
against OAS terrorism. On March 14, he was elected Vice-President of the 
"Congres de la Commmunaute Europeenne des Ecrivains" (COMES).
On the declaration of the cease-fire in Algeria on March 18, Sartre 
wrote an article for Les Temps Modernes. with the title "Les somnambules" 
(The Sleep Walkers), in which he described the bitter disillusionment of the 
peace, and contrasted it with the liberation of 1945, when the French 
people felt joy at the deliverance from their sufferings. Now they felt relief 
because they were getting rid of their crimes in Algeria. Also, in this 
article, Sartre called upon the French left to stand against any attempt 
by OAS terrorists to sabotage the agreements, and to struggle against the 
threat of fascism in France. Before the announcement of Algerian 
independence, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir went to Russia and 
Poland. In Moscow, Sartre was received by Premier Khrushchev and had 
discussions with Russian writers who wanted him to take part in a "Peace 
Congress" which was to be held in Moscow from 9 to 14 July, to which 
they were inviting intellectuals from all over the world. On July 9, Sartre 
returned to Moscow for the "Peace Conference" and made a speech on 
"The Demilitarization of Culture", pointing out how culture had been used 
to further party goals during the Cold War. In Autumn of 1962, Sartre 
wrote an article for Rinascita (in Italian) entitled "The Cold War and the 
Unity of Culture".
After these discussions of Sartre’s writings and political activities
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between 1960 and 1962, let us see first how Sartre reacted to the violence 
which became normal to the "pied-noir" fanatics and the OAS terrorists. 
Are his writings and political activities in favour of the Algerian people? 
Is Sartre considered by the Algerians as a militant who took part in the 
Algerian revolution?
It has been said elsewhere by Algerian nationalists that colonialism 
entered their country by violence and it had to be expelled by violence. 
Indeed, since November 1954, the FLN had insisted that it would not 
agree to stop violence and terrorism until the French recognized the FLN 
as the only organisation representing the Algerian people and it would not 
negotiate unless it was the sole Moslem spokesman. The FLN’s main 
hope for victory was to continue the violence and terrorist attacks and to 
make them so costly and painful that the French would lose their 
determination to stay in Algeria. Certainly, this is what Algerians believe 
today. Defending the FLN’s reasoning, Sartre said that it was hypocritical 
to condemn the terrorism of the FLN members because the initial and 
fundamental violence in the Algerian situation was colonialism, and the 
colonial system was based on violence: first of all by conquest, then by 
different forms of exploitation and oppression, and now by "pacification". 
But the system, according to Sartre, contained a contradiction - its profits 
depended on the labour of the colonial people. By its own violence, 
colonialism in Algeria had created a creature who understood only 
violence and by its intransigence it had inevitably forced him to resort to 
violence. In supporting the FLN’s actions, Sartre argued that the methods 
of the FLN actually were moral if viewed in the context of revolutionary 
humanism. It should be pointed out that Sartre had attacked the 
hypocrisy of bourgeois moralism as early as his novel Nausea before the 
Second World War. Now the Algerian problem persuaded him of the truth 
of the Marxist theory that abstract moralism was the property of the
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dominant class, which the oppressed could not afford, and a means of 
maintaining its dominance. Furthermore, Sartre was hoping that the 
violence of the FLN would force Europeans to do "the striptease of our 
humanism" and also to discover that it was "nothing but an ideology of 
lies, a perfect justification for pillage". [42]
Now let us examine how Sartre gradually developed his thoughts 
from the structure of political economy and oppression to violence. As 
early as in Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre claimed that violence is 
a negative element of human interaction. In the French resistance, he had 
become aware of the defensive and constructive value of a more physical 
kind of violence. It might be the necessary means of defending freedom. 
Man is freedom; that is his dominant characteristic in Sartre’s thought. 
From this it proceeded that man is responsible for his own identity, which 
is self-creation through action. It should be noted that Sartre is 
completely consistent with this position in the Critioue of Dialectical 
Reason (1960), where he defined the project as free because its process 
is other than history, and also as responsible because there is no 
explanation other than its own for its actions. This is freedom and 
responsibility without connotation. [43]
In Being and Nothingness. Sartre explained the character of 
oppression and the reaction to it. He asserted that oppression is the look 
of the other, as he wrote:
42. Sartre, quoted in Le Monde. December 13, 1969, p.15.
43. Indeed Hazel Barnes, commenting on Sartre’s philosophical 
thoughts said that his political and philosophical writings are clear 
and consistent from the starting point to his later development. But 
commentators made his thoughts ambiguous. (Private letter from 
Hazel Barnes, June 14, 1986).
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The "master", the "Feudal lord", the "bourgeois" the "capitalist" 
all appear not only as powerful people who command, but 
in addition and above all things; that is, as those who are 
outside the oppressed community and for whom this 
community exists. It is therefore for them in their freedom 
that the reality of the oppressed class is going to exist. They 
cause it to be born by their look. [44]
This is a basic existentialist point of view in which the oppressed accepts 
the judgement of the other, and agrees to oppression in an active sense. 
In destroying this oppression, the oppressed must find the will to fight 
back, and each oppressed person must recognize his condition and move 
to change it "... the oppressed class by revolution or by a sudden 
increase of its power posits itself as ’they-who-look-at’ in the face of 
members of the oppressing class". [45]
But later in comparing Sartre’s plays The Flies (1943) and The Devil 
and the Good Lord (1951), Simone de Beauvoir observed that:
In 1944, Sartre thought every situation could be transcended 
by a subjective movement, he knew in 1951 that the 
circumstances sometimes steal our transcendence: against 
them there is no individual salvation possible, but only 
collective struggle. [46]
However, it should be noted, as "Mafarialisme et la Revolution" 
testified, that Sartre’s change had come at least as early as 1946, when 
he declared that:
44. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.544.
45. Ibid, p. 544.
46. Quoted in R. Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 181.
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Mais le revolutionnaire lui-meme...se d6 fie de la liberty. Et il 
a raison. Les prophetes n’ont jamais manqu£, qui lui orrt 
annonce qu’il etait libre: et c’est chaque fois pour le 
duper...Elles se reduisaient toutes a une certaine liberty 
infarieure que Phomme pourrait conserver en n’importe quelle 
situation. Cette liberte interieure est une pure mystification 
idealiste...[47].
The development of Sartre’s political writings on the social and economic 
structure of the human being took place after the Second World War. 
Two plays, Dirty Hands (1948) and especially The Devil and the Good 
Lord (1951), Sartre made it the basis of his conviction that the struggle 
for a society of freedom would necessarily entail dirtying one’s hands with 
violence, as the protagonist stressed at the close of the latter play:
...I take command against my will, but I will not release it. 
Believe me, if there is a chance of winning this war, I will win 
it. Proclaim immediately that any soldier who tries to desert 
will be hung. Tonight I want a complete account of the 
troops, the arms and the supplies; you are responsible for 
everything. We will be sure of victory when your men are 
more afraid of me than of the enemy...So the reign of men 
begins. Fine start. Alright. Nasty, I will be executioner and 
butcher...Don’t be afraid, I will not flinch. I will terrify them 
since there is no other way to obey for me, I will stay alone 
with this empty sky over my head, since I have no other way 
to be with everyone. There is the war to make and I shall 
make it. [48]
47. Sartre, Situations. Ill, p. 196.
48. Sartre, The Devil and the Good Lord. Translated by S. and G.
Leeson (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 282.
In Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr (1952) Sartre represented Genet’s 
life beyond failure and triumph. He described the death of Genet the child 
and the emergence of the Genet who wanted to become a thief, in order 
to look for love and property. It appears at first sight that this attitude is 
paradoxical. However, Sartre’s discussion of this attitude is explanatory: 
it reflects the development of his thought in general and on violence in 
particular. According to Sartre, Genet wanted to steal in order to be, but 
stealing led him to lose his freedom. He was jailed many times, and the 
last time he was condemned to life imprisonment. Although, Genet was 
a revolutionary, he loved the French social order with a hate-filled and 
exasperated love. [49] Sartre describes Genet as saying that:
I do not exactly reflect on the owner of the place, but all my 
gestures evoke him...l bathe in the idea of property when I 
rob the property. I recreate the absent owner. He exists not 
face to face with me but all around me. He is a fluid 
element which I breathe, which enters into me, which swells 
my lungs. [50]
Sartre’s first writing and most important contribution on Algeria was 
"Le colonialisme est un systeme". In adapting Marxist theory, Sartre 
argued that the colonial system in Algeria was based not only on the 
exclusion but also on the "super-exploitation" of the native population, 
because the "pied-noir" in Algeria were able to exploit the Moslem workers 
to a much greater degree, by paying them very low wages. In concluding 
his essay, Sartre assumed that the profits of colonial capitalism and the 
prosperity of the "pied-noir" was dependent on the continued misery and
49. See more information about Saint Genet in author’s M.Litt. Thesis, 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s Conception of Bad Faith (Glasgow University, 
1985).
50. Sartre, Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr, p. 244.
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subjugation of the native people. He responded to the colonial reformers, 
saying:
...Oui, le Fellah (small cultivator) meurt de faim, oui, il 
manque de tout, de terres, de travail et destruction; oui, 
les maladies I’accablent; oui, I’etat present en Algerie est 
comparable aux pires miseres d’Extreme - Orient. Et pourtant 
il est impossible de commencer par les transformations 
economiques parce que la miserie et le desespoir des 
Algeriens sont I’effet direct et necessaire du colonialisme et 
qu’on ne les supprimera jamais tant que le colonialisme 
durera.[51]
It should be pointed out that the only solution Sartre offered in 1956 to 
the problem of injustice and soppression in Algeria was the total abolition 
of the system. This meant independence for Algeria.
In The Condemned of Altona (1959), he described the character 
Frantz as France, who had directed the torture of prisoners in the Second 
World War, and used it to appeal to the conscience of France, which had 
allowed the torture of Algerian people by the French Army.
When Sartre was asked what particular emotion he wished to 
convey in "Altona", he said the feeling of the ambiguity of our age. 
Morals, politics-nothing is simple any more. There are some acts, however, 
which are unacceptable. Sartre ended his play with a direct address to 
the French people, in Frantz’s "best speech for the defence":
51. Sartre, "Le Colonialisme est un Systeme", Les Temps Modernes. 
No. 123, 1956, p. 1381.
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The century would have been a good one if man had not 
been struck down by his cruel, immemorial enemy, by the 
flesh-eating species which had vowed his destruction, by the 
hairless, malignant beast - by man. The beast was hiding, 
we surprised his look suddenly in the depths of our 
neighbour’s eyes. Then we struck - legitimate self-defence. 
I surprised the beast. I struck, a man fell. In his dying eyes 
I saw the beast still alive, myself...From whom, from what do 
I find this dull rancid taste in my mouth? From man? From 
the beast? From myself? It is the taste of the cerrtury...The 
century is a woman in labour. Will you condemn your 
mother? Answer!...The thirtieth century no longer replies. 
Perhaps there will be no more centuries after ours. Perhaps 
a bomb will blow out all the lights. Everything will be dead: 
yes, judges, time. Night. Oh, Tribunal of the Night, I, Frantz 
von Gerlach, here in this room, have taken the century upon 
my shoulders and have said, I will answer for it. This day and 
for ever. What do you say? [52]
From this passage one can see that the "you" in the last sentence 
is not only each one of us but all of us, and we might call it the look of 
history. Later, in one of his interviews, Sartre said that:
I wanted the spectator to feel himself to some degree in the 
presence of this tribunaL.Or, quite simply, in the presence 
of centuries to come. [53]
Also, it may well seem in the quotation that another meaning of that 
"Beast" which is inside us, is oneself and which therefore sets up an 
objective situation in which we find ourselves trapped.
52. Sartre, The Condemned of Altona. pp.222-3.
53. Sartre said this in an interview with representatives of L’Express. 
Translated by Richard Seaver in Evergreen Review. January- 
February 1960, pp. 143-4.
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In the Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), Sartre’s explanation is 
more powerful on ground which he personally has explored, particularly 
in his section on the group minds locked in conflict in Algeria, as he 
stated:
When we read in such and such a contemporary sociological 
work that the impoverishment, such as the liquidation of the 
social structures of the Muslin community, is the necessary 
result of the contact between two defined societies, of which 
one is backward, feudal and agricultural, and the other is 
industrialized, the intelligibility and the necessity of this type 
of determination are missing...the contact of two societies, 
these rational beings, is quite incapable of producing 
anything outside the singular contacts of the individuals who 
compose them.Jn fact, it must be said that the contact of 
the industrial society and the agricultural society was made 
by the soldiers of Bugeaud, by the atrocious massacres of 
which they were guilty...all the relations between the 
colonizers and the colonized through the colonial system are 
realizations of those fixed characters "practico-inertes" 
introduced and defined by their common action. [54]
Ultimately, history is intelligible only because it is made by men and men 
in this creative world are comprehensible to Sartre in the words he used 
to explain human consciousness in his main first work, Being and 
Nothingness, and the dynamics of the group cohesion in his second work, 
Critique of Dialectical Reason. In the latter work, Sartre discussed several 
points of interpersonal struggle as the war of freedom against itself; for 
instance, he said that: ...the only violence conceivable is that of liberty 
against liberty by the mediation of inorganic matter. [55] This appeared 
either in personal life, through Bad Faith, or in social analysis, through the 
reification of history.
54. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, pp. 673-4.
55. Ibid, p. 689.
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First let us discuss how Sartre reacted to the Algerian War which 
took place in both Algeria and France, by acting and defending in favour 
of the Algerians’ struggle. Since De Gaulle’s plan of granting a cease­
fire and self-determination to the Algerian people in September 1958, 
Algeria still had neither peace nor self-determination until July 5, 1962. 
Worse, France itself resounded to the exploding bombs of the OAS. Thus, 
the war posed a threat to French society and to the political system. The 
French government discovered Jeanson’s network and arrested all his 
members in February 1960. The score of arrests did not include the 
leader, Francis Jeanson, and did not stop the movement’s activities in 
aiding and recruiting new members. In April the French authorities were 
unable to prevent Jeanson from holding a clandestine press conference 
in Paris, which was reported in the popular daily newspaper Paris-Presse 
under the title "Les etranges confidences du ’Professeur Jeanson’".
In early September 1960, the trial of the Jeanson network opened. 
The day before the trial started a "Declaration sur le droit a I’insoumission 
dans la guerre d’Alg6 rie", (Declaration of the Right of Draft Evasion in the 
Algerian War) appeared. Signed originally by 121 intellectuals it was more 
commonly known as "Le Manifeste des 121" (The Manifesto of the 121). 
Defending the Algerian people, the intellectuals asserted that:
Nous respectons et jugeons just'rRe le refus de 
prendre les armes contre le peuple Algerien.
Nous respectons et jugeons justifiee la conduite des 
Frangais qui estiment de leur devoir d’apporter aide 
et protection aux Algeriens opprimes au nom du 
peuple Francgais.
la cause de peuple Algerien, qui contribue de fagon 
decisive k ruiner le systeme colonial, est la cause de 
tous les hommes libres.[56]
56. Frangois Maspero (ed), Le Droit a L’insoumission: "Le Dossier des 
121" (Paris: Frangois Maspero, 1961), p. 18.
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Among the original signatories of the declaration were the staff of 
Les Temps Modernes. led by the director, Sartre, Marcel P6ju, and 
Simone de Beauvoir; the anti-colonialist militant, Daniel Gu6 rin; the 
surrealist poets, Michel Leiris, and Florence Malraux (the daughter of De 
Gaulle’s Minister of Culture, Andre Malraux). And later one hundred and 
twenty-four other intellectuals added their signatures to consolidate the 
position of the French left. These included the novelist, Michel Butor, the 
sociologist, Maxime Rodinson and Clara Malraux, the former wife of the 
Minister of Culture. [57] It might be surprising to see a few intellectuals 
become pro-Algerian, disobedient to the State, and against De Gaulle’s 
Algerian policies. But what was the reaction of the French authorities 
toward these signatures?
As might be expected the reaction of the government to this 
declaration was swift. On September 28th a Cabinet communique 
announced the determination of De Gaulle’s Prime Minister, Michel Debr6  
to strengthen the State’s disciplinary powers over "the few agents who 
favour refusal of military service or desertion", and also to forbid the 
signatories from appearing in future on the government-controlled radio 
and television services, and in state-subsidized theatres. One of the 
original signatories, Robert Barrat, the Catholic journalist, was imprisoned 
for two weeks because the police found about 170 copies in his office. A 
further decree promised action against officials, writers, professors, 
teachers, artists, journalists, and public or municipal servants among the 
signatories. There were also a series of police raids on the office of 
newspapers and publishers, including those of France-Observateur. 
L’Exoress. Les Temps Modernes. Verit6 -Liberte. and Esprit, and five 
journalists were arrested.
57. Ibid, p. 19.
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It seemed that the "Manifesto of the 121" put the government in a 
dilemma. Although the State was against the manifesto, they took a 
middle way and they ignored some and singled out others for 
punishment, mainly those whom they believed to be the ringleaders, in 
order to avoid the anger of the friends of "L’Alg6 rie Frangaise". Indeed on 
October 3, 1960, the supporters of "L’Algerie Frangaise" organized a huge 
demonstration against the "Manifesto of the 121". From 6  thousand to 8  
thousand members of veterans’ organizations marched to the Arc de 
Triomphe in Paris in protest against those who had signed the manifesto 
in favour of the Algerian people. Before marching, they "gave silent tribute 
to the dead, both civilian and military, who fell under the blows of the 
FLN", [58] and also to “to protest at the summons to treason".[59] Most of 
the demonstrators were shouting and insulting the signatories, as they 
were shouting:
"Fu-si-llez-Jean-Paul-Sartre" (Shoot-Jean-Paul-Sartre) 
"AI-ge-Rie-Fran-gaise" (French-AI-ger-ia!") 
"Li-be-rez-La-gai-llarde" (Lib-er-ate-La-Gaillarde) 
"Sa-Lan-Au-Pou-voir" (Po-wer-to-Sa-lan). [60]
Later Sartre asserted that:
Yes, at that time...the French government wanted to 
prosecute me for having signed the manifesto like the 
hundred and twenty other signatories. [61]
58. Annie Cohen-Solal, Sartre: A Life, p. 426.
59. Ibid, p. 426.
60. Ibid, p. 426.
61. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p. 369.
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Although Sartre claimed that he never belonged to any pro-Algerian 
organizations, he acted by himself in relation to his theories and his own 
political beliefs, and it was natural for him to join forces with the 
signatories who pledged themselves to civil disobedience in the "Manifesto 
of the 121". He believed that: "La gauche frangaise doit etre solidaire avec 
le FLN. Leur sort est d’ailleurs lie. La victoire du FLN sera la victoire de 
la gauche". [62]
In the meantime, the Jeanson network’s trial went forward on 
September 5, 1960. Nineteen French men and women, and six Algerians 
were accused of carrying funds and documents for the FLN and hiding 
Algerians wanted by the police in France. Four of the accused, including 
the alleged leader, Professor Jeanson, were tried in their absence as they 
had fled the country. The two defence lawyers were Roland Dumas, and 
Jacques Verges who became in 1987 the defender of the SS man, Klaus 
Barbie. The accused were not charged with any acts of assault or 
sabotage. Thus, nothing was gained from the capture. Over six months 
intervened between the group’s arrest and its trial which, in turn, lasted 
nearly a month. There was, then, time and publicity enough to force the 
French left to debate its actions and to condemn the Gaullist Algerian 
policies, and also to reveal to the "masses" the network’s character. Above 
all, Sartre said:
D’ou Pimportance exceptionnelle de ce proces. Pour la 
premiere fois, en depit de tous les obstacles, de tous les 
prejuges, de toutes les prudences, des Alg6 riens et des 
Frangais, fraternellement unis par un combat commun, se 
retrouvent ensemble dans le box des accuse. [63]
62. Sartre, interview with Ver'rte-Liberte. August 7, 1960.
63. Francis Jeanson, Sartre dans sa Vie, p. 217.
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On September 8 , Paris-Presse strongly disapproved of the 
appearance of the "Manifesto of the 121" and carried a front-page 
headline which said: "Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone Signoret and 100 others 
Risk Five Years in Jail". [64] Though Sartre was in Brazil, the French 
Embassy was instructed to let the whole world know that Sartre would be 
arrested when he got back to France. Later, M. Terrenoire, the Minister 
of Information, announced that:
Sartre has replaced Maurras and represents an anarchic and 
suicidal dictatorship aiming to impose itself on a bewildered 
and decadent intelligentsia. [65]
It should be pointed out that the French Press had been insulting Sartre 
vociferously for the past two months - traitor, enemy of France, etc...Most t 
of the parties and organizations of the right-wing attacked the signatories 
of the "Manifesto of the 121". Sartre was the one most attacked. But when 
he went back to Paris, he immediately called a press conference; he 
explained his part in the Manifesto and gave an exposition of the present 
situation.
In his preface to Nizan’s Aden-Anabie. Sartre described his feeling 
towards the Algerian problem and the political system in France. He 
wrote:
Nous avons crie, protest^, signe, contresigne; nous avons, 
selon nos habitudes de pensee, declare: "II n’est pas 
admissible..." ou "le proletariat n’admettra pas..." Et puis 
finalement nous sommes la: done nous avons tout accept^..., 
nous avons appris qu’une chose: notre radicale
impuissance.[6 6 ]
64. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p. 562.
65. Ibid, p. 562.
6 6 . Sartre in his preface to Paul Nizan’s Aden-Arabie. p. 13-4.
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Thus, Sartre characterized the emotional anguish of the intellectuals of the 
French left as the Algerian War settled into its sixth year with huge 
numbers of Algerians killed and with the constant threat of military 
government in France itself in the background. For these intellectuals of 
the left, the problem of France’s colonial policy was more the problem of 
the French left; the Socialists had sold out and the Communists were 
divided. Neither Socialists nor Communists in France responded to the 
problem of ending this savage and senseless war which threatened to 
bring fascism and dictatorship into modern society. It seemed that people 
did not agree with their diagnosis, particularly the intellectuals of the 
French left. In this manner, Jean-Marie Domenach, the Catholic left­
winger, wrote that: The leaders of the left must stir themselves: it is their 
softness, the chatty powerlessness, their divisions, which have created this 
void... [67]. Also, Verite-Liberte asserted that: "The time has come to ask 
ourselves if, as a result of being powerless, we are not accomplices". [6 8 ] 
Bourdet, too, took the left to task for: "its inertia, its laziness, or rather the 
miserable prudence with which it had fought against this war...Perhaps it 
is time to think that hopes and pious motions no longer suffice". [69] 
Sartre was more understanding in his writing about the action taken by 
the clandestine Jeanson network, and he explicitly links their 
powerlessness to the political system:
67. In L’Express. March 24, 1960.
6 8 . In Verite-Liberte. June, 1960.
69. In France-Observateur. March 3, 1960.
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If in France there were valid political institutions which 
permitted true action on the left, then there would not be 
these young men (working illegally against the war). But the 
present system works in such a fashion that is impossible to 
engage in opposition. [70]
The trial of the Jeanson network took a political turn as well, with 
a justification in political terms for its action. As Sartre wrote in his letter 
to the tribunal:
...solidarity with the Algerian fighters was not only dictated to 
the network by noble principles or by a general will to fight 
oppression wherever it shows itself; it proceeded from a 
political analysis of the situation in France itself. [71]
It should be pointed out that it was not only Jeanson’s underground 
which gave aid to the Algerians but there were many organizations like 
"Jeune Resistance" (Young Resistance) an organization of those who 
refuse to join the army or deserted from it, distinguished their position 
from that of conscientious objection in that their decision was political. A 
spokesman for "Young Resistance" was Maurice Maschino who was a 
young teacher in Morocco and had written several radical criticisms of the 
war in Algeria. In defending the "Young Resistance", Maschino claimed 
that they had: not disobeyed in order to keep their hands clean, by 
moralism, but to give an example and to encourage other refusals. [72]
70. Sartre, Verite-Liberte. July-August, 1960 and Jeanson himself, "the 
point of departure is the powerlessness of the left", Les Temps 
Modernes. April, May, 1960.
71. Sartre’s letter cited in Frangois Maspero (ed), Le Droit h 
L’insoumission. "Le Dossier des 121". p. 85.
72. Maurice Maschino, L’Enqaqement (Paris: Frangois Maspero, 1961)
p.2 1 .
240
As might be expected, on political grounds "Young Resistance" was 
subject to criticism like any disobedient people in France; they were called 
"infantile". Domenasch said that they would stand by those who refused 
to serve in the army for moral reasons, but could not see their defence 
in political terms, as he stated that:
I approve of the youths who had, in conscience, taken the 
decision not to participate in the Algerian War...(but) I am 
hostile to any counsel which would try to move insub­
ordination from the level of conscientious objection to the 
level of general political action...insubordination...can only be 
a political slogan if one is able, as the Bolsheviks were in 
1917, to pass quickly to an insurrection. Otherwise it only 
reinforces the adversaries... [73]
Nevertheless, the Jeanson network, "Young Resistance", and the 
"Manifesto of the 121" contributed to this radicalization. In 1960 the 
number of youths who refused to serve greatly increased, but this did not 
affect the French military forces. The number of the French left who aided 
the FLN movement was never large, though the Algerian nationalists 
welcomed and gave them moral support and encouragement - a few 
hundred activists drawn from all organizations of the left but the arrest of 
Jeanson’s collaborators made public opinion change its impression of the 
Algerian War and also pushed Sartre and Les Temps Modernes to 
declare publicly their support for this action and helped awaken the rest 
of the left. Both Sartre and Jeanson provided reasons encouraging 
people on the left not only to support but also to work for Algerian 
independence; "the victory of the FLN will be the victory of the left".
73. Cited in Frangois Maspero (ed), Le Droit a L’insoumission. "Le 
Dossier des 121". pp. 141-2.
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It should be pointed out that the aid of the French left, particularly 
the anti-colonialist intellectuals, was never forgotten by the Algerian people. 
They helped by giving money, clothes, medicines and by collecting funds 
for the FLN both in France and Algeria, and also by hiding Algerians 
wanted by the army and the police. But they never participated in any of 
the FLN’s "attentat" or in shooting the French soldiers in the name of the 
ALN. Most of them refused to bomb French military targets, though the 
FLN insisted more on "attentats" in their revolution than collecting funds 
and struggling outside the movement. For instance, in Algeria itself the 
ALN would not accept anyone as a member until he had made an 
"attentat" or killed French soldiers. Thus, today Algerians believe that the 
independence of Algeria was due neither to De Gaulle’s Algerian policy 
nor to the support of the French left, but it was due to the struggle of the 
Algerian people which cost one and a half million martyrs for their cause. 
Perhaps they are right, because the Algerians who fought beside the 
French soldiers in the First and Second World Wars are never mentioned 
in the Western histories. [74]
As was discussed earlier, Sartre’s writings and political activities in 
favour of the struggle of the Algerian people turned public opinion and the 
French government against him and threatened him with death. Indeed, 
on July 19, 1961 a bomb exploded in the entrance to Sartre’s flat at 42
74. Ferhat Abbas stated that "Survint la premiere guerre mondiale. Les 
Algeriens y participerent activement, le service militaire obligatoire 
leur ayant ete impose des 1912. Leurs sacrifices furent encore plus 
grands durant la deuxieme guerre mondiale". See Autopsie d’une 
Guerre, p. 20.
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Rue Bonaparte, causing a little damage but no injuries. Certainly it was 
the work of the OAS, which regarded him as an important opponent of 
its mission to keep Algeria under French control. Sartre was expecting it, 
because he had received many threatening letters and anonymous 
telephone calls. He settled his mother in a hotel and he himself moved 
in temporarily with Simone de Beauvoir.
In his preface to Fanon, Sartre’s most outspoken defence of 
violence is made in an impassioned declaration of solidarity with the 
Algerian fighters. He believed that the time had come and that violence 
was the only cure for "colonial neurosis". Also, violence was "man 
recreating himself"; it alone could remove the scars on his psyche made 
by the colonialists violence. Sartre offered another form of psychic 
liberation and he stressed that violence was the only way to destroy the 
colonial regime:
...no gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only 
violence itself can destroy them. The native cures himself of 
colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of 
arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost 
innocence and he comes to know himself in that he himself 
creates his self. Far removed from his war, we consider it as 
a triumph of barbarism; but of its own volition it achieves, 
slowly but surely, the emancipation of the rebel,...when the 
peasant takes a gun in his hands, the old myths grow dim 
and the prohibitions are one by one forgotten. The rebel’s 
weapon is the proof of his humanity...to shoot down a 
European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an 
oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time...[75]
75. Sartre in his preface to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. 
pp. 18-9.
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Because of his profound knowledge of Algerian society and of the 
revolution itself, Fanon’s judgement of the effects of violence on the 
participants in the Algerian War cannot easily be dismissed. In The 
Wretched of the Earth. Fanon passionately presented his case for the use 
of violence:
But it so happens that for the colonised people this violence, 
because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters 
with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence 
binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms 
a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism 
of violence which has surged upwards in reaction to the 
settler’s violence in the beginning. The groups recognise 
each other and the future nation is already indivisible. [76]
Simone de Beauvoir described in her memoirs how Sartre had become 
convinced of the truth of Fanon’s analysis when he was in Cuba.
He (Sartre) was in agreement with his book: a manifesto of 
the Third World, extreme, whole, incendiary, but also complex 
and subtle; he willingly agreed to preface it.[77]
It is apparent that Fanon used the term violence in different 
contexts in order to describe different phases of a process, and this 
process in his discussion was certainly decolonization. For Fanon, 
decolonization would occur only through violent means, that is, the 
destruction of the colonial system, and also it implied the possibility of 
reconstructing human relations and building a new society. In this manner, 
it can be seen that Fanon and Sartre had the same ideas when they
76. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 73.
77. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p. 609.
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thought that decolonization could only be achieved through the use of 
violence and that armed struggle would give birth to the new man. But 
Sartre presented the notion of violence in, The Critique of Dialectical 
Reason, as the absolute form of praxis. As he emphasized that the 
original source of all violence is French: The violence of the insurgent is 
the violence of the settler, (Pied-noir), there has never been any other. [78]
Also in his preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. Sartre 
asserted that this is more difficult to cure than the influence of false 
consciousness because it destroys the complete personality structure of 
the oppressed. He stressed that:
...the order is given to reduce the inhabitants of the annexed 
country to the level of superior monkeys in order to justify 
the settler’s treatment of them as beasts of burden. Violence 
in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of 
these enslaved men at arm’s length; it seeks to dehumanize 
them. Everything will be done to wipe out their traditions, to 
substitute our language for theirs and to destroy their culture 
without giving them ours. Sheer physical fatigue...Starved 
and ilL.take over his land and force him by dint of flogging 
to till the land for them. If he shows fight, the soldiers fire 
and he’s a dead man; if he gives in, he degrades himself 
and he is no longer a man at all; shame and fear will split 
up his character and make his inmost self fall to pieces. [79]
Thus, Sartre examined the effects on the native - that being who is
"neither man nor animal of internalized aggression, suppressed fury". [80]
Furthermore, Sartre led his compatriots to the point at which the 
French savages and barbarians must be aware of their crime in Algeria:
78. Sartre, The Critique of Dialectical Reason, p. 689.
79. Sartre, in his preface to Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth,
p. 13.
80. Ibid, p.14.
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Now, which side are the savages on? Where is the 
barbarism? Nothing is missing, not even the tom-toms; the 
motor-horns beat out "AIg6 rie Frangaise" while the Europeans 
burn Moslems alive...For we, too, during the last few years, 
must be victims of “frontal sluggishness" since our patriots 
do quite a bit of assassinating of their fellow countrymen and 
if they are not at home, they blow up their house and their 
"concierge" (janitor). This is only a beginning...lt’s our turn to 
tread the path, step by step, which leads down to native 
level. But to become natives altogether, our soil must be 
occupied by a formerly colonized people and we must starve 
of hunger. This won’t happen; for it’s a discredited 
colonialism which is taking hold on us; this is the senile, 
arrogant master who will straddle us; here he comes, our 
mumbo-jumbo.[81 ]
Thus, it seems that there is more criticism of the French atrocities 
in Sartre’s preface than mere confirmation of Fanon’s thesis. Thus, the 
discovery of the torture practised by the French paratroops in Algeria is 
the revelation of French inhumanity. Sartre’s preface to Fanon disclosed 
that the humanization of the colonized took place with their adoption of 
measures of counter-violence. However, the violence which existed in 
colonized Algeria was reimported into metropolitan France in the form of 
OAS activity, as we have seen in the first section of this chapter.
In Sartre’s preface to Fanon’s book we find the contrary of what 
constitutes the basis of Sartre’s hypothesis; with their struggle, men are 
no more exploited, but demolish the oppression imposed on them; 
because of conflict the future is not predestined; those who pay are the 
Europeans if they resist and attach themselves to the past; the only issue 
which remains is solidarity with those who achieve their autonomy, they
81. Ibid, pp. 24-5.
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discover their freedom in their struggle and violence is the source of 
recognition. However, this increased conflict is associated with events: 
resistance movements disfigure Africa and Asia; the Algerian War 
becomes more and more cruel. Whatever the weight of silence and 
conscience, this war which killed one million Algerians and thousands of 
French becomes a real problem for the country. Opposition is expressed 
largely in demonstrations organized by both French and Algerians who 
are killed indiscriminately. According to Sartre, the bodies of Algerians 
were found in the Saint-Martin Canal in Paris. In October 1961, around 
1 0 0 ,0 0 0  demonstrators protesting against these crimes, were injured by 
the police. The scorched earth policy in Algeria, the attacks of the OAS 
in metropolitan France expose the hopelessness of this colonial war which 
has become a civil war. In this conflict there is ferocity on both sides. As 
Sartre declared:
Our precious sets of values begin to moult; on closer 
scrutiny you won’t see one that isn’t stained with blood. If 
you are looking for an example, remember these fine words: 
"How generous France is!" Us, generous? What about Setif, 
then? And those eight years of ferocious war which have 
cost the lives of over a million Algerians? And the 
tortures? [82]
Sartre makes of this tragedy an "epic poem" in which, paradoxically, 
violence become of value if it liberates: everything possesses a 
significance when listening to the oppressed. This is the source of the 
adventure. As he writes that:
82. Ibid, p.22.
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Not so very long ago, the earth numbered two thousand 
million inhabitants: five hundred million men, and one 
thousand five hundred million natives. The former had the 
Word; the others had the use of it. Between the two there 
were hired kinglets, overlords and a bourgeoisie, sham from 
beginning to end, which served as go-betweens. In the 
colonies the truth stood naked, but the citizens of the 
mother-country preferred it with clothes on:...we would utter 
the words "Parthenon! Brotherhood!" and somewhere in 
Africa or Asia lips would open "...thenon!...therhood!,,..."After 
all, let them bawl their heads off, it relieves their feelings; 
dogs that bark don’t bite. [83]
Sartre not only acts on behalf of the oppressed but also against 
degradation of his country and every citizen with the fixed idea that one 
must first "sweep in front of his door". As he stressed:
It is not right, my fellow-countrymen, you know very well all 
the crimes committed in our names, it’s not at all right that 
you do not breathe a word about them to anyone, not even 
to your own soul, for fear of having to stand in judgement 
on yourself...Eight years of silence; what degradation! and 
your silence is all of no avail; today, the blinding sun of 
torture is at its zenith; it lights up the whole country...lt is 
enough today for two French people to meet together for 
there to be a dead man between them. One dead man did 
I say?...France was the name of a country. We should take 
care that in 1961 it does not become the name of a nervous 
disease. [84]
Indeed, Sartre became more active in the struggle for the Algerian 
people. On November 18,1961, a surprise demonstration against fascism 
and racism was organized, mainly by the young Communists in Paris. A 
crowd of about 8,000 demonstrators turned out in support, and, with
83. Ibid, p. 7.
84. Ibid, p. 25.
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Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre paraded behind a placard proclaiming "Peace 
in Algeria". As Simone de Beauvoir affirmed in her memoirs:
I took hold of Sartre’s arm on one side and that of someone 
I didn’t know on the other...As we marched we chanted: 
"Peace in Algeria - Solidarity with the Algerians - Free Ben- 
Bella - OAS murderers"; less frequently: "United action - hang 
Salan".[85]
On December 19, there was yet another anti-OAS demonstration which 
was banned at the last moment. The police charged at the leaders of the 
procession, beating up those who were carrying placards, and shocking 
them with tear gas. Many people were seriously hurt. Certainly, Sartre 
took part in this demonstration. However, it appears that Sartre took a 
great step forward in his position on the Algerian problem when he 
participated in the pro-Algerian demonstration and attacked the French 
terrorist activities in Algeria in his writings. But what was the reaction of 
the OAS to Sartre’s activities? Was the price of his siding with the 
struggle of the Algerian people much higher?
The bombing continued against writers and leaders of the left who 
were considered to be anti-"L’Algerie Frangaise". A bomb destined for 
Sartre’s flat was placed on the wrong floor. Three days before the bomb 
went off, there was an explosion at about two in the morning on the 
corner of Sartre’s building. The shirt shop was completely destroyed by 
a plastic bomb, but it turned out that the target had been the shop owner, 
an Algerian-born Frenchman - a "pied-noir" - who refused to collect funds 
for OAS terrorists. On January 7, 1962 another plastic bomb exploded 
at 42, Rue Bonaparte on the floor above Sartre’s flat. The explosion
85. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p. 619.
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demolished both flats as well as the bedrooms on the floor above. 
Sartre’s front door was blown off and his Norman cupboard smashed. In 
this terrorist act, many of Sartre’s unpublished manuscripts were 
destroyed.[8 6 ] However, Sartre had been living in a flat on the Boulevard 
Saint-Germain for a month (later in the year he was to move to a tenth- 
floor flat at 222 Boulevard Raspail, where he stayed until 1973). When 
Simone de Beauvoir went next day to see how much damage had been 
done, one of Sartre’s neighbours shouted to her: 'This is what happens 
because of all your politics, making trouble for everyone". [87] Moreover, 
on the morning of 7 February, there were about ten bombings, among 
them an OAS terrorist attack on the Boulogne-sur-Seine home of Andr6  
Malraux, Minister of Culture, whose daughter and former wife had signed 
the "Manifesto of the 121". Minister Malraux lived upstairs, and fortunately 
he was absent that day when the bomb exploded on the ground floor.
As it might be expected, in this difficult situation the French 
government had to protect the well-known intellectual Jean-Paul Sartre by 
sending a police guard after the plastic bomb exploded in his flat. Two 
policemen stood outside the building during the day to save Sartre’s life 
from any terrorist attack. 'We’ve received a request for protection on 
behalf of M. Jean-Paul Sartre"[8 8 ] In spite of this, the danger increased 
for both Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, particularly when her book 
Diamila Bouoacha was published. This directly provoked threatening 
telephone calls. However, on February 1 , 1962, Sartre gave an interview 
to France-Observateur where he asserted:
8 6 . Simone de Beauvoir, Tout Compte Fait. (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 
pp.371-2.
87. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p. 626.
8 8 . Ibid, p. 627.
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We must begin by persuading everyone that the anti-fascist 
resistance opposes us as much to the government as to the 
OAS. Not because, as has been said too frequently, the 
government is fascist, but because it is objectively placed in 
a situation where it favours fascism. [89]
Perhaps Sartre here was harping on the same subject, as earlier as 
Jeanson claimed in April 1960: As for the fifth Republic...we have never 
said and we do not think that it is identical with French fascism. We 
content ourselves with regarding it as the ante-chamber. [90] It should be 
noted that it was exactly the kind of opposition which would hasten De 
Gaulle’s decision to make a peace in Algeria favourable to the FLN, as 
Sartre said in one of his interviews: De Gaulle, the man mandated by the 
army - feels his power over the country slipping away and that is the only 
reason he makes peace propositions to the FLN. [91]
On February 8 , 1962, another anti-OAS demonstration was hastily 
organized to take place at the Bastille. Sartre did not take part in this 
demonstration. The demonstrators were in an angry mood and they were 
chanting "O-A-S. AS-SAS-SINS". The police were nervous and charged the 
crowd when they tried to herd the demonstrators away from the Bastille. 
When the demonstrators attempted to escape into the Charonne metro 
station, the police tore up metal tree guards to throw at them. Eight were 
killed - including three women and a sixteen year old boy, and over 1 0 0  
were wounded. The official sources said that the crowd had "crushed
89. France-Observateur. February 1, 1962.
90. Jeanson in Verite Pour. April 16, 1960.
91. Sartre in an interview in Verrte-Libert6 . 3, July-August, 1960.
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itself". The trade unions organized to make the funerals into a mass 
demonstration. On February 13, all the workers in Paris went on strike for 
a silent demonstration in which Sartre participated as well. A crowd of 
approximately 700,000 converged on the cemetery at PSre-Lachaise. 
Simone de Beauvoir observed to herself: "My God! How I had hated the 
French! I was overwhelmed by this suddenly recovered sense of 
brotherhood".[92] It appeared that what surprised the French people was 
that the crisis of the war in Algeria had reached metropolitan France. 
"Algerie Frangaise" was all but dead - killed by OAS terror. Even the 
supporters of "L’Algerie Frangaise" condemned the horror of OAS 
terrorists. The right-wing French newspapers commented "France Wants 
No More of This".
In Algeria itself, the Algerian people were very relieved to see the 
activities of the OAS terrorists carrying the war to metropolitan France, so 
that the French people should experience how painful and dreadful the 
war was, though the violence of the terror was much greater in the 
Moslem area. But for the GPRA, the year 1962 was probably the most 
dangerous time of the whole war. In his interview with Alistair Horne, the 
President of the GPRA, Youcef Ben-Khedda stated that 1962 was the most 
dangerous time:
...because the union between the OAS and dissident French 
army units was creating so much provocation, in its murders 
and indiscriminate massacres of Muslims, and was 
attempting to get the Muslims to demonstrate, out of control, 
in Algiers. Had they succeeded there would have been an 
appalling massacre. [93]
92. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, p. 631.
93. Quoted in Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 507.
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However, during these seven and a half years of colonial warfare 
the French government attempted to describe the Algerian revolution as 
part of a greater Communist design linked with the Eastern bloc in order 
to conquer the world, as Lenin expected that the road to Paris passed via 
Peking. [94] But the French left saw the implications of the Algerian conflict 
which extended beyond North Africa. Later in 1968, in "Les Communistes 
ont peur de la Revolution", Sartre declared:
When I returned from captivity in 1941, well, it seemed to be 
absolutely normal and easy to raise a resistance. I went to 
find people and said 'We will resist these Germans...etc.", 
and of course the little group that we formed was completely 
torn apart by circumstances and disappeared. It was 
necessary, on the contrary, to adhere to much more 
important groups more concretely based. I give you this as 
an example of the idealist. [95]
Although Sartre’s political attitude towards the Algerian revolution 
was in favour of the struggle of the Algerians after 1956 when he started 
to write on the Algerian problem in his periodical Les Temps Modernes. 
he did not attend the ceremony of Algerian independence either in France 
on July 1, 1962, or in Algeria on July 5, which was the biggest ceremony 
in Algerian history and never forgotten. Firstly, it appeared that Sartre was 
occupied with the "Peace Conference" which was held in Moscow from 9 
to 14 of July where he gave a speech. Secondly, he settled down to work 
on his autobiography which we have seen in the first chapter.
94. Tony Smith, "Idealism and People’s War: Sartre on Algeria". Political 
Theory. VI, 1973, p. 446. See also Ferhat Abbas’ Autopsie d’une 
Guerre, who said that:
Pour just'rfier leurs errements et leur tout incapacite a inventer 
le futur, ces militaires invoquerent a leur tour un autre slogan. 
Ils nous ont colle L’etiquette de "communistes". Ils 
pretendaient que le "Marxisme" menacart L’Algerie et que le 
FLN etait deja acquis au totalitarisme revolutionnaire". p.307.
95. Sartre, "Les Communistes ont peur de la Revolution" (Paris: Editions 
John Didier, 1968), p. 40.
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However, to assess Sartre’s writings and his political activities in the 
struggle of the Algerian people for liberation and independence, it would 
be better to ask ourselves how and why Sartre had developed in his 
political writings on the Algerian War from 1956 to 1962? Did he get any 
benefits from standing beside the Algerians? And what was the reaction 
of his country towards his position on the Algerian revolution? Was he 
really the enemy of France for disobeying the government?
(c) AN ASSESSMENT OF SARTRE’S WRITINGS ON THE ALGERIAN
WAR.
Since the outbreak of the Algerian revolution in November 1954, 
the French intellectuals had been greatly concerned with the present 
troubles and future conditions in Algeria. Indeed, the anti-colonialists wrote 
articles, books and tracts which they distributed in the streets; they spoke 
at meetings, signed request, marched in demonstrations, formed 
committees, and established a clandestine network. Further, they lamented 
the war, attacked the atrocities of the French Army, sought to defend 
various individuals from injustice, and called for negotiations to achieve a 
just solution in Algeria. However, the intellectuals’ proposals for a just 
solution were no more courageous than those of politicians. The only 
outstanding intellectuals who spoke in favour of Algerian independence by 
1955 were the leftist writers of Les Temps Modernes  ^France-Observateur. 
and Esprit. Most of them were threatened with death many times during 
the Algerian War. It should be pointed out that between 1954 and 1963 
about thirty five books were seized, two thirds of them published by 
"Editions de Minuit" or "Maspero". The French government wanted the 
public to believe that the FLN was only a handful of terrorists and that the 
"last quarter of an hour" had come; peace in Algeria could be achieved
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without political negotiations with the Algerian nationalists. In order to 
sustain these beliefs, they had to control the news. [96]
Among these anti-colonialist writers who supported the 
independence of Algeria in their periodical Les Temps Modernes was 
Sartre who provoked the French people to describe him as an enemy of 
France. De Gaulle himself said that Sartre one day would be swept away 
by civil war. Indeed, in the fifth volume of Situations. Sartre brought 
together thirteen pieces written between 1954 and 1963, dealing with the 
problems of colonialism and decolonization. These pieces were drawn 
from prefaces of books, polemical articles and interviews on the Algerian 
problem and French politics. Some of them were probably better 
remarked as documents and were testimonials of Sartre’s courageous 
stand against the policies of successive French governments toward 
Algeria. At a time when the most of the French people and their leaders 
were aiming to avoid seeing the profound moral issues confronting them, 
Sartre’s voice was raised to point out the real problem and to remind 
French people of their own recent experience under the Nazis. During the 
intervention of the Soviet Union in Hungary in 1956, Sartre certainly did 
not abandon his commitment to Marxism and to the left. So, it was natural 
for him during the Algerian War to develop his political theory and 
become once again the conscience and the voice of French 
humanism. [97]
96. Martin Harrison, "Government and Press in France during the 
Algerian War", The American Political Science Review. Vol. LVIII, No. 
2, June 1964, pp. 273-85.
97. See Marc Kravetz, "Sartre et la Guerre d’Algerie", Magazine 
Litteraire. No. 103-104, 1975, pp.58-60.
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it might be considered also that Sartre had committed himself in his 
earlier concept of responsibility when he claimed in Being and 
Nothingness (1943) that the individual is responsible for himself and the 
whole in which he exists because "he is the one by whom it happens that 
there is a world". [98] and therefore his "situation is mine because it is the 
image of my free choice of myself", [99] and "everything that happens to 
me is mine."[100] Moreover, Sartre asserted more clearly the 
responsibility of man in general, when he wrote:
There are no accidents in life; a community event which 
suddenly bursts forth and involves me in it does not come 
from the outside. If I am mobilized in a war, this war is my 
war: it is my image and I deserve it. I deserve it first because 
I could always get out of it by suicide or by desertion; these 
ultimate possibilities are those which must always be present 
for us when there is a question of envisaging a situation. For 
lack of getting out of it, I have chosen it. This can be due 
to inertia, to cowardice in the face of public opinion, or 
because I prefer certain other values to the value of the 
refusal to join in the war. Anyway you look at it, it is a 
matter of a choice. This choice will be repeated later on 
again and again without a break until the end of the war...lf 
therefore I have preferred war to death or to dishonour, 
everything takes place as if I bore the entire responsibility for 
this war. [1 0 1 ]
As it appears from this quotation, Sartre’s commitment to his political
98. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 553.
99. Ibid, p. 554.
100. Ibid, p. 554.
101. Ibid, p. 555.
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theory is consistent with his writings on the Algerian revolution. In the 
above passage, man has chosen war, accordingly, because he has taken 
part in it, and further he bears the responsibility for it because, as Sartre 
put it:
I can no longer distinguish at present the choice which I 
make of myself from the choice which I make of the war...In 
this war which I have chosen I choose myself from day to 
day, and I make it mine by making myself. [1 0 2 ]
In Sartre’s view, by accepting himself as being part of the situation of war, 
and by making that situation exist for him as an individual; he is 
responsible for that situation. As he later declared in one of his interviews:
Whenever I committed myself in one way or another to 
politics and carried out an action, I never abandoned the 
idea of freedom. On the contrary, everytime I acted I felt 
free. I’ve never belonged to a party...Take my attitude during 
the Algerian War, for example. That was the time at which 
I separated myself from the Communist Party because the 
party and we did not want exactly the same thing. The party 
did envisage the independence of Algeria but only as one 
possibility among others, whereas we agreed with the FLN 
in calling for that independence in the immediate future. We 
and the Communists came together again to some extent in 
order to try to set up an anti-OAS group. [103]
It should be noted that was the time at which it was original
102. Ibid, p. 555.
103. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p. 367.
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freedom that made Sartre at sixteen look upon colonialism as anti-human 
brutality, and also, as an action that destroyed men for the purpose of 
material interests and well being. This freedom which made him a man, 
made colonialism something abject. Later, when Sartre visited Brazil he 
gave a talk about "the freedom of the Algerian people" and he claimed 
that he had found the connection between freedom, his freedom, freedom 
as an end in itself, "and the exercise of freedom against anything that 
might interfere with it, that is, the action of other men". [104] It was 
therefore a question of presenting "the freedom of the Algerian people" as 
the greatest and absolute end. The war was an attempt to prevent 
human beings from liberating themselves.
In 1956, Sartre’s political writings become involved in the Algerian 
War, as he distinguished in "Le Colonialisme est un Systeme" the wealthy 
Europeans in Algeria from "Je n’appelle colons ni les petits fonctionnaires, 
ni les ouvriers europeens a la fois victimes et profiteurs innocents du 
regime.[105] But in 1957, he said quite shortly: "...there are neither good 
nor bad colonialists: there are colonialists".[106] And by 1959, he had 
decided that the economic exploitation of the Algerians is so intense that 
they can hope for no allies among the "pied-noir", as he emphasized that:
This agricultural lumpenprolertariat can not even count on an 
alliance with least favoured Europeans: Everyone lives off 
him, including the "little settlers" that the great landlords 
exploit but who, compared to the Algerians, are still 
privileged. [107]
104. Ibid, p. 368.
105. Sartre, "Le colonialisme est un systeme", Les Temps Modernes. 
No.123, 1956, p. 1372.
106. Sartre in his preface to Albert Memmi’s The Colonizer and the 
Colonized. Translated by Howard Greenfeld (Montreal: A Condor 
Book, 1963), p.xxv.
107. Sartre, in Verite Pour. June 1959.
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As might be expected, every aspect of native misery in Algeria Sartre 
linked directly to colonial rule, as he said: "It was absolutely necessary 
that the misery of the Algerian increased"[108]
When Sartre recognized that the Algerian problem was not just the 
economic rewards as he saw it in "Le colonialisme est un systeme", he 
declared that:
Ainsi I’explortation met I’exploiteur dans la dependance de 
I’exploite. Et, sur un autre plan, cette dependance est au 
coeur du racisme, c’est sa contradiction profonde et son 
aigre malheur: etre homme, pour I’Europeen d’Alger, c’est 
d’abord etre superieur au Musulman.
Mais si le Musulman s’affirme a son tour comme un homme, 
comme I’egal du Colon? En bien, le colon est entame dans 
son etre, il se sent diminue, devalorise: I’accession des "bou- 
gnoules" au monde humain, il n’en voit pas seulement les 
consequences 6 conomiques, il I’abomine parce qu’elle lui 
annonce, sa d£ch£ance personnelle. Dans sa fureur, il lui 
arrive de rever au genocide. [109]
In addition to his writings on the social and political economy of 
French colonialism in Algeria, Sartre attacked the atrocities of the French 
Army for using torture (the word which had been familiar to the French 
people for seven and a half years^ . In "Line Victoire" (1958), Sartre 
condemned the French "Gestapo" for torturing the Algerian people and he 
reminded Frenchmen that they were in 1943 screaming in agony and pain 
under the Nazis. In 1958, Algerians were tortured regularly and 
systematically in their name. In acknowledging French hypocrisy, Sartre 
wrote:
108. Ibid.
109. Sartre, "Une Victoire", Situations. V. pp.85-6.
259
Plonges dans la stupeur, les Frangais decouvrent cette 
Evidence terrible: si rien ne protege une nation contre elle - 
meme, ni son pass&, ni ses fid&lit&s, ni ses propres 
lois,...[1 1 0 ]
It should be pointed out that in the period intervening between 
1957 and 1959 much of Sartre’s writing focused on the aspect of torture. 
In 1959, Sartre became more aware about the tortured Algerians and he 
developed his political thought in order to condemn French policy in 
Algeria and he wrote The Condemned of Altona. and the great argument 
of this play was "sequestration". This "sequestration" remained, however, 
a poor substitute for reality. But Sartre did not want to discuss the play 
as it might be expected, he wanted to write about French torture in 
Algeria as we have seen in the third chapter. He chose to set his play in 
Germany instead of Algeria in order to avoid any French suspicions, as 
he affirmed later in one of his interviews: Yes. After all, no one is going 
to contradict me if I say the Nazis committed torture. [111]
For Sartre, the hero Frantz is France in The Condemned of Altona. 
Of course, Sartre is not talking about Germany in his writing at all, but 
about his own country. So, France is a torturer. France is herself a war 
criminal, as guilty as any sentenced at Nuremberg. Her crime is the crime 
of torture. It is therefore, actually, to escape her own conscience that 
France has become a "sequestre". France’s life would become apparent 
to her, which is memories of war - real memories. Indeed, truth and reality 
for France were torture, and the rest was unstable and camouflage. Thus, 
Frantz, was unable to redeem himself and he ends in suicide. One might 
say that Frantz was a good man because he committed suicide, as the
110. Ibid, p. 73.
111. An interview with Jean-Paul Sartre by Orest F. Pucciani, The Tulane 
Drama Review. Vol. 5, 1960-61, p.14.
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critics of the play thought of the authentic act which Frantz or his 
father can perform. Later, Sartre responded:
yes...he committed suicide. Actually the terms "good" and 
"bad" have no meaning in history. The more one goes 
along, the more feels one the "good" were "bad". It is a sort 
of mystification. The terms really mean nothing. There is no 
justice in history. Frantz (France) comes to face what he 
(she) has done; so does his (her) father. They have to 
commit suicide. [1 1 2 ]
In order to assess Sartre’s writings on the Algerian revolution it will 
be better to discuss his political activities which are in favour of the 
Algerian people, since the fight against colonialism is a basic part of the 
Marxist "project". Sartre played an admirable role in the struggle against 
General De Gaulle and on behalf of the Algerians. Indeed, towards the 
end of the fifties Sartre became an anti-Gaullist, though he wrote a pro- 
Gaullist article in 1945 when De Gaulle visited the United States for the 
first time. As De Gaulle came back to power in 1958, Sartre began his 
attack in an article for L’Express entitled "Le Pr6 tendant" (The Pretender). 
He proclaimed:
...I’Armee n’obeit qu’a elle-meme et le pays ob6 it a 
l’Armee.[113]
Then, he went further, wondering:
Et s’il les avait, Charles de Gaulle, ces pouvoirs 
exceptionnels, qu’en ferait-il? Quels sont ses projets?...la 
solitude de cet homme enferm& dans sa grandeur lui interdit, 
en tout etat de cause, de devenir le chef d’un Etat
112. Ibid, pp.14-5.
113. Sartre, Situations V. p. 98.
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republican. Ou ce qui revient au meme, interdit a I’Etat 
dont il sera le chef de demeurer une Republique.[114]
As Sartre became anti-Gaullist more than ever, he campaigned 
against his policies in 1958. He detested De Gaulle’s notion of personal 
power and completely disagreed with his "grandeur". Sartre responded to 
the referendum of September 1958, by "no". In "Les Grenouilles qui 
demandent un Roi" (The Frogs Who Want a King), Sartre concluded his 
tirade against the return of the "constitutional monarch" with an 
exhortation:
Comprenons enfin qu’on ne tire pas un pays de son 
impuissance en confiant la toute - puissance a un seul 
homme..."Oui" c’est le reve; "non" c’est le reveil. II est temps 
de savoir si nous voulons nous lever ou nous coucher. 
(Undoubtedly, De Gaulle won a massive majority).[115]
But De Gaulle ignored him until Sartre became one of the first to 
sign the "Manifesto of the 121". De Gaulle started to defend his policies 
and blaming those who became anti-government. In Paris-Jour. (October 
2, 1960), De Gaulle announced that: "Je pardonne & Voltaire, mais pas 
aux serviteurs de I’Etat". (I Forgive Voltaire, But Not Civil Servants). It 
should be pointed out that this Gaullist gesture of appeasement, was one 
of the first steps in the canonization of Sartre. But later De Gaulle thought 
that Sartre was a "Great Sorcerer" who will be swept away by Civil War; 
"we’ll have to fight or rot", [116] although he had protected Sartre and 
put him into the category of citizens whom the law could not touch; the 
intellectuals. [117]
114. Ibid, pp.99-100.
115. Ibid, p. 144.
116. Time. January 5, 1962, p.17.
117. Annie Cohen-Solal, Sartre: A Life, p. 426.
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Between 1956 and 1959, one may say that Sartre was supporting 
the struggle of the Algerian people for their independence and liberation 
by writings on the outcome of the revolution. But when Francis Jeanson 
was perfectly aware of how desirable and useful to have the well known 
intellectual, Sartre, on his side, he wrote:
...I’impatience ou j’etais de retrouver cet homme, de me 
confronter a lui de nouveau, me souffla ce bel argument: je 
n’avais pas "le droit" d’interposer, entre la cause que nous 
servions et i’un de ceux qui etaient le plus en mesure de la 
soutenir, je ne sais quels scrupuls qui ne regardaient que 
moi. Nous avions besoin de Sartre: je devais m’adresser & 
lui, tant pis pour moi s’il m’envoyait au diable.[118]
Indeed the intellectual was ready to move in his direction and he declared
that:
"Vous savez, je suis cent pour cent d’accord avec Taction 
que vous poursuivez. Utilisez - moi comme vous le pourrez: 
j’ai des amis, aussi, qui ne demandent pas mieux que de se 
mettre a votre disposition; dites-moi de quoi vous avez 
besoin".[119]
it should be noted that between 1956 and 1959, Sartre did not 
have much contact with the FLN’s members, only in meetings and 
exchanging letters with the Algerian elites. Among the Algerian elite who 
supported Sartre for his political writings on the Algerian revolution was 
M’Hamed Aoune (member of the former party PPA in 1945 and the FLN 
latter), poetry writer. Aoune had written personally a letter to Sartre 
supporting his writings and political activities on the Algerian 
revolution. [120] For the Algerians, Sartre on one’s side meant a hundred
118. Francis Jeanson, Sartre dans sa Vie, p. 214.
119. Ibid, p. 214.
120. M’Hamed Aoune, "La Plume et la Prob'rtS", Actualite: Alaerie. No. 
1159, December-January 1988, p.38.
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thousand French supporters on the Algerian side. Sartre, now has 
developed his political theory from writings to acting on the struggle of the 
Algerian people. Since he offered his active support to the Jeanson 
network, he started to meet with the FLN representatives not only in 
France but also abroad. During his trip to Brazil, Sartre met the 
representative of the GPFIA, as he said later: 'Together, we discussed pro- 
Algerian propaganda. We were in perfect agreement".[121] Indeed later 
Ali Haroun, the FLN member in France confirmed that:
Dans le monde entier I’opinion publique de gauche s’6 meut 
du Bresil ou ils se trouvaient, parvient signe de Jean-Paul 
Sartre et Simone de Beauvoir...Un appel est lance aux 
intellectuels, aux dirigeants ouvriers et etudiants "pour la 
sauvegarde de la dignite humaine, du droit des hommes a 
lutter pour leur ideal, du droit du peuple Algerien a compter 
sur I’aide active de tous les militants de gauche". [122]
Further, in Rio de Janeiro, Sartre insisted on the same point: 
Algeria...lndependence. Self-determination might yet be the best means to 
solve the problem, but only on condition that the FLN be given real 
guarantees.[123] The support for the Algerian people’s struggle for 
independence on the part of the majority of the South American 
population pushed even further the parallel between the Algerian and 
Cuban situations; Sartre added his view in Le Monde:
This is why I, a Frenchman, tell you about a national flaw we 
have no right to hide. If we, old Europeans want to remain
121. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux. A Farewell to Sartre, p. 368.
122. Ali Haroun, La 7* Wilava: La Guerre du FLN en France 1954-1962. 
p.342.
123. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, p. 369.
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the friends to young nations, we must recover our 
internationalist tradition, whereas underdeveloped countries 
can only grow by relying on and affirming their own 
nationalism. [124]
On December 13, 1961, Sartre attended a meeting for Algerian 
independence, which had been organized by Tayeb Boulahrouf, the FLN’s 
representative in Rome. Indeed, this meeting turned the French Press 
against Sartre, by insulting and described him as an enemy of 
France.[125] Moreover, in March 1962, Sartre gave a speech at a factory 
building in a room containing an audience of six thousand on "Algeria and 
Fascism" in Brussels.
Between 1960 and 1962, Sartre’s writings and political activities on 
behalf of the Algerians increased greatly. Indeed the political position that 
he had adopted about the Algerian revolution brought him sympathisers 
from all over the world. At the beginning of the 1960s, in the political 
development and in the movements that kept developing throughout 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, Sartre’s thought was perceived as a 
theoretical foundation, because of his positive attitude towards the Algerian 
War. In his preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. Sartre 
proclaimed his passionate solidarity not only with Algerians but with all 
revolutionaries throughout the Third World and he wrote:
We know that it is not a homogeneous world; we know too 
that enslaved peoples are still to be found there, together 
with some who have achieved a simulacrum of phoney 
independence, others who are still fighting to attain 
sovereignty and others again who have obtained complete 
freedom but who live under the constant menace of
124. Quoted in Le Monde. September 1, 1960.
125. Pierre Herve, "Ce qui fait delirer Sartre". Le Nouveau Candide. 
December 29, 1961.
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imperialist aggression. These differences are born of colonial 
history, in other words of oppression. Here, the mother 
country is satisfied to keep some feudal rulers in her pay; 
there, dividing and ruling she has created a native 
bourgeoisie, sham from beginning to end; elsewhere she has 
played a double game: the colony is planted with settlers 
and exploited at the same time...[126]
Sartre’s powerful, violent essay established him as one who 
responded to the violence of the FLN. French colonialism entered Algeria 
through torture, the indiscriminate killing of people, and shooting for "fun". 
It had to be deported by violence. He responded to the FLN’s principle:
To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one 
stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses 
at the same time: there remain a dead man, and a free 
man... [127]
For Sartre, all the French people are exploiters and he strongly insisted:
...by this mad fury, by this bitterness and spleen, by their 
ever-present desire to kill us, by the permanent tensing of 
powerful muscles which are afraid to relax, they have 
become men: men because of the settlers (the French 
oppressor) who wants to make beasts of burden of them - 
because of him, and against him. [128]
Indeed by revealing this truth, Sartre identified a new reality in the world; 
"...in the past we made history and now it is being made of us".[129]
126. Sartre in his preface to Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. 
pp.9-10.
127. Ibid, p. 19.
128. Ibid, p.15.
129. Ibid. p.23.
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As might be expected, Sartre’s political writings on the Algerian 
revolution have been the subject of many critical discussions even by the 
new Algerian generation. In his book, L’Alq6 rie en Armes. Slimane Chikh 
criticized Sartre’s preface to Fanon and he wrote that this atmosphere 
described by Sartre and which emerges from a reading of Fanon is the 
same as can be found in Algeria during the revolution for national 
liberation, at night in "maquis" around a mysterious camp fire, or in town 
in a clandestine cell where the execution of the colonizer and the 
destruction of his universe are whispered. While this atmosphere of 
exclusion implies per se a fundamental exclusion of the "other", the "other" 
is still present though excluded because he is interiorized; and finally, if 
the "zombies" (Algerians) change camps, this transfer is not as automatic 
as Sartre would seem to suggest. Furthermore, the sheer fact of reducing 
the other to a "zombie", or rather of limiting it to an act of negation and 
otherness reveals the implied presence of the "zombie" itself. [130] 
However, it seems that Chikh misunderstood Sartre’s philosophy, 
particularly on the Algerian War, because Sartre developed his political 
writings on the Algerian revolution from the evolution of the working class 
and he used the terms used by the French Army like "zombies" and "rats", 
which are familiar to the supporters of "L’Alg6 rie Frangaise" to reveal its 
racism and barbarism.
It should be noted that when Sartre decided to commit himself to 
Jeanson’s network in order to become anti-Gaullist; he continued his
130. Slimane Chikh, L’Alqerie en Armes (Paris: Economica, 1981), p.16. 
It should be pointed out that Slimane Chikh’s father Mofdi Zekaria 
is a famous poet in Algeria and the Arab world. He wrote 
"Quassaman", the national anthem of Algeria and the author 
dedicated his book to his father and "Quassaman".
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political activities, against the French government, until the independence 
of Algeria on July 5, 1962. Although the right-wing extremists against his 
position on the Algerian revolution, attempted to kill him, while he did not 
give up his support to the FLN. He took part in many political activities in 
favour of the Algerians. In September 1960, Sartre was one of the first 
signatories of the "Manifesto of the 121". In November 1961, he attended 
a silent demonstrations against racism and fascism, and also he 
participated in other anti-OAS demonstrations. On December 19, he took 
part in a particularly violent demonstration on the "Place de la Bastille". On 
February 13, 1962, he marched in a demonstration in order to protest at 
the police massacre that had taken place a few days earlier in the 
Charone Metro Station. Further, he attended different meetings in Paris 
and Rome and he explained his attitude towards the Algerian revolution 
in press conferences. He gave many talks on the freedom of the Algerian 
people not only in France but also abroad. Furthermore, he was one of 
the defence witnesses at the trials of Ben-Saddok in December 1957 and 
of Georges Arnaud in June 1960, and others. Thus he testified at the 
trials of Algerian and pro-Algerian militants and he struggled in order to 
build anti-war and anti-De Gaulle coalitions. Indeed 'The Algerian War was 
his war", [131] said Cohen-Solal. As one of the defence lawyers of 
"Jeanson network" Roland Dumas commented twenty-five years later:
The Spanish Civil War passed Sartre by, as did the Popular 
Front. The Resistance? Yes, but so little...He missed all the 
important political events of his time except the Algerian War, 
which was, in a way, the meeting of a great cause and a 
great personality. [132]
131. Annie Cohen-Solal, Sartre: A Life, p.440.
132. Quoted in Ibid, pp.440-1.
268
But the reaction of the French extremists to Sartre was anger. 
Since the Autumn of 1960 everyone in France, who was concerned about 
the Algerian revolution seemed to be taking stances, either pro-Sartrean 
or anti-Sartrean. As he was one of the first to sign the "Manifesto of the 
121", the French people focused many of its tensions on Sartre, who 
served as a "scapegoat" for some people, particularly the OAS terror, and 
a symbolic shield for others. For the opposition, Sartre had gone too far 
in supporting the Algerians instead of his own people. As Andr6  Brissaud, 
the right-wing journalist of Le Figaro wrote:
The real France must be crushed so that there will be victory 
for the Sartrean France, the revolutionary idea of France that 
M. Jean-Paul Sartre has substituted for France, and which 
he prefers to France. In this Sartrean France, in this France 
of "thinking individuals", it is the FLN that is the true army, 
while the French army becomes the hated, unpardonable 
enemy, something like the inheritor of Hitler’s army of the 
1940s.[133]
Since then Sartre became "untouchable". Threatening telephone 
calls and letters became a daily experience, even the insulting turned out 
to be normal, particularly in public places. Thus, he was one of the first 
targets of the OAS attacks. For the OAS, to kill Sartre, meant to destroy 
the ambition of the French left which claimed that the victory of the FLN 
would be the victory of the French left. Also, the offices of his periodical, 
Les Temps Modernes. were attacked on May 13, 1961 by the OAS. [134] 
Nevertheless, the newspaper Reforme, in an article titled "Le Temps des 
Militants", (The Era of Militants), argued that:
133. Le Figaro. September 30, 1960.
134. See A.A. Fatouros, "Sartre on Colonialism", World Politics. XVII, 
No. 4., July, 1965,pp. 703-19.
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La reflexion de Sartre merite d’etre entendue. Jl ne veut pas 
que les evenements actuels le rejettent une fois de plus du 
cote de la gauche respectueuse: il pense que le temps de 
prendre des risques est venu. II recommande au jeunes 
I’insoumission, il se range aux cotes des nationalistes 
Algeriens qui luttent pour I’independance de leur pays. II ne 
nous appartient pas de juger Jean-Paul Sartre, mais de le 
comorendre. r 1351
In supporting freedom of speech, Andre Malraux said that it would be: 
"better to let Sartre shout ’long live FLN’ in the Place de la Concorde than 
arrest him and embarrass ourselves. [136]
Up to this point one may say that is Sartre the enemy of France as 
the right-wing extremists described him? Certainly not. Firstly, he 
committed himself to his freedom of choice and responsibility, which is the 
foundation of his thought. As he asserted earlier:
When we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not 
mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but 
that he is responsible for all men...(and) when we say that 
man chooses himself, we do mean that everyone of us must 
choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing 
for himself he chooses for all men...What we choose is 
always the better; and nothing can be better for us unless 
it is better for all. [137]
Indeed if France chooses to be free from the Nazi occupation she must 
recognize the choice of Algeria in order to be free. Secondly, Sartre 
described the Nazi occupation in a manner which clearly illustrates this 
way of thinking and reminded the French of people who were in the same 
situation as theirs:
135. Reforme. October 1, 1960.
136. Quoted in Annie Cohen-Salal, Sartre: A Life, p.425.
137. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, p.29.
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Jamais nous n’avons ete plus libres que sous Poccupation 
allemande. Nous avions perdu tous nos droits et d’abord 
celui de parler;...Et le choix que chacun faisait de lui - m§me 
etait authentique puisqu’il se faisait en presence de la 
mort,...[138]
The FLN never denied the struggle of Left-wings not only in France 
but also the Western countries for helping the Algerians in order to obtain 
their freedom. Ferhat Abbas in his part stated that:
"Des hommes rompent la ‘politique du silence* et 
desavouent...prennent partie et protestent contre la guerre 
menee en Algerie. Ms pr£conisent la negotiation et la 
paix...Des journalistes, malgre les dangers qui pesent sur 
eux, mettent leur plume au service de I’Algerie et plaident 
pour la decolonization". [139]
Most of the anti-colonialist intellectuals were given a job after Algerian 
independence. Among those intellectuals was Francis Jeanson who had 
a job in Algiers, as an adviser of the social sciences section in the Ministry 
of Education.[140] But Sartre was considered by the Algerians as one 
who was actively involved in the debates over decolonization and also the 
one who was standing beside them in their struggle not only by writing 
and attacking French atrocities but also by acting and participating in 
political events since 1956. In Algeria today most of Sartre’s works have 
been translated from French into Arabic, particularly the work on Algeria. 
For instance, "Une Victoire" (A Victory) has been translated to "Our 
Infamy in Algeria". The title is the meaning of the whole Sartre’s essay.
138. Sartre, Situations III, p.11-2. (It should be pointed out that this 
quotation has been referred to in Chapter One).
139. Ferhat Abbas, Autopsie D’une Guerre, pp. 189-9.
140. Francis Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality. p.xxiii.
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Between 1962 and 1964, Sartre became famous throughout the 
world; as the man of scandal, man of wisdom, man of freedom and the 
man of truth. On October 22, 1964, during the independence of Algeria, 
Dr. A. Osterling, a member of the Swedish Academy, made the following 
announcement:
The Nobel Prize has been awarded this year to the French 
writer Jean-Paul Sartre for his work, which, in the spirit of 
freedom and in the name of truth, has had a great impact 
on our era.[141]
But Sartre refused to accept it as he stated:
Je regrette vivement. Jes raisons pour lesquelles je renonce 
aux prix ne concernent ni l’Acad6 mie suedoise, ni le prix 
Nobel en lui-meme, comme je Fai expliquS dans ma lettre h
I’Academie. J’y ai invoque deux sortes de raisons: des
raisons personnelles et des raisons objectives...mon refus 
n’est pas un acte improvise,...[142]
At this stage of rejecting the Nobel Prize, one can draw two main reasons 
for Sartre’s explanation to the Swedish Academy. Firstly, in refusing the 
Prize, Sartre was insisting on his need to remain independent, as he
claimed: "L’ecrivain doit done refuser de se laisser transformer en
institution..."[143] Also he thought that what was important was what the 
writer said, not who he was, as he affirmed that:
141. Nobel Academy Archives, Stockholm, courtesy of Carl-Gustav
Bjurstrom. Quoted in Annie Cohen-Salal, Sartre: A Life, p.446.
142. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, Les Ecrits de Sartre:
Chronoloaie. Biblioaraphie Commentee (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), 
p. 402.
143. Ibid, p. 403.
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Je veux etre lu par des gens qui ont envie de lire mes livres. 
Pas par des collectionneurs de c£lebrites...Un 6 crivain doit 
vivre dans sa verity. [144]
Secondly, Sartre’s reason for refusing the Nobel Prize was that it had 
been awarded in the context of the Cold War as he asserted:
...dans la situation actuelle, le prix Nobel se pr£sente 
objectivement comme une distinction reservee aux ecrivains 
de I’Ouest ou aux rebelles de l’Est...Je ne veux pas dire par 
la que le prix Nobel sort un prix "bourgeois" [145]
As it appeared in the second reason Sartre would have been glad to 
receive the Prize during the Algerian War for:
Pendant la guerre d’Algerie, alors que nous avions signe la 
"declaration des 1 2 1 ", j’aurais accept^ le prix avec 
reconnaissance, parce qu’il n’aurait pas honore que moi, 
mais aussi la liberte pour laquelle nous luttions. Mai cela n’a 
pas eu lieu et ce n’est qu’ apres la fin des combats que Ton 
me decerne le prix. [146]
Up to this point, as we have seen in this thesis, Sartre’s writings 
and political activities on the Algerian conflict reveal that his attitude 
towards the Algerian War had gradually developed between 1956 and 
1962, though the Algerian revolution had started earlier in November 1954.
To assess Sartre’s position on the Algerian revolution it will be 
useful to sum up his view in the following points:
144. Ibid, p. 405.
145. Ibid, p. 403-4.
146. Ibid, p. 403-4.
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After the Algerian problem came to prominence in French politics 
in 1956, Sartre condemned France for using the nineteenth-century 
economic machinery of colonial exploitation. He said that the only 
possibility of action was to support the Algerian fight against 
tyranny, and also against what he called "neo-colonialist 
mystification". However, Sartre did become involved on the Algerian 
War in 1956, and he decided to be on the side of the Algerians, 
perhaps because of his imprisonment during the Second World 
War.
The second stage of the development of Sartre’s attitude towards 
the Algeria revolution is seen in his writings on the torture of 
Algerians in 1958, revealing the truth and reminding the French of 
the Second World War:
...s’il suffit de quinze ans pour changer en bourreaux les 
victimes, c’est que I’occasion decide seul: selon I’occasion, 
n’importe qui, n’importe quand, deviendra victime ou 
bourreau.[147]
In 1959, Sartre was more aware of the torture in Algeria and had 
gradually developed his attitude towards the Algerian question by 
writing The Condemned of Altona which was designed to call 
attention to the torture, then being perpetrated by the French in 
Algeria. Indeed Sartre characterized the hero Frantz as France 
whose crimes were so great that they must be hidden in "madness" 
and so "limitless" that Sartre must expose them through images of 
Nazi Germany. Later Sartre claimed in one of his interviews:
Sartre, "Line Victoire", Situations. V. p. 73.
But that’s not the only reason. For though we are not 
Germans, though our problems are different from theirs 
under Nazism, there are very special relations between the 
Germans and us. We were once in exactly the same position 
with respect to them as the Algerians are with respect to us 
today. [148]
3. In writing and acting on behalf of the Algerians, Sartre declared his 
full support for the FLN in 1960. He was one of the first to sign the 
"Manifesto of the 121" and he took action by confirming his "total 
solidarity" with Jeanson’s network, as he asserted:
Si Jeanson m’avait demande de porter des valises ou 
d’heberger des militants Algeriens, et que j’aie pu le faire 
sans risque pour eux, je I’aurais fait sans hesitation. [149]
This declaration proved that Sartre took an increasingly militant 
position on Algeria. From then on, he strove against French 
atrocities and the De Gaulle government. In this way, he put himself 
in danger and became one of the French terrorist’s targets.
4. Towards the end of the Algerian revolution, Sartre apprehended 
that he was indeed fighting for the freedom of the Algerians and he 
perceived that his "freedom is the freedom of others", that his 
theory had become his practice. In defending the Algerians and 
attacking the French, Sartre wrote: 'We are chained, humiliated, sick 
with fear; we are at our lowest ebb". [150]
148. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, Sartre on Theatre, p. 255.
149. Francis Jeanson, Sartre dans sa Vie, p. 217.
150. Sartre in his preface to Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.25.
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And he went further, arguing: On which side are the savages? On 
which side is barbarism?...7Tiey are now on the French side!!![151] 
The development of Sartre’s attitude towards the Algerian revolution 
in the early 1960s is revealed not only by his political writings but 
also by his actions in attending demonstrations.
5. If one assesses Sartre’s attitude towards the Algerian revolution, 
one will find that Sartre’s political writings in 1956 were concerned 
only with the structure of the social and political economy. But 
between 1957 and 1959, his writings became more involved with 
torture from 1960 to 1962, Sartre’s writings and political activities 
became stronger and more violent.
151. Ibid, p. 24.
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CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to discuss Jean-Paul Sartre’s writings on 
the Algerian revolution. It has shown the philosopher of high intellectual 
standing who was actively and practically involved in the Algerian problem. 
In my discussion, it has been repeatedly insisted that Sartre’s writings and 
political activities are in favour of the struggle of the Algerian people, since 
he committed himself to stand on their side in 1956, and strongly attacked 
French colonialism in Algeria, although he did not call for the complete 
independence of Algeria at the end of the Second World War nor did he 
support the FLN’s actions until January 1956. Perhaps he was like all the 
leftist intellectuals, particularly the writers of Les Temps Modernes. who 
were supporting the French Communist Party and the Soviet Union after 
the Second World War and before the outbreak of the Algerian revolution.
As the outbreak of the Algerian revolution which started in 
November 1954 and the emergence of the FLN’s organization have been 
the subject of many critical discussions, I have attempted to show logically 
and objectively how the organized revolution started against the 
oppression. Indeed the French colonialists did not understand the social 
and political economy of Algeria until the native population turned against 
them. Violence in some way must have a goal. Since the beginning of 
the 1950s, Algerians have believed that the only language which could be 
used against colonialism is violence. The use of violence will force the 
oppressors to recognize your existence. In defending the use of violence 
in the early 1960s, Sartre emphasized that violence was the only cure for 
"colonial neurosis" and the only way to destroy the colonial regime.
My aim in this work was to prove not only to the Algerians but
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also to Left-wing people everywhere that the political writings of the 
French anti-colonialist intellectuals supported the struggles of the Algerian 
people for independence and liberation in many ways. Among them 
certainly was Sartre who developed his social and political freedom after 
the Second World War and his ideas were transformed into a new political 
commitment. Indeed in the development of Sartre’s thought there is an 
important element which has alienated him from his earlier self and from 
his earlier political writings, this is the idea of freedom. It is this idea of 
freedom which prevented Sartre from joining the French Communist Party 
during his period of political commitment. It is, also, this freedom which 
has obliged him to defend the freedom of others and prevented him from 
becoming a determinist. This is how we must understand the 
development of Sartre’s thought. Thus, to ignore Sartre’s writings on and 
political activities during the Algerian revolution would be unjust, and to 
accept them would be to appreciate the attitude of an unusual man, as 
he described himself later:
II a vecu jusqu’au bout une condition impossible: fuyant et 
cherchant la solitude, vivant pour mourir et mourant pour 
vivre, convaincu de la vanity de Taction et de sa necessity, 
tentant de justifier son entreprise en lui assignant un but 
auquel il ne croya'rt pas, recherchant la totale objectivity du 
resultat pour la dileur dans une absolue subjectivity, voulant 
I’echec qu’il refusait, refusant la victoire qu’il souhaitait, 
voulant construire sa vie comme un destin et ne se plaisant 
qu’aux moments infinitesimaux qui separent la vie de la 
mort...Mieux encore: il prouve que c’est cette impossibility 
d’etre qui est la condition de son existence et que Thomme 
existe parce qu’il est impossible. [1]
1. Sartre, Situations. VI. (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), pp.20-1.
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My conclusion is both negative and positive. It is negative in that 
Sartre’s writings on and political activities during, the Algerian revolution 
are dismissed, particularly by Algerian investigators who are concerned 
with the French intellectuals who supported their freedom. To this extent 
I agree with most of those who have attempted to elucidate the political 
writings of the French anti-colonialist intellectuals toward the struggle of 
the Algerian people. The victory of the FLN was the victory of the French 
left. In my previous discussions I have tried to show the participation of 
the French intellectuals who were close to Sartre in taking part on the 
Algerian War. On the other hand, the gradual development of Sartre’s 
position on the Algerian revolution is totally consistent with his theory of 
freedom for which he had been fighting since the Second World War. It 
seems that he is right when he said: "Dire la Verite. C’est le reve de tout 
ycrivain vieillissanf.p] However, I would like to suggest to those who wish 
to study the French intellectuals and the Algerian War, that they should 
concentrate on the attitude of the French Marxists toward the Algerian 
revolution.
2. Sartre, Situations. IX. (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), p.11.
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